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This thesis examines the development of the Copyright Hub, an emerging infrastructural 
initiative, designed to streamline the processes of expressing, identifying and communicating 
Intellectual Property (IP) rights information, especially copyright licensing, across sectors of 
the creative industries. 
The study highlights the origins of the Copyright Hub and the provision of public support for 
its R&D as a product of divergent pressures: the creative industries sought government action 
to redress their concerns about difficulties in enforcing copyright in a digital world; 
government sought to stimulate the economy through fostering sustainable digital 
industries. The project however did not fulfil its promise of enabling the innovation of new 
market infrastructures for trading copyright-protected content. 
To go beyond prevalent snapshot studies of innovation, this research draws upon the 
Biographies of Artifacts and Practices (BOAP) approach, which informs the methodological 
choice of multi-site, longitudinal fieldwork. A rich account of the unfolding of a field of 
innovation is provided, combining archival and contemporary ethnographic sources. 
The analysis applies concepts from the sociology of expectations (and in particular ‘arenas of 
expectations’) to understand the process by which visions and expectations are mobilised to 
accumulate public and private funding and support, as well as understanding the dynamics 
of development of the Copyright Hub project. These notions are complemented by Abbott’s 
concept of “linked ecologies”, which helps in scrutinising the interrelation of actors within 
the policy-making ecology and its neighbouring ecologies of business and IP standard 
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development. In addition, Abbott’s discussion on “things of boundaries” provides a helpful 
template for conceptualising the processes through which protected spaces are constructed. 
The thesis makes three main contributions to knowledge. 
1. It provides a rich, empirical description of the Copyright Hub initiative from its embryonic 
stages when novel ideas are being formed, new alliances are being made, and resources 
are mobilised to build a protected space for innovation development. In addition to high 
expectations, this research managed to capture and portray how ‘low’ and ‘slow’ 
expectations can help in propelling the Copyright Hub project by (a) ensuring existing 
market actors that the new initiative would not cannibalise their commercial interests, 
and (b) providing for stability in policy making which counter-balanced the rapid re-
bundling of policy issues around IP. The substantive area of developing digital 
infrastructures for IP licensing and management is per se of wider interest to policy 
makers, creative industries and scholars of innovation studies. 
2. It contributes to the sociology of expectations by furthering our understanding of “arenas 
of expectations” as the battleground where adjacent ecologies meet in search of alliances, 
resources and support. Policy makers, businesses and infrastructure entrepreneurs do not 
compete alone, but rather in alliance, and thus any successful strategy must provide “dual 
rewards” for members of the alliance in both ecologies at once. For example, the 
Copyright Hub successfully acted as a “hinge”, which helped the UK creative industries 
prevent further copyright exceptions being imposed upon them, while allowing the 
government to fight off criticism of the dearth of visions and policies for long-term 
economic growth. Similarly, arenas of expectations are not isolated phenomena, but they 
are linked together through members of an alliance in its overall struggle for power. 
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3. It helps in reconceptualising “protected spaces”. The protected space for the 
development of the Copyright Hub’s technology was established through explicit act of 
various actors yoking together three “sites of differences”: the Copyright Hub Ltd., the 
Digital Catapult, and the Linked Content Coalition. These sites of differences brought with 
them constraints, preferences, and vested interests into the development process and 
played a crucial role in shaping the innovation’s trajectory. When the interest needed to 
hold these social boundaries in place was no longer adequate, the protected space would 
be dissolved. Yet, elements of such spaces do not completely disappear but morph, 
transform and eventually constitute new protected spaces or other types of social 
entities. In the case of the Copyright Hub, for example, the protected space was eventually 
dissolved when the Digital Catapult withdrew from the project, yet elements developed 
within this space morphed and constituted a new project named ARDITO, whose 
objectives were to develop actual services in the marketplace from the Copyright Hub’s 
pilot use cases. 
 
Keywords: dual dynamics of promises; promise-requirement cycles; sociology of 






This thesis studies the development of the Copyright Hub – an emerging infrastructural 
initiative which aimed at facilitating the management and communication of intellectual 
property (IP) information, as well as streamlining copyright licensing processes, across 
sectors of the creative industries. 
The study highlights the origins of the Copyright Hub and the provision of public support for 
its R&D as a product of divergent pressures: the creative industries sought government action 
to redress their concerns about difficulties in enforcing copyright in a digital world; 
government sought to stimulate the economy through fostering sustainable digital 
industries. The project however did not fulfil its promise of enabling the innovation of new 
market infrastructures for trading copyright-protected content. 
The findings of this study are built on three empirical data sources: (1) long-term fieldwork 
including participant observation and fieldnotes, (2) in-depth, semi-structured, qualitative 
interviews with key stakeholders, (3) publicly accessible documents published by the UK 
government and other organisations that are relevant to the case. 
The analysis focuses on the concept of expectations and how they are mobilised to help 
accumulate funding and support for the project from both public and private sectors. 
Furthermore, it draws attention to the ways policy makers, businesses, and innovation 
entrepreneurs form alliances across the boundaries of their socio-political groups to compete 
for the domination of their endorsed visions and expectations of the project. 
This study makes three contributions to knowledge: 
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1. It provides a rich, empirical case study of the Copyright Hub, which exemplifies the 
dynamics of expectations and the ways they are mobilised to support an innovation in-
the-making. The substantive area of developing digital infrastructures for IP licensing and 
management is of wider interest to policy makers, creative industries and scholars of 
innovation studies. 
2. It contributes to theories on the dynamics of expectations in innovation process by 
highlighting the act of alliance making across socio-political groups and the ways actors 
compete in alliance in an array of separate, yet linked, arenas. Any successful strategies 
therefore must provide rewards for all members of the alliance at once. 
3. It helps reconceptualise the notion of protected space for innovation. The study reveals 
that such a space is formed through explicit act of various actors bringing together 
different groups of people, who share overlapping visions and expectations of the 
innovation. These groups bring with them constraints, preferences, and vested interests 
into the development process and thus, these elements play a critical part in shaping the 
innovation’s trajectory. When the interest needed to hold these groups of actors together 
is no longer adequate, the protected space is dissolved, yet elements of such a space do 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
I. Overview of the case study of the Copyright Hub 
In this thesis, I studied the development of an emerging infrastructural initiative, known as 
the Copyright Hub. The main objectives of the Copyright Hub were to streamline the 
processes of expressing, identifying and communicating rights information, especially 
copyright licensing, across various sectors of the creative industries. The Copyright Hub 
project emerged from the UK’s turbulent backdrop of economic downturn in the early 2010s 
as an unintended consequence of the government’s schemes to stimulate “strong and 
sustainable economic growth” via open-ended commitment to invest in infrastructure and 
innovation. Promising to make Britain “the most attractive place in the world to start and 
invest in innovative technology companies”, the government further strengthened their 
resolution by proposing a thorough review of the UK Intellectual Property (IP) framework to 
make it “fit for the internet age” (Cameron, 2010). Nevertheless, this “frame” of thinking was 
fiercely challenged and eventually replaced by a vision, endorsed by the creative industries, 
of using digital technology to solve the problems of copyright in the interconnected world. 
Owing to the complete lack of similar projects to compare and evaluate the feasibility and 
performance of the Copyright Hub, resources and support for the project were mobilised 
from both the public and private sector by means of expectations and promises. 
Therefore, this research was initially motivated by curiosity about the roles which the 
dynamics of expectations played in shaping the Copyright Hub as an innovation project. Since 
the Copyright Hub was a product of divergent socio-political, economic and technical 
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pressure, the case study also inspired me to study the dynamics of expectations within the 
context of multiple ecologies, instead of mono-ecology as in the majority of the sociological 
studies on expectations. 
On the one hand, the sociology of expectations is employed as the theoretical point of 
departure to help further analyse the dynamics that shape the Copyright Hub project. Being 
central to this literature is the concept of “dual dynamics of expectations”, which depicts the 
interrelation between two different types of promises (Parandian, Rip and Te Kulve, 2012). 
“Umbrella promises” are diffuse, open-ended promises, which function as protection for 
more specific promises once the general promises become accepted. Under these umbrella 
promises, there are specific promises, which can be translated into requirements on further 
development. These “promise-requirement cycles” occur in a protected space supported by 
expectations until a working artefact is realised or the cycles end immaturely due to 
unsatisfactory progress (van Lente, 1993; van Lente and Rip, 1998b). This framework thus 
provides a number of useful concepts to help examine the case study of the Copyright Hub, 
whose initiation, trajectory and progress are very much coloured by the dynamics of 
expectations and promises. 
On the other hand, this research draws upon literature from the Social Shaping of Technology 
(SST) perspective, which highlights the “inconvenient methodological truth” for the social 
study of technology: i.e. processes of socio-technical change, which occur across wide-
ranging spatial and temporal contexts, are at odds with the dominant research design in STS, 
which leans towards intensive ethnographic engagement usually conducted at a single site 
over a short period of time (Russell and Williams, 2002). Extending the SST perspective, the 
Biographies of Artifacts and Practices (BOAP) approach provides a comprehensible 
framework for conducting multi-site, longitudinal research on innovation by combining the 
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reconstruction of the historical development of the field through previous studies with 
“strategic ethnography” of key sites where innovation is taking place (Pollock and Williams, 
2009a, 2010a). Here, parallel concepts, such as Abbott’s (2005) “linked ecologies”, are 
particularly helpful in further scrutinising the interrelation of actors within an ecology and its 
neighbouring ecologies, as well as the rationales by which these actors operate and the ways 
they affect the shaping of technology and practices over an extended time frame. 
II. Research Questions 
In this thesis, it is my intention to find answers for the following research questions: 
1. How do the dynamics of expectations help advance and shape an innovation project? 
Apart from high expectations, were there any other types of expectations used by 
innovation actors to mobilise resources and support for the Copyright Hub project? 
2. Why do certain expectations gather greater credibility and legitimacy than others? 
How should the notion of credibility of expectations be conceptualised from the 
perspective of linked ecologies? 
3. What is the role of the protected space in an innovation project? 
What is the mechanism behind the emergence and dissolution of the protected space? 
III. Organising the Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of seven chapters, including this chapter which serves as an 
introduction to the thesis. In the following section, the structure of the thesis will be 
introduced, with a brief summary of each chapter. 
Following the Introduction chapter, chapter 2 presents a comprehensive review of the 
existing literature on the sociology of expectations. A brief history of the development of the 
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field is presented, followed by a detailed discussion of the term “expectations” and two of 
its most common “siblings”, i.e. promises and visions. After that, I will discuss the main 
findings of the literature on sociology of expectations, which is grouped under four tenets: 
(1) the constitutive force and performativity of expectations; (2) expectations and temporal 
variabilities; (3) expectations and socio-spatial variabilities; and (4) expectations and 
embodiment. Finally, the chapter concludes with the identification of three gaps in the 
literature: (a) the dominance of studies on “high expectations”, while other types of 
expectations are neglected; (b) the dearth of understanding of the credibility of expectations; 
and (c) the need to reconceptualise the notion of “protected spaces”. 
In chapter 3, I discuss in detail the reasons behind my choices of research design and 
methodology for the thesis. Particular emphases are given to explain the advantages of 
adopting (1) the Biography of Artefacts and Practices (BOAP) approach, (2) Abbott’s 
perspectives on the relation between social boundaries and social entities, and (3) his “linked 
ecologies” framework to study the dynamics of expectations in the case of the Copyright 
Hub. The second section in this chapter is dedicated to documenting my journey as a 
researcher through various stages of this project: from planning my fieldwork, to data 
collection, and data analysis.  
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter in this thesis, which serves as a detailed introduction 
to the backdrop of the Copyright Hub’s case study. This chapter thus helps familiarise the 
audience with the context of this research, as well as introducing the reader to three of the 
most important key stakeholders in the case study of the Copyright Hub: (a) the Digital 
Catapult, (b) the Copyright Hub, and (c) the Linked Content Coalition. 
Chapter 5 is the main empirical chapter in this thesis. In this chapter, I provide comprehensive 
accounts of the social interactions, expectation work, and strategies for alliance making 
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between a wide array of actors involved in shaping and reshaping the Copyright Hub, from 
ideas to an innovation project. The chapter is composed of three main sections. The first 
section is dedicated to examining the pre-Copyright Hub period, which is characterised by 
the Hargreaves Review and the Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE) proposal. In the second 
section, I describe a series of events which lead to the establishment of the Copyright Hub, 
from Hooper’s DCE feasibility study to conclusion of the first year of the Copyright Hub. In 
the final section, I provide an explanation for the Copyright Hub’s successful establishment 
using data from various levels of granularity.  
Chapter 6 is a brief empirical chapter, which discusses the more technical aspect of data 
modelling and the problems of the data model adopted by the Copyright Hub. 
In chapter 7, I discuss the three unique contributions which this thesis makes to knowledge. 
First, it provides an account of the ways “low” and “slow” expectations help advance the 
Copyright Hub project by contributing to securing allies and resource mobilisation. Second, 
this thesis offers new insights into the notion of expectations’ credibility by applying the 
linked ecologies perspective to transcend the conventional Ecology/ Audience model. Third, 
it offers a reconceptualisation of the notion of “protected spaces”, which emerge as a result 
of social actors yoking various proto-boundaries together, instead of the prevalent notion of 
protected spaces as black-boxes which help shield technical development from scrutiny. The 
chapter ends with a summary of these contributions to knowledge and a few remarks on 





Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
The development of newly emerging technologies and pre-market applications is inherently 
surrounded by an extremely high level of socio-technical uncertainty, ranging from long 
development timeframes and complex innovation cycles, to unforeseeable performance, 
practical utility and eventual market value (Veryzer Jr., 1998). Such observations apply well 
to the case study of the Copyright Hub, whose main aims and objectives were to devise novel 
digital services to streamline copyright licensing processes, as well as opening up a whole 
new market for licensing creative content at the “long tail”1 of the demand curve. In this and 
other similar cases, governments, firms and researchers generally engage in “an intensely 
future-oriented business” when they have to make decisions about future products and 
services in envisioned markets, all of which, by definition, do not yet exist (Borup et al., 2006). 
Future-oriented abstractions, such as expectations, visions and promises, thus become some 
of the most critical objects of enquiry for scholars of innovation in recent years (Brown and 
Michael, 2003). The growing number of social studies of expectations in the context of 
scientific and technological innovation has given rise to a fruitful, emerging area of research 
known as sociology of expectations (Brown, Rip and Van Lente, 2003). Since sociology of 
expectations has proven to be a fruitful area of research for studying newly emerging 
technologies, whose examples include pharmacogenetics (Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003), 
hydrogen and fuel cell (Ruef and Markard, 2010; Bakker, van Lente and Meeus, 2011), 
                                                          
1 Anderson (2006) predicted that our culture and economy are increasingly shifting away from a small 
number of big hits, i.e. mainstream products and mass markets, and moving towards a large number 
of niches at “the tail” of the demand curve. Such a dramatic change in the nature of the market was 
made possible by eliminating the bottlenecks of conventional means of products/ services 
distribution, as well as the constraints of physical shelf space, through harnessing the power of 
Internet and digital technologies. Anderson proclaimed: “We are turning from a mass market into a 
niche nation, defined now not by our geography but by our interests”.   
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nanotechnology (Selin, 2007; Parandian, Rip and Te Kulve, 2012) to mention but a few, this 
field of studies is thus chosen as a “promising” point of departure for penning the literature 
review in this chapter. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, I begin by sketching a brief 
history of the emergence of sociology of expectations (section I), followed by a detailed 
discussion of what expectations are and what expectations can do in the context of 
technological innovation (section II). In section III, I examine a number of “sibling 
terminologies” of expectations via state-of-the-art case studies in order to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the term in question. I then proceed to explore the four 
central tenets of sociology of expectations (section IV), before concluding the chapter by 
pointing out existing gaps in the literature (section V).   
I. Sociology of Expectations – a Brief History 
Although the roles which expectations and promises play in shaping innovation had been the 
critical objects of enquiry for scholarly research prior to the turn of the millennium (Antonelli, 
1989; Mulkay, 1993; van Lente, 1993), the social studies of future and anticipation only began 
to attract considerable interest and came together under the banner of sociology of 
expectations in early 2000s (Brown and Michael, 2003). More specifically, Contested Futures 
– a seminal volume of works edited by Brown, Rappert and Webster (2000) – is one of the 
earliest attempts to bring together a collection of Science, Technology and Society (STS) 
studies on the dynamics and significance of future-oriented coordination and contestation. 
In 2001, the annual meeting of the Society for Social Study of Science was named Fashioning 
the Future to bear witness to the thriving intellectual interest in this area. These and other 
movements urged researchers to shift the analytical angle “from looking into the future to 
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looking at the future”2, to borrow the words of Brown, Rappert and Webster (2000b), and to 
treat future as an analytical object, instead of “a neutral temporal space into which objective 
expectations can be projected” (Brown and Michael, 2003, p.4). To STS scholars, expectations 
help shape and constitute the very future they try to predict, or to phrase it differently, 
“expectations mobilize the future into the present” (Brown, Rip & van Lente, 2003, p.3). 
STS is only one amongst a wide variety of disciplinary fields in which future and anticipatory 
expectations emerged as analytical objects3. Classical economic theory, for instance, has a 
well-established literature on expectations (Sargent and Wallace, 1976; Harrison and Kreps, 
1978; Davidson, 1982; Burczak, 2001). Muth (1961, p.316), in his pioneering work on the 
subject, defined expectations as “informed predictions of future events” and argued that 
“[expectations] are essentially the same as the predictions of the relevant economic theory”. 
Muth called these expectations “rational”. He hypothesised that the economy would not let 
scarce information go to waste, and the ways expectations were formed would depend 
specifically on the structure of the entire system describing the economy. Muth’s hypothesis 
consequently laid the foundation for the “rational expectations” tradition in economics 
(Lucas Jr. and Sargent, 1984). This school of thought assumes a realist distinction between 
people’s expectations and the underlying fundamentals or ‘real’ worth of the object of 
interest. Consequently, the “real value” of future can be determined objectively through the 
production of “rational” calculations and expectations can thus be adjusted “rationally” 
depending on the variation in calculated value (Kantor, 1979). 
Such contrast in the two aforementioned disciplinary approaches to expectations 
immediately calls attention to the difference in epistemological status of claims about the 
                                                          
2 Emphasised as in the original document. 
3 For more detailed treatments of the subject, see (Brown, Rip and Van Lente, 2003, pp.6-8) and 
(Borup et al., 2006, pp.287-289) 
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future. On the one hand, economic theory, especially the ‘rational expectations’ tradition, 
adopts a positivistic or realist approach to expectations, which asserts a clear distinction 
between expectations and the ‘real’ state of affairs. Based on this assumption, economic 
theorists argue that it is possible to calculate the real underlying fundamentals of, for 
instance, a technological innovation and thus determining in priori whether expectations of 
such technology are true or false, even before it has been fully developed and trialled by the 
market. On the other hand, STS scholars generally take a constructivist approach to 
expectations, which regards expectations as constitutive force of the future: i.e. they help in 
providing structure and legitimation, mobilising resources, attracting alliances, shaping 
technical artefacts, and so on. STS researchers therefore recognise the theoretical difficulties 
in distinguishing between expectations and the very future they want to project. To borrow 
the words of Borup and his colleagues:  
If we accept that anticipation is actually constitutive of value, then we logically 
cannot differentiate between our expectations of things (biotechnologies, stem 
cells, nanotechnologies, etc.) and what those things in fact are. (Borup et al., 2006, 
p.289) 
Since the ‘underlying fundamentals’ are themselves future abstractions, it is only possible to 
determine the truthfulness or falsity of expectations retrospectively, at the time when such 
knowledge might not be needed anymore (van Lente, 2012). Consequently, instead of trying 
to establish whether or not hype, or inflated promises, is taking place by calculating ‘the real 
worth’ of technical innovation independently from its expectations, the constructivist 
approach places greater importance upon identifying and defining various hype patterns that 
explain a wide variety of shapes of hype cycles in different innovation contexts (van Lente, 
Spitters and Peine, 2013). 
26 
 
In this thesis, I choose to adopt the constructivist approach to expectations due to its 
compatibility with my own epistemological stance on the subject, and more importantly, its 
consonance with the STS-inspired sociology of expectations, which I draw heavily upon in 
order to develop the theoretical basis for this research.  
II. Defining Expectations 
What are expectations? In its general form, the term ‘expectations’ can be defined as the 
state of looking forward (from Latin exspectatio, which means looking or waiting for). In the 
particular context of technological innovation, however, ‘expectations’ is described by 
sociology of expectations as “real-time representations of future technological situations and 
capabilities” (Borup et al., 2006, p.286). Interestingly, this is as much a comprehensive 
definition as one can find on the topic owing to the fact that sociology of expectations places 
great emphasis upon specifying what expectations can do, not what they are. To borrow the 
words of van Lente (2012, p.772) – one of the most significant contributors to the 
development of sociology of expectations: 
A central theme is that expectations are statements that do4 something, rather 
than being descriptive statements that may be true or false. An expectation is not 
just a description of a (future) reality, but rather a change or creation of a new 
reality.  
Making a similar argument, Brown, Rip and van Lente (2003, p.3) proclaim:  
                                                          
4 Emphasised as in the original document 
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Expectations are part of the world of action: they incite, block, justify. This can be 
further understood in narrative terms: expectations help shape the plot (and its 
further development) that guides actions and interactions.  
Then, what are expectations capable of doing in the context of technological innovation? Van 
Lente (2012) argues that, over the years, the sociology of expectations have identified three 
forces of expectations in the dynamics of technical change. Those forces include legitimation, 
heuristic guidance and coordination. First, the most conspicuous aspect of what expectations 
do is to draw attention and legitimise investments in the development of nascent 
technologies. Attention, in the early stages of innovation, is generally attracted by means of 
inflated promises. Consequently, disappointments seem to be built into the way expectations 
operate in technological innovation. Confirming this observation, Brown, Rip and van Lente 
(2003, p.3) wrote: 
[P]romises will be inflated, and have to be inflated in order to get a hearing. So it 
is almost inevitable that early hype will eventually give way to disillusionment, 
except when the emergence of new promises helps people forget their former 
disappointments.   
After the relevant stakeholders’ interest in the technological innovation has been firmly 
secured, expectations continue to play a central role in mobilising resources both at the 
macro level (i.e. international and national policies), at the meso level (i.e. within and across 
sectors and networks of organisations) and at the micro level (i.e. within engineering and 
research groups, and individual innovators) (Borup et al., 2006).  In addition, expectations 
can provide a protected space for the development of nascent technology, whose existing 
level of performance might not be able to justify the support needed. Furthermore, 
outcomes of failed projects might be interpreted favourably in the light of possible future 
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success, which helps maintain the necessary level of support for further technological 
development (Konrad, 2006). 
Second, heuristic guidance refers to the ability of expectations to provide direction to the 
search processes of technological development (van Lente and Bakker, 2010). Due to the 
inherently high level of uncertainty and countless possible paths to take during the 
development process of nascent technologies, technology developers often have to rely on 
informal expectations circulating amongst their communities in order to determine whether 
or not a direction is “promising” (Geels and Raven, 2006). In a similar vein of argument, Schot 
(1998, p.197) argues:  
Technological development means to project something that does not yet exist. 
Expectations and promises are therefore of crucial importance to technological 
development and once they are accepted they are converted into heuristics that 
guide the technical search process. Technological development implies that you 
have to make your way as you go along. Who will produce which technology, for 
which market and in which society are questions that are answered little by little. 
Therefore, expectations help reduce uncertainty in technological development in the same 
way as heuristics do in scientific and technical research (Dosi, 1982; Dosi and Nelson, 1994).  
Third, expectations play a critical role in coordinating the efforts needed for technical change. 
They serve to specify roles, clarify duties, and offer a shared understanding of opportunities 
and risks for all stakeholders involved in the innovative endeavour. Borup et al. (2006) argues 
that expectations  are capable of bridging and mediating across different stakeholders’ 
communities and research groups (i.e. horizontal coordination) and between different scales 
and levels of organisations (i.e. vertical coordination), as well as changing over time in 
response to new conditions and unforeseeable problems (i.e. temporal coordination). 
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Furthermore, owing to its ability to connect technical and social issues, expectations can be 
regarded as “the missing link between the inner and outer worlds of techno-scientific 
knowledge communities and fields” (ibid. p.286).  
Apart from sharing the properties of the three aforementioned forces which make 
expectations ‘constitutive’ or ‘performative’5, expectations however can vary greatly in terms 
of level and hence, the degree of constitutive force each type of expectations has over the 
dynamics of technological change. Konrad (2006), for instance, differentiates between two 
main types of expectations: specific vs. collective expectations. On the one hand, specific 
expectations include expectations that are held by and attributable to individuals, as well as 
those shared by specific groups of actors. On the other hands, collective expectations are 
generalised, taken-for-granted social repertoire, which are shared by a wide range of 
stakeholders. More importantly, collective expectations are distinct from their specific 
counterparts in terms of constitutive force: they become “a quasi-certain prerequisite of 
action” and exert “image pressure”, both of which allow collective expectations to motivate 
and coordinate a wide range of heterogeneous innovation actors to engage in the innovation 
process (ibid. pp.433-442). In addition, collective expectations can influence the 
interpretation of project outcomes (i.e. the results can be interpreted favourably, or the 
evaluation criteria can even be suspended) and thus provide a protected space for innovation 
activities.  
Konrad’s identified types of expectations are comparable to typologies proposed by other 
scholars working on similar topics. Ruef and Markard (2010), for instance, propose to divide 
expectations into: (1) specific expectations expressed in statements of individual actors, (2) 
generalised expectations expressed in impersonal statements, and (3) frames or overarching 
                                                          
5 I will present a more detailed discussion on this subject in section IV – Four Central Tenets of the 
Sociology of Expectations 
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expectations which put technological innovation in the context of generic societal problems 
and visions. Bearing in mind the differences between these types of expectations is crucial 
for understanding the (dual) dynamics of expectations in technological innovation, which will 
be examined carefully in the following section. 
III. Understanding Promises and Visions 
Before moving on to explore the four central tenets of the sociology of expectations, I find it 
noteworthy to clarify the meanings of two related and overlapping terminologies with 
‘expectations’. The most notable instance of such terms is ‘promises’, which have been used 
interchangeably with ‘expectations’ in a great number of studies in an implicit and undefined 
manner. For examples, the act of promising is loosely defined as “pronouncing/formulating 
an expectation” in Brown, Rip and van Lente (2003)’s paper6 and promises are regarded as 
“positive expectations” in van Lente (2012)’s later work. Another common term of this kind 
is ‘visions’, which is deemed to be associated with overarching expectations, as mentioned 
in Ruef and Markard (2010). The nuances in meaning of ‘expectations’, ‘promises’ and 
‘visions’ are discussed a little further in Borup et al. (2006, p.286) when the authors 
differentiate ‘expectations’ from the remainder by highlighting the “enacting and 
subjectively normative character” of the sibling terms: 
                                                          
6 This point is illustrated by the following quote from (Brown, Rip and Van Lente, 2003, p.3): 
Expectations can be performative also in the sense that promises are 
performative. […] Pronouncing an expectation does not create accountability, but 
does lead to reactions and the idea that the enunciator should justify the 
expectation. This is how early promises and early warnings lead to reactions and 
sometimes to escalating arguments for and against (specious inflation). 
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Similar terms, which are commonly used, like technological ‘promises’ and 
‘visions’ are largely overlapping with ‘expectations’ but emphasise to a higher 
degree their enacting and subjectively normative character. They stress that 
expectations are wishful enactments of a desired future.   
In this section, I seek to go beyond the short abstract discussions as mentioned above and 
present more fruitful, state-of-the-art accounts of how ‘promises’ and ‘visions’ are 
conceptualised and employed in two distinct case studies of socio-technical innovation. 
These explorations are intended to give new insights into different facets of expectations’ 
work through the conceptual lens of ‘promises’ and ‘visions’.   
A. The dual dynamics of promises 
According to Tutton (2011), ‘promises’ is used in ‘expectations’ stead  by North American 
scholars as a key concept for studying the dynamics of future-making. Tutton argues that a 
promise is “a binding ‘contract’ about a future made by one person to another” uttered in 
the form of ‘I promise’ (ibid. p.413). Similarly, Brown, Rip and van Lente (2003) assert that ‘I 
promise X’ is not only a descriptive account of the possibility of X occurring in the future, but 
also a statement in which the enunciator is held accountable for doing X or a version of X. In 
addition to making promises about something and/or doing something in the future, a 
person can also make statements about how promising something is, which can be read as 
“an implied warrant to others” and hence the idea that the enunciator should justify the 
expectation (ibid. p.3). Commenting on the “volatile, … [yet] absolutely necessary” roles of 
promises “to every economy and to every science, but especially to an emergent 
technoscience”, Fortun (2005, p.158) states: 
Promising cannot be reduced to either empty hype, or to formal contract, but 
occupies the uncertain, difficult space in between. 
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Nevertheless, not all promises are the same. Parandian, Rip and Te Kulve (2012), in their case 
study of emerging nanotechnologies, observe the differences between two types of 
promises: (1) the “big but open-ended promises” which they call ‘umbrella promises’7 and  
(2) the more specific promises which constitute the concrete promise-requirement cycles.  
On the one hand, umbrella promises are characterised as being “open-ended”, “discursive” 
and “very general in nature”. These big promises offer narratives which help link emerging 
technologies with broader socio-political issues, such as sustainable development and 
climate change. According to Parandian, Rip and Te Kulve (ibid.), the most important aspect 
of umbrella promises is that, once they are accepted, they can provide a protected space for 
the development of more specific promises subsumed under these “umbrellas”. Specific 
promises, on the other hand, can be formulated in concrete terms, such as certain technical 
features or levels of performance, and thus can be translated into requirements on further 
development. These requirements will be addressed in a protected space, which helps shield 
early innovation activities from outside scrutiny, until a working artefact or system is 
developed; or the whole process can be disrupted immaturely due to disappointing progress. 
The promise-requirement cycles thus represent the trajectory of technical development. 
These two types of promises are dependent upon one another. While promise-requirement 
cycles rely upon the umbrella promises for legitimation, the umbrella promise also depends 
on the success of some concrete realisations in order to reinforce its narrative. Hence, 
Parandian, Rip and Te Kulve (ibid.) call the interactions between these two ‘the dual dynamics 
of promises’ (see Figure 1).   
                                                          
7 Parandian, Rip and Te Kulve’s notion of ‘umbrella promises’ is built upon Konrad’s (2006) idea of 
‘collective expectations’. In this case, expectations and promises have been used interchangeably 




Figure 1 The Dual Dynamics of Promises  
(Reproduced from Parandian, Rip and Te Kulve, 2012, p.568) 
Based upon the ways in which specific promise-requirement cycles and umbrella promises 
interact, four patterns of the dual dynamics of promises are identified. First, in the “hype-
disappointment cycles” pattern, the umbrella promise is hype-friendly, and early interests 
are attracted by exaggerated promises. When the umbrella promise eventually collapses due 
to its own unreasonably high expectations, only a few technologies that deem promising are 
continued to be further developed. Second, the “promise icon” pattern refers to 
circumstances in which failures of concrete projects are attributed to other factors while 
referring back to the umbrella promise. In this way, the umbrella promise remains legitimate 
even in the face of specific promise-requirement’s failures. Third, the “priority setting” 
pattern is illustrated by cases where the umbrella promise is resolutely upheld to provide a 
stable backdrop for building agenda and securing funding. Long-term goals are thus 
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considered more critical than short-term concrete achievements. Finally, the ‘waiting games’ 
pattern depicts cases of deadlock in technical development, where stakeholders are kept ‘in 
the game’ by appealing umbrella promises but are unwilling to take the risk of investing 
heavily in concrete developments. 
This model of the dual dynamics of promises is built on early works of van Lente (1993) and 
van Lente and Rip (1998a) on the general idea of expectation dynamics. In the earlier version 
of this model, the sequence of activities and nested nature of the promise-requirement 
cycles remain the same8. The most critical differences between the two versions are the 
separation between umbrella and specific promises and the interactions between them. As 
a result, the model of the dual dynamics of promises offers a useful analytical framework for 
studying multiple levels of expectations at work. In addition, it helps highlight and open up a 
new line of research into expectation dynamics, which focuses on examining different 
patterns of technological development based on the outcomes and interactions between 
different levels of promises. 
B. The articulation and diffusion of successful visions 
In his study of the generation, articulation and deployment of technological expectations in 
systems innovation, Berkhout (2006) points up the close association between expectations 
and visions. In particular, he proposes that expectations should be viewed as ‘bids’ offered 
by agents, who constantly compete with others’ bids in the context of large-scale socio-
technical change. In this sense, expectations are “relational objects” which represents how 
the “present order of things” is perceived: 
                                                          
8 See (Brown, Rip and Van Lente, 2003) for details of the previous model of expectation dynamics.  
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In so far as images of the future take the same form as images of the present and 
are to some extent modifications of images of the present, we need to see 
expectations as relational objects. They are representations either of things 
remaining the same, or of things changing. In this sense they are always 
referenced to attitudes and perceptions about the present order of things. (ibid. 
p.301) 
To be adopted and diffused successfully, expectations are hypothesised to be inherently 
flexible and bidders generally anticipate the modification of their bids in the adoption 
process. It is due to the fact that expectations, or bids, can be adopted by new adherents 
only when they can be matched to new sets of interests and new “image of the present” 
(ibid. p.302). Expectations thus remain malleable throughout the innovation process until a 
point when they are materialised in one form or another. Even after this point, expectations 
might continue undergo change or being re-interpreted as the bidding process is never 
completed. 
In addition, a clear distinction is drawn between private expectations, which are privately 
held and not necessarily communicated, and public or collective expectations, which are 
widely communicated and shared. There is interaction between these two types of 
expectations. On the one hand, collective expectations influence the frames and interests of 
social actors in so far as these expectations are aligned with their interests and are 
compatible with their privately interpreted experience. On the other hand, private 
expectations are used by agents to interpret the meaning and evaluate the value of collective 
expectations. Any inconsistencies between the public conception and private experience 
might result in the re-evaluation and modification of collective expectations.    
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Building on such understanding of the notion of expectations, Berkhout (ibid. p.302) 
tentatively proposes a definition of visions as “collectively held and communicable schemata 
that represents future objectives and express the means by which these objectives will be 
realised”. Beyond this definition, Berkhout also specifies three characteristic features which 
every vision possesses: (1) objectives, i.e. expression of novel future outcomes in qualitative 
and/or quantitative terms; (2) orders, i.e. social and institutional relationships that allows 
these objectives to be met; and (3) technologies, i.e. the technological means for achieving 
these objectives. Furthermore, it is argued that visions are typically organised around a 
positive/negative or utopian/dystopian dualism, whose function is to position agents with 
regard to the vision. Commenting on this moralised feature of vision, Berkhout states:  
[T]he moralised vision becomes the object around which social interests can be 
arranged – with ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ groups being crystallised out. […] Ironically, one of 
the primary functions of visions therefore can be to frame dissensus, rather than 
to generate consensus” (ibid. pp.303-304). 
Visions can be further divided into two categories based on the plurality of their sources. 
While single-source visions are defined as “those that are generated by visionaries with the 
intention to instruct or entertain”, multiple-source visions are regarded as originating from 
“structural social processes of the making explicit9 of possible future” (ibid. p.307). Berkhout 
argues that multiple-source visions exist for the purpose of either validating or counteracting 
single-source visions originated from scientific, industrial or governmental interests. To give 
explanations for the successful articulation and diffusion of a vision, Berkhout argues that it 
is due mainly to the vision’s ability to attract a wide range of interests and/ or its power to 
dominate a discourse about possible futures. In the former cases, the process of enrolling 
                                                          
9 Emphasised as in original document 
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social actors for the vision is thought to be voluntary and empowered. In the later cases, 
however, the enrolment is to a certain degree involuntary, or even coercive. 
In short, Berkhout’s conception of visions (and its close association with private and public 
expectations) offers an original and beneficial approach to studying the ways expectations 
operate in large-scale socio-technical change. This approach highlights the fact that visions 
and public expectations can attract a great number of adherents only when they are flexible 
enough to accommodate a wide array of privately-held expectations and interests, yet stable 
enough to coordinate and discipline the actions of these social actors. 
IV. Four Central Tenets of the Sociology of Expectations 
This section is dedicated to exploring key findings of the sociology of expectations, which 
revolves around four main themes10: (1) the constitutive or performative force of 
expectations, (2) expectations and temporal variabilities, (3) expectations and spatial 
variabilities, and (4) the embodiment of expectations in different forms and shapes. Although 
these themes are conceptually separated for the purpose of highlighting different aspects of 
the discussion, the boundaries between them are indeed blurred and elements discussed in 
one category can seamlessly flow into or connect with another category. Detailed discussion 
of the four central tenets of the sociology of expectations are presented below. 
 
                                                          
10 The categorisation of central findings of the sociology of expectations into four main themes as 
presented in this chapter follows closely the suggestion, which has been put forward by Borup et al. 
(2006). However, this section does not simply summarise what has been discussed in Borup et al. 
(ibid.), but also includes many more state-of-the-art developments in the field since the 
aforementioned publication.  
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A. Expectations, Constitutive force and Performativity 
The notion of ‘performative’ or ‘constitutive’ refers to the phenomenon in which hype and 
hopes mobilised in technological innovation do not simply describe future technologies but 
also help bring them into reality. Expectations, by definition, are constitutive or performative 
because they help in building shared agenda, defining roles, and attracting alliances 
throughout the development and diffusion of new technologies (see section II). Such 
dynamics of expectations are deemed to be “crucially constitutive” in the early stages of 
innovation when various technological options are competing for attention and thus, 
resources will normally be allocated to the seemingly most promising development paths 
(Brown, Rip and Van Lente, 2003, p.3). 
At the most general level, overarching expectations or visions are thought to play a central 
role in “brokering relationships between different actors and groups” (Borup et al., 2006, 
p.289). As discussed earlier in (Berkhout, 2006), the capacity of visions for aligning social 
actors, motivating action, and mobilising resources depends on the mutuality between the 
collective and private expectations. In Berkhout’s words: 
In these processes of regime transformation, future visions about the functions, 
order and means represented by the regime are extremely important. Regime 
members will align themselves to visions of the future that are aligned with their 
interests and which they believe they have the resources to achieve (or which they 
believe they can convince other powerful actors to achieve with them). (ibid. 
p.304) 
As a result, the robustness of a coalition organised around a vision is closely associated with 
the degree of interpretative flexibility of that vision and its associated expectations. A vision, 
which can be flexibly interpreted and matched to different circumstances, can widen its 
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relevance to a vast array of social actors. Nevertheless, if the degree of interpretative 
flexibility were too great, the vision’s capacity to coordinate and discipline agents’ actions 
would be diminished. Therefore, Berkhout argues that effective visions are those that 
“achieve the right balance between the utopian and the aspirational, and the grounded and 
realistic, and in doing so do not appear too aligned to current interests and capabilities” (ibid. 
p.306). Making somewhat a similar conclusion about the constitutive force of visions, Borup 
et al. (2006, p.289) stated: 
Indeed, it would be hard to picture the formation of technology developments and 
innovation without some kind of shared, though flexibly interpreted, cluster of 
guiding visions. 
Expectations are also performative in the sense that promises are performative (Brown, Rip 
and Van Lente, 2003). As discussed in section III, the act of promising (i.e. I promise X) does 
prompt reactions and the expectation that the enunciator should justify their future-oriented 
claims. When a promise and its associated expectations are widely diffused and accepted, 
they can be used to justify other promises and actions. Any deviancy from the taken-for-
granted social repertoire is effectively marginalised and therefore required much greater 
effort to be justified and accepted. This results in the phenomena known as ‘path 
dependency’ and ‘irreversibility’, which would have significant impact on the establishment 
of networks and structures of emerging socio-technical fields. Brown, Rip and van Lente (ibid. 
p.5) argue: 
Already at the very earliest stages of a field’s formation, actors use ‘hype’ and 
‘hopes’ as a means to initiate movement, position themselves and others, build 
alliances and marginalise competing fields – this is how networks and industry 
structures emerge. The dynamics of expectations thus articulate with the 
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emergence of irriversibilisation, the production of a particular narrative order that 
polices the future behaviour of a whole range of actors. 
Nevertheless, the constitutive force of expectations appears to have different impact in 
different sectors. Brown, Rip and van Lente (ibid.) assert that in highly volatile sectors such 
as ICTs, where uncertainties are high and the sector’s relationships consist largely of 
impermanent forms of alliance, expectations are employed as means to define stakeholders’ 
roles and stabilise relations. On the other hand, in a well-established sector where roles and 
relationships are clearly defined, expectations are used to safeguard the existing networks 
and marginalising any potential threats and displacement.   
B. Expectations and Temporal Variabilities 
The temporal variability of expectations is generally illustrated through the ‘hype-
disappointment’ cycles, which Brown, Rip and van Lente (2003, p.3) summarise as follow:  
Promises will be inflated, and have to be inflated in order to get a hearing. So it is 
almost inevitable that early hype will eventually give way to disillusionment, 
except when the emergence of new promises helps people forget their former 
disappointments. 
As a result, the necessity of an early surge in hype to attract attention and resources, and the 
subsequent disappointment that follows when high promises cannot be fulfilled, are thought 
to be “almost built into the way expectations operate in science and technology” (Borup et 
al., 2006, p.290). Hype-disappointment cycles thus depict the trajectory of technological 
innovation over time and are critical to understanding temporal variabilities in expectations.  
Indeed, hype and disappointment have become “part of a widely shared cultural and social 
stock repertoire for interpreting socio-technical change” (ibid. p.291). The most well-known 
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example of this kind is Gartner’s Hype Cycle, which is a simplistic graphical representation of 
the way an emerging technology progresses through the peaks and troughs of technological 
expectations (see Figure 2). In this model, a novel technology is alleged to move along a linear 
path from technology trigger, rising to the peak of media attention and inflated expectations, 
then sliding into the trough of disillusionment before eventually materialising in some forms 
of adoption or applications (Linden and Fenn, 2003). Despite its popularity and impacts, 
especially within the ICT sector, the Gartner’s Hype Cycle is criticised for its oversimplification 
and incapability to accommodate numerous types of variation and unpredictability that are 
commonly found in technological, let alone social, change (Steinert and Leifer, 2010). 
Consequently, the Gartner’s hype cycle is castigated for reintroducing a “highly linear 
understanding of a technology’s path dependency” with little regard to the ways 
technologies, artefacts and practices would be changing, reconfiguring and reconfigured over 
time in a continual and practical process of diffusion and adoption (Borup et al., 2006, p.292).  
 
Figure 2 The Gartner's hype cycles (Reproduced from (Linden and Fenn, 2003)) 
From the sociology of expectations’ perspective, the notions of ‘hype’ and ‘disappointment’ 
are initially examined as a part of the broader research agenda on expectation dynamics and 
their performative effect on innovation processes (see above). In recent years, however, an 
42 
 
increasing number of scholars have taken hype and disappointment as the main focus of their 
studies, and consequently turn this line of enquiry into a promising research avenue.  
Pioneering this line of research is Ruef and Markard’s (2010) study of disappointment and its 
effects on innovation processes in the case of stationary fuel cells technology. In this paper, 
Ruef and Markard make two distinguished contributions to further our understanding of the 
hype-disappointment cycles. First, they are the first to conceptually separate attention and 
expectations in their comprehensive definitions of ‘hype’ and ‘disappointment’. Hype is 
defined as “extravagant claims” which have the potential of being deliberately misleading or 
deceiving. At the same time, hype can be regarded as “excessive publicity” owing to the 
unusual attention a subject receives in a short period of time. Ruef and Markard (2010, p.319) 
state: 
[W]e will use the term hype for a combination of a phase of high media attention 
and of high rising expectations, which can turn out to be exaggerated ex post. Hype 
culminates in a peak of attention and of expectations, and is followed by a decline 
or downturn of both. It can only be detected ex post11.  
Disappointment, on the other hand, can be defined as a feeling of being let down when 
something hoped for did not happen or the outcomes were not satisfactory as expected. In 
other words, “disappointment, or disillusionment, is clearly related to failed expectations” 
(ibid. p.320). Based on these definitions, Ruef and Markard argue that hype cannot be 
deduced from a peak of media attention alone, nor does the decline of media attention 
automatically indicate disappointment, because attention and expectations are not 
necessarily in sync with one another. 
                                                          
11 Emphasised as in the original. 
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Second, Ruef and Markard’s paper is also the first to adopt the distinction between different 
levels of expectations to the analysis of hype and disappointment. They identify three types 
of expectations at work: (1) specific expectations referring to characteristics which are 
specific to a particular product or project expressed in personal statements; (2) generalised 
expectations referring to general features of a technology expressed in impersonal 
statements; and (3) overarching expectations or frames placing a technology in the context 
of generic socio-political problems and visions. Focusing on the latter two types of 
expectations, Ruef and Markard assume that frames (which provide legitimacy for innovation 
activities in a more general way) and generalised expectations (which guide the direction of 
innovation activities) can develop and change independently. Based on this assumption, they 
argue that the consequences of disappointment for underlying innovation activities 
significantly depend on the interplay between different levels of expectations. Four stylised 





Positive Disillusionment  
• Legitimacy intact 
• Guidance intact 
Innovation sustained 
• Innovation activities 
continue 
• Former direction of 
development maintained 
Disenchantment 
• Legitimacy lost or 
contested 
• Guidance intact 
Innovation delayed/ modified 
• Decrease societal/ public 
support 






• Legitimacy intact 
• Guidance lost or 
weakened 
Innovation delayed/ modified 
• Innovation activities 
reduced 
• Potential shift to other 
applications of the 
technology 
Total disappointment 
• Legitimacy lost  
• Guidance lost 
Innovation delayed/ modified 
• Innovation activities cut 
down significantly or 
abandoned 
• Shift to other 
technologies 
Table 1: Different types of disappointments and potential effect on innovation  
(Reproduced from Ruef and Markard 2010) 
 
Furthering Ruef and Markard’s exploratory work, van Lente, Spitters and Peine (2013) seek 
to develop a theory of hype patterns, which is capable of providing explanations for different 
shapes of hype cycles in different innovation contexts. Rather than adopting Ruef and 
Markard’s definition of hype as exaggerated, misleading and deceiving predictions of the 
future, the authors regard hype as “collectively pursued explorations of the future that affect 
activities in the present” (ibid. p.1616). Their analysis of the shape of hype patterns is focused 
upon three main variables: (1) the shape of the peak, i.e. the degree of enthusiasm during 
the peak, and the swelling and slope of the peak; (2) the depth of the trough, i.e. the degree 
in which enthusiasm breaks down in the trough and how the recovery takes place after the 
trough; and (3) the overall length of the hype. 
Building on Ruef and Markard’s conclusion (i.e. the effects of disappointment on underlying 
innovation activities strongly depend on the interplay of expectations on different levels), 
van Lente, Spitters and Peine proceed to examine how hype patterns are influenced by two 
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additional variables: the specificity of the envisioned application, and the nature of the 
environment in which expectations surrounding such application are created, diffused and 
refined. They choose to study and compare case studies of hype patterns in three different 
empirical contexts: (1) Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) – a very specific application with a 
mature industry setting; (2) Gene therapy – a generic application in an emerging industry 
setting; and (3) High temperature superconductivity (HTS) – a generic application in basic 
science setting with not-yet materialised promises for mature industries. 
In the case of VoIP, the analysis has confirmed that hypes of a very specific application in a 
mature industrial environment largely resemble the pattern suggested by Gartner’s hype 
cycle (see Figure 2). It is argued that expectations on all levels are able to flourish owing to 
the sufficient space and variety provided by the mature industry setting. On the other hand, 
hypes of generic technologies are found to be more precarious due to their fundamental 
struggles to define viable applications. The environments in which expectations of such 
applications are embedded also play a critical role in influencing the shape of hype patterns. 
In the case of gene therapy, such a “rich environment, combining perceived business 
opportunities and industrial patterns with the search for applications” serves as a fertile 
ground for productive recovery after the trough of disappointment (ibid. p.1626). In the case 
of HTS, however, the highly in-synch state of expectations at all three levels proves to be 
counter-productive as the environment provides little room to redefine or reorient 
expectations after disappointment. Based on these observations, a mixture of various 
expectations at different levels appears to be a good indicator of a potential productive 
recovery after disappointment. van Lente, Spitters and Peine conclude (ibid. p.1626): 
When expectations at project, field and societal levels are neatly aligned, the risk 
of a profound disappointment after hype is greater. Some degree of misalignment 
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between these levels may thus help a field to flourish, when visions about the 
future are sufficiently open-ended to turn disappointment into a productive 
reconfiguration of expectations. 
C. Expectations and Socio-spatial Variabilities 
The third central tenet of the sociology of expectations is concerned with the ways 
expectations vary in accordance with a few key social and spatial parameters. In this regard, 
sociologists of expectations build their understanding of the relationships between 
expectations and socio-spatial variabilities on previous studies in STS literature.  
Certainty trough and actors’ proximity to the site of technical 
development 
One way of approaching this issue is to consider the correlation between the different actors’ 
proximity to the actual site of technological development and their trust in the future. 
MacKenzie (1990)’s notion of certainty trough is highly valuable in this respect. In his study 
of the high-precision guidance systems of modern American inter-continental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), MacKenzie discovers that the closer the actor is to the point of knowledge 
production (i.e. development, experimentation, testing activities, etc.), the more uncertain 
he feels toward the knowledge and promises that are produced by such activities. 
Consequently, the certainty trough (Figure 3) highlights the raise of uncertainty amongst 
‘insiders’ of the technology in question. By comparison, uncertainty is usually low amongst 
those who have commitment to the technology but are distant from the actual site of 
knowledge production. Again, ‘outsiders’ and ‘competitors’ of the interested technology 




Figure 3 MacKenzie's Certainty Trough (Reproduced from (MacKenzie, 1998)) 
 
In a similar vein of argument, Borup et al. (2006) contend that people will attach different 
levels of trust to expectations based on their social distance from innovation activities. 
Expectations thus appear to have greater authority for those who consider themselves to be 
on the receiving end of those activities which generate, evaluate and redefine promises and 
claims of the future. A heightened sense of confidence is often a sign of a distance or 
detachment from the messy reality of conducting research at the “coal face” (ibid. p.292). 
Nevertheless, ‘insiders’ of innovation activities are capable of offering contradictory 
expectations based on the role which they assume at a given moment. For instance, 
researchers usually discuss the potential of their research with caution among their peers, 
but tend to make strong claims about the innovation while wearing the entrepreneurial hat 
in public (Brown and Michael, 2003). Based on this observation, Brown and Michael (ibid. 
pp.15-17) offer a new means of modelling the “situatedness of expectations” by examining 
the trough of certainty within a quadrant composed of three variables: (1) the complexity of 
innovators’ roles (i.e. knowledge producers, end users, competitors); (2) networks (i.e. 
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whether the networks are emerging or established); and (3) activities (i.e. whether the 
activities are routine or novel). 
Arenas of Expectations 
Apart from social variables, sociology of expectations is also interested in studying spatial 
variables of expectations. One of the most helpful concepts which have been developed in 
the literature so far is Bakker, van Lente and Meeus (2011)’s notion of “arenas of 
expectations”. This notion is built on the quasi-evolutionary approach to studying innovation, 
which asserts that the processes of variation and selection of technological change are 
interrelated and embedded in a “cultural matrix of expectations” (Van den Belt and Rip, 
1987). In other words, instead of relying on blind variation for technological development, 
expectations are used to help guide the search for promising solutions through different 
heuristics, as well as being employed to shape the selection environment.  
The dynamics between variation and selection processes are further examined in (Garud and 
Ahlstrom, 1997). In this paper, the authors highlight the differences in the assessment 
approaches employed by insiders and outsiders in the constitution of a technological field. 
On the one hand, insiders’ perspectives result in the creation of enactment cycles, which help 
proliferate various technological trajectories. On the other hand, outsiders’ perspectives lead 
to the creation of selection cycles, which reduce the number of those trajectories by selecting 
only a few promising solutions according to the outsiders’ own criteria. Insiders and outsiders 
are assumed to meet and interact at “bridging events”, when actors on one side actively 
engage in influencing the emerging assessment approaches adopted by actors on the other 
side for their respective cycles. Based on this difference in socio-cognitive position and style 
of activities, Rip (2006) suggests improving upon Garud and Ahlstrom’s terminologies by 
replacing ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ with ‘enactors’ and ‘selectors’ respectively. In addition, 
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Rip points up the structural difference between these actors’ perspectives as follows: while 
enactors claim to develop technological variations that might successfully address certain 
perceived problems, selectors often make their assessment based on different perception of 
what the problem is and how various technical options may contribute to a solution. As a 
result, it is suggested that communication occurred during the bridging event is not a one-
way process, but rather a bilateral one whereby enactors anticipate the possibility of being 
interrogated, as well as the comparative-selection perspective held by their audience. 
 
Figure 4 Dynamics in the Constitution of the Technological Field (Reproduced from (Garud and Ahlstrom, 1997)) 
These findings provide a solid foundation for the development of Bakker, van Lente and 
Meeus’ concept of “arenas of expectations”. These arenas are defined as “the loci where 
expectations are voiced by the enactors and tested by the selectors, where they are 
confronted with experience, knowledge and interests” (Bakker, van Lente and Meeus, 2011, 
p.159). In other words, expectations of different technological variations are trialled within 
these arenas based on earlier experiences of failed promises or fulfilled expectations, as well 
as social and economic forces of the environment in which they are supposed to be 
materialised. As a result, arenas of expectations become the linchpin which gives further 
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shape and content to the “cultural matrix of expectations”, as proposed in the quasi-
evolutionary model of technical change, and the notion of “bridging events” as discussed 
earlier in (Garud and Ahlstrom, 1997) and (Rip, 2006). The ways enactors and selectors 
engage in expectation work within the arenas of expectations are summarised in Figure 5.   
 
Figure 5 Arenas of Expectations (Reproduced from (Bakker, van Lente and Meeus, 2011)) 
As illustrated above, enactors constantly feed and maintain expectations in the arena to 
secure mandate for furthering their technical work. The mandate is given if enactors were 
able to convince selectors of the future potential of their technological trajectories, as well 
as emphasising the limits of competing options. Selectors, on the other hand, are informed 
of, as well as being constrained by, the circulating expectations in the arena. Based on such 
constraints, knowledge and their private interests, selectors develop their own criteria for 
assessing and picking the winning variations. Outcomes of the selectors’ decision-making 
process eventually feed back into the arena and influence the enactors’ ongoing battle for 
mandate.  
It is further argued that various arenas of expectations may co-exist at different levels of 
aggregation. Highly detailed expectations of technical trajectories, for example, are 
circulated and assessed at different arenas than those expectations dealing with the impacts 
of such technology on societal level. Consequently, Bakker, van Lente and Meeus conclude 
that, apart from the bilateral and synchronous fashion of exchanging expectations at 
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“bridging events” as suggested by Garud and Ahlstrom (1997), the communication of 
expectations also take place in asynchronous and multilateral fashion at a wide range of 
arenas, including scientific publication, foresight activities, roadmaps and so on. The complex 
interactions between enactors and selectors in these arenas bring about the coordination of 
research activities and further development for the prospective technology. 
Protected Space for Research and Development (R&D) activities 
The last spatial variable that is worth mentioning is the notion of “protected space”. This 
notion is crucial to understanding how an innovation is capable of overcoming contingencies 
in its early stages of development and subsequently engaging in the promise-requirement 
cycles (van Lente and Rip, 1998a). Being elaborated in (van Lente, 1993), this concept refers 
to either laboratories, where attempts by scientists to try out new expectations are 
protected, or niches within firms, where a provisional space for trial and error is created to 
foster a novel innovation project, or at the level of society, where strategic research areas 
are stimulated by science and technology policy measures. Van Lente (ibid.) argues that these 
spaces are created and maintained through expectations and thus, they share the same traits 
of being temporary, as well as being dependent upon precarious agreements and alliances 
between a wide range of different actors. 
Concurring with van Lente in the role of protected space in technological development, Rip 
and Schot (2002) propose a mapping tool for visualising the innovation journey through three 
clusters of activities: (1) building a protected space for “hopeful monstrosities”, (2) stepping 
out into the wider world, and (3) making changes at the sectoral level. All technological 
opportunities are argued to start out as “hopeful monstrosities”: they are full of promises, 
but perform rather crudely (Mokyr, 1990). As a result, enactors will have to make more 
specific promises to selectors so that resources can be mobilised for the new innovation 
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project. Through such promises, functions and potential public demand are articulated, as 
well as specifications for the material, types of artefact and expected performance of the 
new technology. As these expectations are stabilised into R&D agenda, a new cycle of 
promise-requirement is initiated and the innovation trajectory begins to take shape (van 
Lente, 1993). Rip and Schot (2002, p.162) argue that a protected space for a promising 
technological trajectory will emerge as “the net effect of the networking and resource 
mobilisation”. Furthermore, the authors contend that R&D activities within the protected 
space may carry on “according to [their] own dynamics” with little or no checking with the 
outside world: 
Part of the protection stems from a (precarious) agreement over a diffuse scenario 
about functions to be fulfilled and their societal usage. The nature of the protected 
space, its boundary agreements, the rules and heuristics derived from the 
promises that were made, together determine choices and directions. Work 
within the protected space thus proceeds according to its own dynamics, with only 
occasional checks with the scenario of usage (if at all). (Rip and Schot, 2002, p.163) 
Nevertheless, such R&D activities cannot proceed indefinitely. At some point in time, 
enactors must attempt at demonstrating a working technology, or in Rip and Schot’s (2002) 
terminology, they must “step out into a wider world”. This second cluster of activities is 
comprised of prototyping, troubleshooting, optimising production, preliminary market 
testing and so on, all of which are less self-contained than the previous R&D activities. 
Indeed, the second cluster of activities are alleged to “fall prey to intra- and inter-
organisational tensions” (ibid. p.163). They require different types of interactions, such as 
the enactment and selection cycles as suggested by Garud and Ahlstrom (1997) (see above). 
Such activities are crucial for real-world learning and subsequent product’s adaptation so 
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that enactors can make their work overcome the limitation of the particular protected space, 
where the innovation originates, and explore further applications in other market niches. 
Consequently, Rip and Schot (2002, p.165) conclude that, without a protected space, an 
innovation cannot survive the “harsh selection environment” and unprepared market, whose 
demand is only slowly articulated in response to supply. On the other hand, particularities of 
a certain protected space might confine the innovation to one market niche, which results in 
a product that survives only within that space. 
The final cluster of activities witnesses the changes which the new technology makes at the 
sectoral level. According to Schot (1998), the successful creation of a niche may lead directly 
to the emergence of a new techno-economic paradigm consisted of cognitive and 
institutional structures, existing networks of suppliers and consumers, and competences, all 
of which have adapted to the new technology. In other cases, successful niche creation might 
require further “niche branching”, before the accumulative effect of such a process can bring 
changes in the outside world. These changes become irreversible (or path dependency) once 
they have been made because the innovation is closely coupled with institutional structures 
and vested interests, specific narratives and practices, competencies and so on. These 
elements continue to exert significant influence on the market, even after the technology 
has been widely taken up and become “pervasive” (Rip and Schot, 2002, p.165). 
Interestingly, Rip and Schot’s description of the innovation journey leads us to speculate 
about a relationship between protected space and arenas of expectations. As mentioned 
above, enactors and their expectations compete in the arena for mandate and support. 
When mandate and resources for further work are given, enactors will use them to guide 
R&D activities in the protected space. By the end of the project, outcomes of the R&D 
activities will be interpreted, refined, and employed as rhetoric and materials for 
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constructing new expectations, which enactors will use to feed into the arena. Figure 6 
summarises the interrelation between the two spaces.   
 
Figure 6 The interrelation between Protected Space and Arenas of Expectations 
D. Expectations and Embodiment  
The fourth central tenet of the sociology of expectations is concerned with various shapes 
and forms of expectations (Borup et al., 2006). The literature examines to what extent 
expectations are expressed in rhetorical forms, i.e. enunciated views and ideas of people 
(utterances), and/or embedded in texts, materials, organisations, research activities, 
technological artefacts and so on. More importantly, scholars of expectation studies are 
interested in understanding the routes of transmission between imagination and materiality, 
especially how promissory abstractions take on substance and become materially embedded 
in technological systems and practices. In other words, it is an effort to comprehend the 
constitutive force and performative nature of expectations. 
Conventionally, scholarship on expectations focuses on examining the relationship between 
rhetorical representations of the future and the actual materialisation of these imaginations. 
Wyatt (2000), for instance, analyses the use of metaphors in future discourse about the 
Internet to demonstrate how linguistic representations of the future can play a critical part 
in shaping and reshaping the socio-political landscape of the ICT sector. More recent studies 
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of expectations, nonetheless, turn to examining future representations over time, instead of 
their roles at any single moments. A typical example of this kind of research is Brown and 
Michael (2003)’s seminal study of changing expectations in the case of xenotransplantation12 
(XT). By comparing people’s recollections of past futures (i.e. “retrospecting prospects”) and 
the ways these memories are redeployed to engage with the current future (i.e. “prospecting 
retrospects”), the authors have discovered how statements of expectations change over time 
and help in prospectively shaping current initiatives, as well as responding to retrospective 
patterns of past innovations. As a result, Brown and Michael emphasise the importance of 
mapping the “situatedness of expectations” and argue that “whilst expectations are largely 
discursive in character, they largely depend on material practice” (ibid. p.7). 
In recent years, however, the accelerating pace of innovation has significantly altered many 
techno-scientific fields, especially ICTs, which resulted in the proliferation of active strategies 
to grapple with expectations (i.e. envisioning, road mapping, standardisation, etc.), and the 
emergence of new intermediaries specialising in the production of promissory knowledge 
about nascent technologies and future markets (Pollock and Williams, 2009b). Such change 
provides new, and fruitful, empirical ground for further research on the performativity of 
expectations and shifts the focus of studies on a new group of actors, namely industry 
analysts. Pollock and Williams (2010, p.532) call them “promissory organisations” to 
emphasise the fact that these intermediaries “routinely and prodigiously produces future-
oriented claims”, which are not simply reflections or representations of the state of affair in 
a particular market, but also critical factors contributing to the shaping of such a market. 
They argue that the current frameworks developed within the sociology of expectations are 
incapable of providing explanations in a “sufficiently comprehensive and nuanced way” for a 
                                                          
12 The use of non-human tissues and organs on human transplant surgery. 
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wide range of promissory behaviour, which they witness in the field of IT procurement (ibid. 
p.542).  
Inspired by theoretical approaches emerging from the Sociology of Finance and Economic 
Sociology, Pollock and Williams propose the development of a “typology of promissory 
behaviour”, which considers different kinds of effect and accountability possessed by various 
kinds of promissory work. Instead of dividing expectations into two categories: specific vs. 
collective as in (Konrad, 2006), or into three levels of aggregation: micro, meso and macro, 
as in (Borup et al., 2006)13, the typology suggests the existence of a spectrum of promissory 
activities in the field. At one end is promissory work that “matters”, in the sense that they 
are researched and defended vigorously by promissory organisations. The promissory work 
of this kind tends to have strong and enduring effect on the market; and actors would be 
held accountable if it failed to materialise. At the other end of the spectrum is, intriguingly, 
the kind of promissory work that “does not matter”. These types of work act as if they are 
“provocations”: i.e. being simply “launched into the ether” for the main purpose of capturing 
interest, resulting in short-lived levels of influence (Pollock and Williams, 2010, p.543). If 
provocations failed, they do not seem to matter because reputations of promissory 
organisations are not explicitly damaged by such failures.  
Pollock and Williams also predict the presence of other types of promissory work that inhabit 
the full spectrum of the promissory activities, and thus, constitute the proposed “typology of 
promissory behaviour”. Such an assertion is in line with the aforementioned concept of 
“arenas of expectations”, which is built on the postulate that multiple types of expectation 
work “meet in different arenas of expectations for different aspects of the technology and 
for different levels within the prospective technological system” (Bakker, van Lente and 
                                                          
13 Cross-referencing section II, page 29. 
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Meeus, 2011, p.160). These concepts indeed provide a good foundation on which I build the 
theoretical discussion in this thesis. 
V. Existing gaps in the literature 
Having carefully examined the existing theoretical frameworks emerging from the sociology 
of expectations, I have identified the following three gaps in the literature, which I intend to 
address in my thesis. 
A. Gap 1: The lack of study of other types of expectations  
As evident from the previous discussions, the majority of literature from the sociology of 
expectations are built on the postulate of “high expectations”. High expectations are thought 
to be built into the way science and technology develop (Borup et al., 2006). Using high 
expectations as an analytical point of departure, scholars of expectation studies have 
developed numerous frameworks, most notably the hype-disappointment cycles, for 
understanding the ways actors constitute and engage with the future. The problem of this 
kind of model, according to Brown and Michael (2003), is that it creates a circular way of 
thinking in which the assessment of an innovation cannot be analytically distinguished from 
representations of expectations. They assert: 
The problem with this model is that it uses high expectations as an index of a 
technology’s early stage of development and vice versa. That is to say, high or 
optimistic expectation is discursively correlated with a technology in its infancy: 
this is something of a circularity. Analytically, it is problematic because our 
assessment of an innovation’s progression along this path are virtually 
indistinguishable from representations of promise and expectation. (Brown and 
Michael, 2003, p.12)  
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Apart from the analytical perspective, assuming expectations always “have to be inflated in 
order to get a hearing” (Brown, Rip and Van Lente, 2003, p.3) is also questionable from the 
theoretical point of view. As Pollock and Williams (2010) have successfully demonstrated, the 
typology of promissory behaviour constitutes a full spectrum of expectations, ranging from 
robustly-defended promissory work (which has strong and enduring influence) to 
provocations (which are low in accountability and exert short-lived influence on the field). 
This wide array of expectations would have their strengths trialled in different arenas for 
different levels of the technological system and for different aspects (i.e. social, political, 
economic, technical, etc.) of the technology in question (Bakker, van Lente and Meeus, 2011). 
As a result, selectors in each arena would employ radically different criteria for assessing 
expectations and it is reasonable to speculate that high or positive expectations might not 
be favoured in a few certain arenas. In such cases, enactors may have to resort to other types 
of expectations to propel their choices of technological trajectories.  
This argument has been reinforced by empirical evidence found in Tutton (2011, p.425), who 
argues that “every promising future is predicated on another more pessimistic future to be 
avoided”. His study of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings from three 
companies operating in the biotech sector reveals that these organisations are compelled to 
co-articulate both pessimistic and promising futures in their statements to reflect the 
volatility and promises of their own sector. Consequently, Tutton concludes that “pessimistic 
representations of the future cannot be treated separately from promissory representations” 
and urges STS scholars to pay equal attention to the construction of pessimistic futures as 
opposed to optimistic expectations (ibid. p.425). I suspect that promissory representations 
and pessimistic projections (or “high” and “low” expectations) are only two amongst a great 
number of different kinds of expectations that could be found in the field, especially in a case 
as complex as the Copyright Hub. 
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B. Gap 2: The dearth of understanding of the expectations’ credibility 
Why are some expectations more credible than others? Why do certain expectations triumph 
and help propel their associated technological trajectories when others do not? These 
questions represent a thorny issue of understanding expectations’ credibility, which has 
troubled STS scholars for decades. Commenting on this problem, Berkhout (2006, p.305) 
concedes: 
Clearly, some visions and expectations will garner greater credibility and 
legitimacy than others. We do not properly understand the basis of this credibility 
– why some ideas seem to be more resonant at a given moment than others.  
Several attempts have been made to address this issue with various degree of success. Callon 
(1987), for instance, in his seminal case study of the electric vehicle in France, tries to give an 
explanation as to why the French electricity company EDF was able to convince Renault – the 
car manufacturer – and other actors to accept the roles that were assigned to them in EDF’s 
proposed “future world”, despite the fact that this vision conflicted with Renault’s interest. 
Callon demonstrates various means by which the “engineer-sociologists” had used to 
construct the “heterogeneous associations” needed to advance their vision, ranging from 
pure coercion, to negotiation, to bargaining. Despite being appealing, Callon’s framework 
depends on analysing direct interactions between actors and lacks the capacity to 
accommodate more subtle, indirect social mechanisms. Furthermore, Callon has not been 
able to explain what caused the reversal of the accepted socio-technical scenario by Renault 
at the end of the case study.  
To address these shortcomings, Konrad (2006) proposes looking at the “social dynamics of 
expectations” as potentially useful concepts for explaining these incidents. The article 
suggests three mechanisms by which innovation processes can be affected by expectation 
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dynamics. First, Konrad argues that once a collective expectation14 is taken for granted, 
alternative visions will be eclipsed and the necessity to convince other actors to take part in 
realising the vision is, to a certain extent, relieved. Second, collective expectations, as social 
repertoire, can also exert “image pressure”, which compels actors to meet those 
expectations. These dynamics, according to Konrad (ibid. p.442), help explain how a large set 
of heterogenous actors can be rallied behind a vision, although some actors may “a priori” 
hold only marginal or little interest in the innovation field. Finally, Konrad contends that the 
interpretation of the project’s outcomes will be strongly influenced by collective 
expectations. He maintains: 
The results of technological projects are interpreted in the light of the same 
expectations they are supposed to ‘validate’. This is because ‘hard facts’, or 
evaluation criteria, are themselves subject to interpretative flexibility. (Konrad, 
2006, p.436) 
As a result, collective expectations can act as a protected space for the project, whose 
outcomes will be interpreted in a favourable light. Even if outcomes of the project were 
negative, evaluation criteria may be suspended, or the result can still be read as peripheral 
to decision making. Konrad’s conclusions, despite being valuable and helpful in offering new 
insights into the ways expectation dynamics shape innovation processes, still suffer from the 
incapacity to accommodate a “typology of promissory behaviour” as suggested by Pollock 
and Williams (2010). Furthermore, Konrad has not been able to provide us with a robust 
framework and useful vocabularies for further analysing the complex dynamics between 
                                                          
14 For Konrad’s classification of expectations, cross-referencing page 29 
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different types of innovation actors and their different (in both kinds and levels of) 
expectation work. 
This gap in literature, I argue, has been filled rather successfully with Bakker, van Lente and 
Meeus’ (2011) concept of “arenas of expectations”15. To recapitulate, it is argued that 
technological communities of enactors and their expectations compete in various arenas of 
expectations for different aspects of the technical innovation and for different levels within 
the technological system. Apart from bilateral and synchronous fashion of exchanging 
expectations occurred during bridging events, expectations are also circulated in a more 
multilateral and asynchronous fashion through scientific publication, foresight activities and 
similar activities. Selectors, on the other hand, inform and constrain themselves with 
expectations circulated in the arenas. They develop their own criteria for assessment and use 
them to evaluate and pick the winner(s) in the arena. Although the concept of “arenas of 
expectations” has helped us make a big step toward furthering our understanding of the roles 
of expectations on innovation process, Bakker, van Lente and Meeus (ibid. p.159) concur that 
the issue of expectation’s credibility still has not been “fully understood”: 
How and why exactly the selectors come to their assessments of the different 
expectations in the arenas is a question that we think deserves further study. […] 
it is not fully understood why some options are thought to be credible and others 
are not.   
Taking the matter into their own hands, Bakker, van Lente and Meeus (2012) tackle this 
question through a case study of the US Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hydrogen Program. 
It has been found that expectations are assessed as credible when they build on (1) the 
                                                          
15 Cross-referencing Section IV. C 
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technology’s current level of performance and its historical progress, (2) a path forward 
which assures that higher level of performance can be achieved, and (3) an end target 
performance level that relates to societal needs. Amongst them, the construction of a path 
forward is deemed most critical to the credibility of expectations. In addition, the paper also 
foregrounds the distinct role of agency in “the enaction and selection process of forceful 
expectations” (ibid. p.1070). On the one hand, it confirms the basic tenet of the sociology of 
expectations which asserts that collective expectations, once accepted, will create the 
boundaries within which enactors and selectors perform their expectation work. On the 
other hand, it highlights the mutual relationship between the credibility of actors (or 
communities of actors) and the credibility of their expectations. This notion of “dual 
credibility” is suggested to be key to understanding the lobbying capacity of actors – a 
potentially fruitful area for further research. 
Despite its validity and usefulness, Bakker, van Lente and Meeus’ approach to understanding 
expectations’ credibility still suffers from one critical weakness: it does not explain how 
outcomes of the trials of strength of expectations in multiple arenas interact and influence 
each other. In other words, if Bakker, van Lente and Meeus (2011, p.160) accepted that 
“multiple arenas may co-exist at various levels of aggregation”, they must also concur that 
the boundaries, within which enactors and selectors perform their expectation work, are not 
limited to any one single arena. Being able to examine the results and complex interactions 
of the enaction and selection processes of strategically important arenas of expectations, I 
argue, is the key to understand why, not just one, but a constellation of expectations is more 
credible than the other. This approach can also help shed light on explaining why and how a 
collective expectation become taken-for-granted – a question which still has not been 
satisfactorily addressed. In short, it was my intention to fill the second gap in the literature 
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by tackling the theoretical and analytical void currently existing between the multiplicity of 
interrelated arenas of expectations.   
C. Gap 3: The need to reconceptualise the notion of “Protected Space” 
As mentioned above, the concept of “protected space” is of crucial importance to 
understanding the (successful) journey of technological innovation. Nonetheless, not much 
attention has been paid to further problematising this notion in recent scholarship of the 
sociology of expectations since Rip and Schot’s (2002) proposal16. To recapitulate, Rip and 
Schot propose a two-dimensional model for visualising the innovation journey and 
application/adoption activities of a novel technology. This model is composed of two axes: 
(1) the vertical axis indicating the progress of the innovation journey through time, and (2) 
the horizontal axis housing different poles of techno-economic networks, i.e. Science, 
Technology and Market/Society. The dynamics of innovation are represented by activities 
(and their interactions) occurring sequentially and/or concurrently at different poles, from 
top (representing the present) to bottom (representing the future). Rip and Schot 
hypothesise that an innovation journey may go through three clusters/ phases of activities: 
(1) building a protected space, (2) stepping out into the wider world, and (3) sector-level 
changes. With regard to protected spaces, they argue that these spaces emerge as the net 
effect of networking and resource mobilisation, which are driven by expectations and 
promises. 
Despite its appeal of simplicity, Rip and Schot’s model still suffers from three critical 
shortcomings. First, the authors are neither able to conceptualise the underlying mechanisms 
upon which a protected space is formed, nor capable of explaining why and how a protected 
                                                          
16 Cross-referencing page 51. 
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space is dissolved. Consequently, the notion of “boundaries” of a protected space has not 
been properly developed, apart from the following scanty, equivocal argument:  
Part of a protection stems from a (precarious) agreement over a diffuse scenario 
about functions to be fulfilled and their societal usage. The nature of the protected 
space, its boundary agreements17, the rules and heuristics derived from the 
promises that were made, together determine choices and directions (Rip and 
Schot, 2002, p.163).  
Second, Rip and Schot assume sequential order and clear-cut separation between the first 
cluster of activities, i.e. building protected spaces whose work is thought to proceed 
“according to its own dynamics”, and the second cluster, i.e. stepping out into a wider world, 
whose activities are described to be “much less self-contained […] and fall prey to intra- and 
inter-organisational tensions” (ibid. p.163). Such rigidity of the model does not allow 
researchers to apprehend more complex cases, where boundaries between the two clusters 
of activities are blurred, or even significantly overlapped; or where activities to build a 
protected space and stepping out into a wider world do not take place in sequence, but 
rather occur concurrently.  
Third, Rip and Schot argue that an innovation journey may conclude with one of three 
scenarios: (1) promises turn out to be empty, innovation fails and the protected space 
collapses; (2) innovation fails to make changes at sector-level but manages to survives in one 
market niche; and (3) innovation succeeds in branching to other niches, which leads to niche 
“piling”. The accumulative effect of such a process is that innovation makes structural 
changes to the sector (i.e. standard setting, production networks, consumption habits, social 
                                                          
17 My own emphasis. 
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values and culture, etc.) and becomes “a pervasive technology” (ibid. p.165). In the latter two 
cases, protected spaces are assumed to dissolved “naturally” because innovation no longer 
requires protection. The fallacy of this argument lies in its strong focus on a single niche (or 
project) and its success or failure, which misleads Rip and Schot into conceptualising that 
sector-level changes would materialise through bottom-up processes of niche expansion, 
with little regard to other ongoing processes at higher levels.  
Since Rip and Schot’s work, however, no further studies have been conducted to directly 
tackle these issues. Recent studies in sociology of expectations either omit the notion of 
“protected spaces” completely (Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003; Nerlich and Halliday, 2007; 
Selin, 2007), or use it as a black-boxed concept with scant introductory descriptions (Brown, 
Rip and Van Lente, 2003; Borup et al., 2006; Konrad, 2006), or focus their attention on 
developing a different-yet-related concept, i.e. “arenas of expectations” (Bakker, van Lente 
and Meeus, 2011, 2012). This argument is illustrated through the following summary of the 
general perception of “protected space” as presented in the contemporary sociological 
studies of expectations. Geels (2007) argues that when certain encompassing promises are 
accepted and stabilise into an agenda, expectations are translated into more specific 
requirements, which will then be addressed in a protected space. A protected space is thus 
defined as “an environment which is relatively shielded from outside scrutiny” (Parandian, 
Rip and Te Kulve, 2012, p.567), where enactors are given the mandate to explore and develop 
their visions on the promise of delivering (some forms of) the expectations in the end. By the 
time projects conclude, their outcomes are assessed, and new promises will be made to the 
selectors. “Repair work” might be performed when prior expectations have not been met 
and reasons are voiced by enactors to justify the delay (Geels and Raven, 2006). New 
expectations are made to be more refined and specific, and subsequently translated into new 
requirements. The succession of promises, requirements, ongoing work and more specific 
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promises and related requirements results in the promise-requirement cycles, which create 
a trajectory of development (Parandian, Rip and Te Kulve, 2012). These cycles continue if 
progress is still able to justify new promises, and selectors are still convinced of the benefits 
which further technological development will bring.  
In short, compared to the foundational work laid by van Lente (1993), van Lente and Rip 
(1998b, 1998a), and Rip and Schot (2002), recent studies of sociology of expectations 
contribute little new insights to furthering our understanding of the concept of “protected 
spaces”. However, one can argue that the development of Bakker, van Lente, and Meeus’ 
(2011, 2012) concept of “arenas of expectations” has offered a valuable suggestion on how 
the second shortcoming of Rip and Schot’s proposal could be addressed. As mentioned 
above18, there exists a mutual shaping relationship between arenas of expectations and 
protected spaces. Arenas of expectations can be regarded as spaces where enactors venture 
into the outside world to compete for mandate and support. These mandate and support will 
then be used to create and maintain a protected space for R&D activities, whose outcomes 
will in turn be used to develop further expectations for “trials of strengths” in different 
arenas. The act of enactors stepping into the outside world thus does not automatically lead 
to the dismantling of the protected space and the cycle of “mandate-expectations” can occur 
multiple times throughout the development trajectory of an innovation. By using these two 
concepts in conjunction with one another, we can reconceptualise the innovation journey, 
which does not necessarily follow a sequential, clear-cut order from “building a protected 
space” to “stepping out into a wider world” as originally proposed by Rip and Schot. 
While the notion of “protected spaces” has been neglected in recent studies of the sociology 
of expectations, its equivalent concept - “technological niches” - has become a central focus 
                                                          
18 Cross-referencing page 53. 
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of research in an emerging field of studies, known as Strategic Niche Management (SNM). 
The equivalence between these two notions is expressed in Kemp, Schot and Hoogma’s 
(1998, p.186) foundational paper in the field, as they provide a definition of strategic niche 
management as follows: 
Strategic niche management is the creation, development and controlled phase-
out of protected spaces for the development and use of promising technologies 
by means of experimentation, with the aim of (1) learning about the desirability 
of the new technology and (2) enhancing the further development and the rate of 
application of the new technology. 
Using the quasi-evolutionary model for innovation19 as a point of departure, Kemp, Schot and 
Hoogma (ibid.) criticise the limitation of Dosi’s (1982) concept of technological paradigm and 
Nelson and Winter’s (1977) notion of technological regime for being biased towards cognitive 
aspects of problem-solving activities, while neglecting other socio-economic factors. The 
interactions between these socio-economic factors and the cognitive aspects of technical 
development are argued to help shape the direction of R&D activities. Consequently, the 
authors propose a broader definition of technological regime, which is defined as “the whole 
complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, production process technologies, 
product characteristics, skills and procedures, and institutions and infrastructures that make 
                                                          
19 Schot, Hoogma and Elzen (1994) proposes the quasi-evolutionary model for innovation, which 
emphasises the coupling of the variation and selection processes in technological change. This 
approach contradicts the conventional evolutionary models of innovation, which lay heavy emphasis 
on the randomness of the variation and selection processes (i.e. variation and selection are considered 
separate processes which have their own causes and dynamics). Schot (1998) argues that developers 
of innovation create and employ expectations to anticipate and further adjust the selection 
environment. These expectations thus form various links between the variation and selection 
processes, which make them “deliberately combined” (ibid. p.197). Nonetheless, outcomes of the 
process of technological change are not completely dictated by the strategies and links designed by 
actors. Therefore, the main reason for holding on to the evolutionary theory to explain technological 
change, according to Schot (ibid. p.198), is because of “this fascinating process of [actors’] efforts to 
create order in an otherwise random process of many interrelated developments”. 
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up a totality of a technology” (Kemp, Schot and Hoogma, 1998, p.182). Comparing a 
technological regime to a political regime, or a regulatory regime, Kemp, Schot and Hoogma 
(ibid. p.182) argue that “the existing complex of technology extended in social life imposes a 
grammar or logic for socio-technical change”. Consequently, this extension and embedding 
of existing technologies in broader technological systems, production and consumption 
practices, research and management belief systems, cultural values and so on, create not 
only technological, but also economic, cognitive and social barriers for new technologies. 
These barriers help explain why most technological changes are non-radical, and why these 
changes are often geared toward regime optimisation rather than regime transformation. 
Then, how does novel technologies overcome these interrelated (and seemingly impassable) 
barriers? Kemp, Schot and Hoogma (ibid. p.184) resort to the notion of “niche formation” 
and argue that niches are “instrumental” in helping a novel technology to take off: i.e. from 
demonstrating its capability and securing financial support to building a constituency behind 
the innovation. They contend: 
These niches are important for the development of a new technology. Without the 
presence of a niche, system builders would get nowhere. The niches were 
instrumental20 in the take-off of a new regime and the further development of a 
new technology. Apart from demonstrating the viability of a new technology and 
providing financial means for further development, niches helped to build a 
constituency behind a new technology, and to set in motion interactive learning 
processes and institutional adaptations […] that are all-important for the wider 
diffusion and development of the new technology. 
                                                          
20 These are emphasised as in the original document. 
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Consequently, the authors urge governments to contribute to the processes of niche 
formation by adopting their proposed strategy of “strategic niche management”. Such a 
policy consists of five steps. First, an “appropriate” technology, i.e. outside the existing 
technological regime, but has great potential in alleviating social problems, must be chosen. 
Second, an “appropriate” setting in which the new technology is to be used must be selected, 
where the advantages of the technology are valued highly, and its disadvantages are 
regarded as trivial. The third step is concerned with the establishment of the protected space 
itself. It is emphasised that a balance must be struck between the protection and selection 
pressure in this step. Too much protection may lead to costly failures, while too little 
protection might force developers to abandon certain paths of development in favour of 
short-term gains and benefits. The fourth step is about scaling up the experiment by means 
of policy. In the final step, niches might break down when support for the new technology is 
no longer necessary due to its success, or undesirable due to its disappointing outcomes. 
Therefore, strategic niche management, in its original form, was proposed as a strategy for 
governments to manage the transition process to a different technological regime. Since 
Kemp, Schot and Hoogma’s (1998) foundational work, however, SNM scholars did not focus 
on developing SNM as a policy tool, but instead directed their attention towards examining 
the conditions and processes which determine successful21 niche development (Schot and 
Geels, 2008). Schot and Geels (ibid.) argue that, after ten years of fruitful development of the 
field, SNM scholars have identified three internal processes which determine the success of 
niche development: (1) the articulation of expectations and visions, (2) the building of social 
                                                          
21 In this context, success is defined as the extent to which a technological niche can be transformed 
into a market niche, and eventually a regime shift. This criteria follows early SNM work, which 
conceptualised the process of regime shift as a bottom-up process: (1) novel technologies emerge in 
technological niches, (2) the conquer market niches, (3) and eventually replace and transform the 
existing regime (Schot and Geels, 2008). 
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networks, i.e. creating a constituency behind the new technology, and (3) learning processes 
at multiple dimensions: e.g. technical aspects, user preferences, production and 
maintenance networks, government policies, cultural meaning and societal effects. The 
majority of researches cited by Schot and Geels (ibid. pp.541-543) are empirical case studies 
of finished and/or ongoing experiments in a range of fields, which place special focus on 
“explaining the limited success of the experiments studied”. As a result, the authors contend 
that these studies have proved SNM to be “a useful ex-post analytical framework” (ibid. 
p.541), while conceding the fact that “[s]o far, SNM has been used primarily for ex-post 
evaluations of case studies. It has not been applied prescriptively in ongoing processes” (ibid. 
p.548). Thus, from a methodological perspective, SNM also shares a similar weakness to the 
sociology of expectations in the lack of a robust methodological approach to studying 
innovation-in-the-making. 
Nonetheless, one crucial contribution which these ex-post studies have made to the 
literature of SNM, according to Schot and Geels, is the differentiation between local socio-
technical projects and global niche-level, which consists of an emerging community that 
shares cognitive, normative and formal rules and believes (Geels and Raven, 2006). 
Consequently, niche development can be conceptualised as a dual process22, which is 
simultaneously occurring at two levels: the level of projects in local practices and the global 
niche level. The “branching” and “piling” of local niches may eventually add up to an 
emerging niche at the global level. Most intriguingly, this conceptualisation helps refocus 
attention on sequences of projects, instead of single projects and their success or failure. 
Since sequences of projects can accumulate into learning trajectories, the very notion of 
                                                          
22 One might notice the converging of ideas between sociology of expectations and strategic niche 




projects’ failure should be reconsidered, as even failed projects can contribute to the success 
of the overall sequence (see Figure 7). Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that recent 
scholarship in SNM has successfully addressed the third shortcoming23 in Rip and Schot’s 
model, which places excessive focus on single projects and their outcomes in its account of 
technological change. 
 
Figure 7 Technical trajectory carried by local projects (Reproduced from (Geels and Raven, 2006, p.379)) 
To conclude, in this section, I have discussed three critical shortcomings of the model for 
mapping innovation journey proposed by Rip and Schot (2002): (1) the lack of 
conceptualisation of the boundaries of protected spaces and the ways they are formed and 
dissolved; (2) the rigidity of the model in assuming a sequential order and clear-cut 
separation between activities to build protected spaces and stepping out into a wider world; 
and (3) the strong focus on single projects and their outcomes. It has also been shown that 
the latter two shortcomings have been addressed to a certain extent by recent literature 
developed in the sociology of expectations and strategic niche management, while the first 
pitfall is still being neglected. In other words, the existing literature still falls short of fulfilling 
the gap in our knowledge about “protected spaces”: i.e. how should protected spaces be 
                                                          
23 Cross-referencing page 64. 
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conceptualised and defined other than the prevalent black-boxed notion which currently 
dominates the literature? How and by what mechanism does the creation/ formation of a 
protected space take place? Why and how does a protected space dissolve? Does the 
dissolution process leave behind an “empty space”? It is my intention to fulfil this gap in the 





Chapter 3 - Research Design & 
Methodology 
 
I. Research Strategies and Methodology 
A. Theoretical & Methodological Presuppositions 
Deductive vs. Inductive Strategies 
According to Bryman (2012), there exists a close relationship between theory and research 
design/ methodological choices. Theory can either form the ground upon which hypotheses 
are deduced and then subjected to empirical scrutiny (deductive theory) or be the outcome 
of the inductive process which draws generalizable inferences out of empirical data 
(inductive theory). Hence, there exists deductive and inductive strategies in research 
although the differences between them are not always clear-cut. With regard to this study, 
an inductive strategy was chosen as the main approach as it is not the intention of the 
researcher to put some presupposed hypotheses to empirical tests, but to disclose hidden 
socio-economic factors which influence the decision-making process behind the Copyright 
Hub and attempt to construct some generalisations from them.  
Grand Theories 
Apart from deductive-inductive categorisation, theories can also be classified based on their 
levels of abstraction, ranging from empirical theorisation, to middle-range theories, to grand 
theories. At the highest level of abstraction, grand theories deal primarily with issues at the 
general and most abstract level. To be precise, grand theory deals with two important 
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considerations: epistemology, i.e. the question of justification of knowledge, and ontology, 
i.e. the question of fundamental nature of being (Blaikie, 2009, pp.92-96). In this research, 
which deals with the emergence of a new socio-technical phenomenon, my epistemological 
perspective is of an interpretivist who asserts that the research subject of social sciences is 
significantly different from that of natural sciences and hence the importance of grasping 
“the subjective meaning of social action” (Bryman, 2012, p.30). What is more, it is conceded 
that scientific knowledge and technological trajectories are neither neutral nor value free, 
but they are indeed contingent upon the socio-technical context which gives birth to them. 
As a result, objectivity and “the view from nowhere” are mere a “god trick” in science and 
technology studies (Harding, 1995; Shapin, 1998). Additionally, constructivism is employed 
as the ontological perspective used in this research. In this point of view, social phenomena 
and their meanings are constantly under construction and revision by social actors, instead 
of being an external structure that acts on and constraints people (Saunders, 1992; Young 
and Collin, 2004). 
Qualitative vs. Quantitative vs. Mixed Methods 
Bryman (2012) argues that, if one take the aforementioned epistemological and ontological 
concerns into consideration, two types of distinctive research strategy could be identified, 
namely quantitative and qualitative research strategies. In short, quantitative research 
focuses on the quantification of data collection and analysis, and leans towards deductive 
theory, positivism and objectivism. On the contrary, qualitative research emphasises on 
word-based data and leans more towards inductive theory, interpretivism and 
constructivism. Consequently, it would be logical to choose qualitative research as the 
primary research strategy in this study.  
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However, making such a decision is neither straightforward nor uncomplicated since each 
research strategy comes with its own strengths and weaknesses. Carr (1994) argued that 
quantitative and qualitative approaches have the following advantages and shortcomings. 
First, in data sampling, quantitative research normally required data to be sampled randomly 
and hence the more likelihood of the findings to be generalizable. However, random 
sampling is expensive and time-consuming to conduct. On the other hand, qualitative 
research normally has recourse to a small, selective sample due to its in-depth nature of 
studies. Consequently, it makes findings from qualitative studies more difficult to generalise 
but this can be offset by the cost and time needed to conduct the study. Second, in the 
relationship between researchers and subject, quantitative researchers maintain a distant, 
detached view with regard to the subject and treat them merely as a source of data. The 
strength of this position is that it helps researchers avoid bias and maintain their objectivity. 
However, because of that they do not have first-hand experience as qualitative researchers. 
The close relationship between researchers and subject also allows them to gain more in-
depth insights into the subject’s perspective. However, such close relationship also increases 
the possibility of bias and complicates the research process. Third, quantitative methods 
allow researchers to make predictions and control future outcomes due to the fact that 
variables can be manipulated in experiments. On the other hand, qualitative methods allow 
both researchers to gain deeper understanding of the subject and the subject to raise novel 
issues which are unknown to the researchers. Fourth, it is argued that quantitative data is 
easy to process, especially with the help of computer software. However, this analysis tends 
to ignore deviant cases while qualitative data identifies and takes into account all of these 




Apart from these two strategies, mixed-methods has recently become the third of the three 
major ‘research paradigms’ (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie and Turner, 2007, p.123). Mixed 
methods research is defined as “the type of research in which a researcher or a team of 
researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches […] for 
the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and corroboration”. By 
combining the two approaches, it seems promising that mixed method approach would be 
able to overcome the weaknesses encountered in each individual strategy to “provide the 
most comprehensive approach […] to solve a research problem” (Morse, 1991). However, 
Bryman (2012) argued that mixed method approach is not intrinsically superior to mono-
method and is also subject to the same constraints and considerations as other approaches. 
Furthermore, when considering using mixed methods, it is important to be aware that: first, 
using methods with different or even conflicting epistemological and/or ontological 
presuppositions would undermine the integrity and coherence of the research; second, 
mixed methods can consume significantly more time and resources than research conducted 
with mono-method; and third, mixed methods approach requires a researcher to possess 
substantive understanding and skills in both qualitative and quantitative methods in order to 
conduct the research effectively. As a result, it might not be desirable or feasible to use mixed 
methods in certain types of research. The drawbacks of mixed methods become even more 
acute in the case of doctoral research, which is typically restricted by a limited timeframe, 
inadequate resources and the lack of the researcher’s expertise and experience in conducting 
a wide range of research methods.  
Taking these arguments into considerations, I decided to choose qualitative approach as the 
research strategy for this study. The main argument here is that it is of utmost importance 
for the adopted approach to be able to help the researcher gain in-depth insights into the 
subjects’ perspective and (hopefully) uncover unexpected themes and issues that could shed 
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new light on the complex dynamics between actors, expectations and innovation’s 
trajectory. This work is carried out via careful examination of the mechanisms by which key 
players interact within (and beyond) their own ecologies, how alliances are formed across 
ecological boundaries, and the ways the Copyright Hub project is shaped and moulded by 
socio-technical expectations and ecological forces. All of these issues require data that can 
only be produced through qualitative approach, and thus, it is the most suitable research 
strategy for the purposes of this study. 
Middle-range theories 
The final theoretical presupposition that needs considering is the choice of middle-range 
theories. This concept is proposed and discussed by Merton in three versions of Social Theory 
and Social Structure, amongst which the 1968 version is the most cited. Merton (1968, p.39) 
defines middle-range theory as: 
Theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve 
in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts 
to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities of social 
behaviour, social organization and social change. 
Such a definition therefore implies the differences in the theoretical scope between middle-
range theories and empirical theorisations, which are located at the small-scope end of the 
spectrum, and grand theories, which are located at the large-scope end of the spectrum. 
Middle-range theories are situated between the two extremes. In addition to the definition, 
Merton also points up three defining characteristics, which set middle-range theories apart 
from the remainder. First, they consist of a limited set of interconnected concepts aimed at 
understanding limited topics, instead of broad and abstract entities as in the case of grand 
theories. In other words, middle-range theories focus on comprehending certain aspects of 
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social phenomena, rather than the social phenomena themselves. Second, middle-range 
theories also differ from grand theories in their emphasis upon empirical research, i.e. 
propositions and concepts of middle-range theories should be specific and empirically 
researchable. Third, middle-range theories should specify and theorise the relationships 
between concepts into analytical models, which indicate how one concept relates to and 
influences other concepts. Merton argues that only when concepts are integrated into 
analytical models that they constitute “the definitions or prescriptions of what is to be 
observed” (Merton, 1968, p.143). 
The Promise of Middle-Range Theories and the Discontent in STS 
Building on Merton’s work, Geels (2007, p.627) argues that “talk of ‘middle-range theory’ 
(MRT) is often an indication of discontent in a discipline, suggesting a middle way between 
undesirable extremes”. Elaborating upon his argument regarding STS, Geels asserts that the 
feeling of discontent occurs in four aspects of the field: (1) policy relevance; (2) conceptual 
language; (3) excessive focus on complexity; and (4) theoretical styles.  
First, despite being a fruitful and vibrant field of research, STS is still regarded as having 
limited impact on other fields, most notably policy making (Edge, 2003). Geels (2007, p.630) 
argues that this is due mainly to “the normative aversion against instrumental contributions, 
for fear of technocracy”. Consequently, this leads to the fact that, instead of being 
constructive and proactive, most policy contributions are either reflexive or critical of policy 
discourses for the lack of understanding of the relationships between science, technology 
and society. Second, STS also suffers from the drawback of having, in abundance, loose 
concepts which are neither clearly defined nor carefully demarcated in regard to other similar 
concepts. The lack of efforts to systematically integrate and interrelate concepts is evident 
in calls, such as (Molina, 1995, p.387):  
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A need continues to exist for further refining and developing systematic 
approaches to understand complex technological processes by integrating 
concepts in an analytically operational way.  
Third, STS studies are criticised for placing too much theoretical emphasis on complexity, 
local practices and contingencies. Geels argues that, in the early days of STS, such a focus on 
contingencies and non-linearity was crucial for tackling taken-for-granted ideas about the 
linear model of technical development and technological determinism. Approaches such as 
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) and Actor Network Theory (ANT) had served these 
purposes well in the 1980s and 1990s. Nonetheless, these approaches (and numerous case 
studies which they inspire) are now suffering from diminishing returns of repetitious and 
unintriguing message about messiness, local practices, and contingencies (Guggenheim and 
Nowotny, 2003).  
Fourth, theories are not only different from one another in their concepts and propositions, 
but they are also regarded to come in different styles. DiMaggio (1995) proposes three styles 
of theories: (1) as covering law, i.e. theories consisted of generalisations, when taken 
together, describe the world as we see it; (2) as enlightenment, i.e. theories viewed as a 
device of sudden enlightenment24, which are rich in paradox, complex and defamiliarizing25; 
and (3) as narrative, i.e. theories regarded as an account of a social process with particular 
focus on empirically testing the possibilities of the narrative and careful attention to the 
scope conditions of the account. In addition, Weick (1999) suggests that all styles of theories 
                                                          
24 ANT and SCOT arguably belong to the enlightenment style of theories due to their “shock value” 
and “the potential for scandal” in the case of ANT (Law, 1999, p.3) and “the agenda of demonstrating 
the social construction” of mundane technologies and artefacts as in the case of SCOT (Bijker, 2009, 
p.90). 
25 DiMaggio (1995, p.392) defines defamiliarization as “the process of enabling a native – of a 
society, an organization, or an academic discipline – to see his or her world with new eyes”. 
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need to make trade-offs with regard to three criteria for a “good theory”: (a) 
generality/scope, (b) simplicity, and (c) accuracy/specificity. Weick contends that a theory 
that satisfies any of the two criteria, is least able to satisfy the third. Based on this argument, 
Geels (2007, p.633) evaluates the characteristics of SCOT and ANT – the two dominant 
theories in STS – and concludes that these approaches are characterised by “a gap between 
relatively simple, sensitizing conceptual schemes and detailed, complex case descriptions 
with some empirical generalizations”. 
Having discussed four aspects of discontent in the existing STS literature, Geels recommends 
middle-range theories as the promising solution to these problems. He argues that middle-
range theories in STS would: (a) focus on limited themes and topics rather than addressing 
science and technology as a whole; (b) make explicit efforts to integrate a set of interrelated 
concepts into an analytical model; and (c) search for patterns and explanatory mechanism. 
STS middle-range theories can satisfy all three characteristics of a “good theory” by making 
minor compromises in each of the criteria. On generality, they are situated between 
empirical theorisations and grand theories. On simplicity, they consist of a limited number of 
related concepts, which are integrated into more complex analytical models. These models, 
nonetheless, are different from the type of complicated and elaborate conceptual 
frameworks, which are normally found in grand theories. On accuracy, the propositions of 
middle-range theories have a clear link to empirical cases. Yet, the patterns and explanatory 
mechanisms, which middle-range theories provide, are abstract and thus accepting some loss 
of empirical complexity. 
To give examples for the significant achievements of recent STS scholarship regarding middle-
range theories in technology dynamics, Geels cites the sociology of expectations and 
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strategic niche management as successful exemplars26. These theories address the first 
problem (i.e. policy relevance) by informing new large-scale research programmes in 
nanotechnology and genetics through analytical models, such as the promise-requirement 
cycles. An additional example is the Dutch government’s adoption of strategic niche 
management as a frame to better manage pilot projects on renewable energy technologies. 
Regarding the second problem (i.e. unrelated concepts), both theories express explicit efforts 
to combine and integrate concepts into analytical models. In regard to the third problem (i.e. 
too much focus on complexities, contingencies and local practices), both middle-range 
theories show the potential for abstracting from complexities and deriving generic patterns. 
This also addresses the last problem regarding theoretical styles. Middle-range theories 
create a new style of theories, which allow researcher to derive overall mechanisms from 
local practices and contingency; and working on both description and explanation at the 
same time. Geels also notes that the aforementioned theories address long timeframe (i.e. 
decades) and broad scale (i.e. sociotechnical systems and communities) and thus, they differ 
from conventional STS studies, which focus on short-term technical projects and local 
practices.   
Despite concurring with Geels in his promotion of middle-range theories, particularly the 
sociology of expectations and strategic niche management, my careful review of the existing 
literature of the two theories reveals a number of shortcomings which make them unfit to 
be adopted as the middle-range theories for this research. From a methodological 
perspective, both sociology of expectations and strategic niche management are proved to 
be useful for ex-post studies. Yet, these theories provide little support for studying 
                                                          
26 Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) on Sociotechnical Transitions is also cited as the third example in 
Geels’ (2007) paper. Nonetheless, Geels concedes that MLP is not yet a true middle-range theory due 
to the lack of descriptions of mechanisms at local level. 
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innovation-in-the-making, which is the case of the Copyright Hub. From theoretical 
perspective, as discussed at length in the previous chapter, there are gaps in the current 
literature which do not allow these theories to (a) identify and examine a wide range of 
expectations in the early stages of technological development, (b) describe and explain the 
outcomes of interactions between various arenas of expectations, and (c) adequately 
conceptualise the notion of “protected space” and theorise about the formation and 
dissolution of these spaces. As a result, there is a need for inspiration from other lines of 
academic work that help address these shortcomings. In the following section, I will discuss 
three bodies of work from which I draw my inspiration: (1) the Biography of Artefacts and 
Practices (BOAP), (2) Abbott’s (1995) discussion on Things of Boundaries, and (3) Abbott’s 
(2005) Linked Ecologies perspective. 
Biographies of Artefacts and Practices (BOAP) 
Historically, the BOAP approach was developed in two key sites (Edinburgh and Helsinki) in 
the mid- to late-1990s, before merging into a shared research programme by the mid-2000s 
(Hyysalo, Pollock and Williams, 2018). Due to its origin, the BOAP approach borrows heavily 
from achievements of the Social Shaping of Technology (SST) tradition and its original focus 
on studying technology-in-the-making (Williams and Edge, 1996; MacKenzie and Wajcman, 
1999).  
From a methodological perspective, the BOAP approach emerged out of the dissatisfaction 
with some of the dominant analytical traditions on technology and work organisations 
(Pollock and Williams, 2010a). Pollock and Williams (ibid. p.521) criticise “the dominance of 
relatively short-term, often single site studies of technology”, which they characterise as 
“impact studies” and “implementation studies”. Often found in practitioner and trade 
journals oriented towards potential adopters, “impact studies” are presented as a ‘before 
83 
 
and after’ study, whose narrative often conveys messages of improvement, i.e. beginning 
with the potential adopters’ problems, followed by the identification of a new technology as 
a solution for such problems, and concluded with discussion on adoption of the new 
technology and its benefits. Pollock and Williams (ibid. p.524) argue that this kind of writing 
often suffers from the lack of analytical distance and critical concerns, which renders it biased 
towards “an engineering or managerialist view of technology as instrumentally transforming 
work”. On the other hand, “implementation studies” are often conducted in the immediate 
aftermath of technology adoption. Such studies point up the gap between expectations of a 
new technology and its immediate outcomes. Despite engaging critically with claims from 
suppliers, these studies are prone to produce “an incomplete and misleading understanding 
of the consequences of technological change” since these consequences might only emerge 
after years or decades (ibid. p.525). For instance, early studies of the implementation of 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems concluded that there are misalignments 
between standardised pre-configurations embedded in the packaged solutions and the 
particularities of local organisational practices, which results in the complete failure of the 
implementation process or the need for expensive customisation and/or undesirable 
organisational adaptation (Soh, Kien and Tay-Yap, 2000; Davison, 2002; Hong and Kim, 2002). 
Nevertheless, such accounts cannot adequately explain how eventually SAP conquered the 
world (Pollock and Williams, 2009a), or more generally, the phenomenon of ERP’s success 
and high adoption rate across multiple domains and organisations around the world.  
Based on this evidence, Pollock and Williams (2010a, p.529) express their frustration of the 
embedded epistemologies and characteristic research design of these “localist” or 
“interactionist” accounts, which place particular emphasis upon the “privileging of the local”. 
They argue that, in the context of increasingly pervasive information systems such as ERP, 
local interactions become significantly intertwined with global practices and technological 
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development processes elsewhere. In a similar vein of argument, Monteiro and colleagues 
describe the “localist studies”, which are restricted to specific settings and timeframes, as 
“problematic” when they are applied to case studies of large-scale, integrated and 
interconnected information systems (Monteiro et al., 2013) Consequently, this gives rise to 
a call for moving beyond snap-shot (i.e. short-term, single-sited) studies and embrace a multi-
sited, longitudinal approach to study sociotechnical systems, known as Biography of 
Artefacts (BoA)27. Pollock and Williams (2010a, pp.530-531) proclaim: 
Our early research had demonstrated the need to move beyond episodic (short-
term single site) studies of settings of technology design or its organisational 
implementation/use and instead to address the evolution of workplace 
technologies over multiple cycles of design and implementation. […] Our 
articulation of the BoA perspective reflects our concern to engage more 
coherently with the ways in which longer term history and the broader context 
shape innovation processes and outcomes. 
To successfully design a research according to BOAP perspective, Pollock and Williams 
(2009a) propose an approach, which they call “strategic ethnography”. It suggests that the 
researcher’s choices of research settings and scopes of studies are informed by provisional 
theoretical and empirical understandings of the spaces where the new technology is being 
shaped. Strategic ethnography also requires the research to engage with multiple locales and 
moments of innovation (e.g. technology design, prototyping, implementation, maintenance, 
etc.), as well as tackling extended timeframes through more complex temporal designs 
encompassing longitudinal studies, follow-up studies, and long-term historical investigation. 
                                                          




Pollock and Williams (2010a, p.532) concede that such requirements are “no small feat” and 
a comprehensive account of the biography of an artefact and its practices needs to be seen 
as “the outcome of a research programme amongst a community of enquiry”. 
In addition to the “strategic ethnography” approach, the most recent development of BOAP 
also provides some useful principles and concepts that are worth mentioning. First, Hyysalo, 
Pollock and Williams (2018) argue that the shaping of innovation and practices takes place 
within ecologies of interconnected actors and thus, only studying actors with regard to how 
they affect the technology in question will overlook the rationales by which these actors 
operate, as well as the subtle mechanisms by which actors within and beyond an ecology 
interrelate. Second, the concept of interstices is proposed to help clarify how strategic 
ethnography should be conducted. Interstices are defined as:  
[M]oments and sites in which the various focal actors in the ecology interlink and 
affect each other and the evolving technology. An overall understanding of the 
ecology of actors is typically used to pinpoint key locales where these interstices 
may be researched in detail, perhaps by ethnographic means. (Hyysalo, Pollock 
and Williams, 2018, p.6) 
Third, Hyysalo, Pollock and Williams (2018, p.9) insist that BOAP is a methodological 
approach that typically utilises “combined ethnographic and historiographic methods 
including the collection of documents, in-depth interviews and records of field observations”. 
The availability of multiple data sources and types allow both data and method triangulation. 
For instance, field observation and interview could help highlight specific conflicts and 
concerns that appear to be particularly interesting for research, which will assist in analysing 
other types of data, such as documents. In turn, documents can put into perspective any 
exaggerated expectations and biased views of stakeholders collected through interviews.  
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Fourth, the BOAP approach also furthers our understanding of technology development 
processes and user-developer relations by advancing the notion of “series of configurational 
movements” (Hyysalo, Pollock and Williams, 2018, p.12). Unlike early writing on technology 
studies, which adopted the idea of “closure” from the sociology of science and treated the 
closure and opening up of technologies as discrete episodes28, the BOAP approach regards 
technology development as “the gradual and continuous shaping of technology that takes 
place in multiple arenas and modes in the life of technology, con-figuring things together into 
assemblies and capabilities for action and actors becoming included in its story, in the 
biography of technology” (Hyysalo, Pollock and Williams, 2018, p.12). The distinguishing 
ability of the BOAP approach to examine technology over long-term, as well as focusing on 
key sites and moments, reveals the generative nature of partial closures and stabilisations in 
technological development. Many aspects of configurations can reach temporary closure and 
become more difficult, but not impossible, to reverse. Similarly, actors are conceptualised as 
having limited capacity to engage across the (potentially unlimited) wide-reaching 
technology development process. Therefore, in contrast to the immutability implied in Actor-
Network Theory (ANT)’s notion of “obligatory passage points”, the BOAP approach argues 
that actors must resort to series of partial interventions within the realm of their control and 
interest to retain their positions vis-à-vis other actors within the continually transforming 
field.        
Having carefully examined the BOAP approach, my decision to adopt it as the methodological 
approach for this research is justified on the following grounds. On the one hand, the BOAP 
                                                          
28 For instance, Woolgar (1990) employed the notion of “configuring the user” to depict the ways 
designers embedded in technology their favoured enactment of certain types of users and uses. The 
user was thus regarded as being built into the technology by the designer in the designing phase. 
Conversely, Sorensen (1996) described the “domestication” process through which the form and 
meaning of new technology could be altered by users when it was placed in contexts of use.  
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approach is highly compatible with the literature of sociology of expectations and strategic 
niche management. These theories are all concerned with addressing research in extended 
timeframe (i.e. years and decades) and in multiple locales and communities. They all aim at 
helping researchers to study innovation at multiple levels, i.e. local projects, global technical 
development processes, etc., and allow us to work with description and explanation at the 
same time. On the other hand, the BOAP approach can supplement the shortcoming of 
sociology of expectations and strategic niche management by providing strategies and 
conceptual guidance on how to conduct research on innovation-in-the-making. The notions 
of “strategic ethnography”, “ecologies of interconnected actors” and “interstices” have 
proved to be valuable in assisting the design of this research, while the notion of “series of 
configurational movements” is particularly helpful in analysing the case study of the 
Copyright Hub. 
Things of Boundaries 
I draw my second inspiration from Abbott’s (1995) discussion on “Things of Boundaries”. In 
this seminal paper, Abbott questions the relation between boundaries and entities, as well 
as the conditions under which social entities come into or leave existence. Abbott argues that 
the latter question can be answered via a comprehensive understanding of the former.  
Abbott builds his argument on a basic assertion about the relation between boundaries and 
entities, which contradicts the conventional position on the matter29. Abbott (ibid. p.860) 
proposed: 
                                                          
29 The conventional perspective takes the biological human being as the prototypical entity 
in modern social thought. In the conventional view, social entities are regarded as 




Social entities come into existence when social actors tie social boundaries 
together in certain ways. Boundaries come first, then entities. 
Such a proposition requires Abbott to develop a new definition of boundary which makes 
sense when there is no social entities to bound. To solve this problem, Abbott (ibid. p.862) 
proposes a general notion of “difference of character” and defines a boundary point as 
follows: 
I shall define a point x as a boundary point in space S if every neighbourhood of x 
contains at least two points that differ in some respect […] In a simple case, this 
difference will be a single known property – color, gender, creed, education. In the 
more complicated (and more likely) case, it will be a combination of properties or 
dimensions of difference. 
Abbott calls these boundary points “sites of difference”. He emphasises that differences are 
things that stem from “local cultural negotiations” and thus two sides are defined gradually 
by stable properties tossed up by local interaction. In Abbott’s (ibid. p.863) words: “For me, 
the central requirement is rather that these differences be local and interactional”. Abbott 
proceeds to argue that to explain change, one must begin with change and hope to explain 
stasis as a by-product. Although all social interaction occurs within a mixture of pre-existing 
                                                          
essences like biological individuals. Furthermore, due to “a self-other boundary guaranteed 
by centuries of Cartesian philosophy” that is normally assigned to human individuals, one 
cannot imagine boundaries without human entities and thus this perception is generalised 
to the level of social entities (ibid. p.860). By reversing the flow of metaphor, i.e. taking the 
social actor as metaphor for the individual human being, Abbotts comes up with an 




actors and actions, these previously-constituted actors do not traverse the interaction 
unscathed. Instead, they enter an interactive environment, which is fraught with difficulty 
and contingency, and in such an environment many disappear. What comes out of this 
process are new entities, new actors and new relations amongst old parts. Following Mead’s 
(1932, p.1) assertion that “the world is a world of events”, Abbott argues that these old parts 
are instantaneous and unique “events”, some of which have stable lineages and thus 
becoming what we call “actors”. 
Using the emergence of social work as a social entity to exemplify his argument, Abbott 
proclaims that the field emerged as a result of the separation of tasks that fell under social 
work and those that fell elsewhere. What is more important is that the separations had 
occurred as independent, unconnected boundaries long before the emergence of social work 
as a social entity. Abbott concludes that social work came into existence when various sites 
of difference were hooked up by social agents into larger proto-boundaries, and 
subsequently into larger units. Such processes placed numerous people within social work, 
while ruling others outside the field. An image was then constructed so that this emerging 
reality could be rationalised as a single thing and placed under the umbrella term of “social 
work”. 
Based on this example, Abbott presents a conception of the origin of social entities, which 
revolves around the process of “yoking” various proto-boundaries together. Yoking is defined 
as “connection of two or more proto-boundaries such that one side of each becomes defined 
as ‘inside’ the same entity” (Abbott, 1995, p.871). Abbott argues that there are two kinds of 
yoking. When a social space is already institutionalised or divided into established entities, 
radical changes can be made via means of delegitimising old differences or emphasising new 
ones. The first strategy yokes entities together and the second divides them. On the other 
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hand, when the social space is relatively unstructured, yoking means literal connection of 
boundaries.  
The connecting of these local oppositions and differences results in a single whole, or a social 
entity, which has a quality which Abbott calls “thingness”. Abbott (1995, p.873) argues that 
“the central quality of an entity is endurance”. Entities differentiate themselves in “a world 
of events” via their property of repetition, which could arise either internally (i.e. via internal 
structures that regulate “enduring events”, resulting in internal reproduction) or externally 
(i.e. via external structures – an ecology which does not allow the entity to change – and thus 
leading to ecological reproduction). Nonetheless, Abbott emphasises the property of 
coherence or internal autonomy of an entity and argues that if the recurrence of a given 
event were due solely to the force of ecological reproduction, then it is less helpful to 
consider such an event as an entity. The second crucial property of entities is their ability to 
do social action, which is defined broadly as “any ability to create an effect on the rest of the 
social process that goes beyond effects that are merely transmitted through the causing 
entity from elsewhere” (Abbott, 1995, p.873). 
If we were to match the previously-discussed notion of “protected spaces” with Abbott’s 
concept of “social entities”, it becomes apparent that the former is not corresponding to the 
latter in the strict sense. Since protected spaces are temporary and dependent upon 
precarious agreements between a wide range of social actors, these spaces do not possess 
internal structures that allow them to reproduce internally, but instead rely on external 
structures to maintain their existence, albeit for a limited period of time. Nevertheless, the 
mismatch between the two concepts does not undermine the value of Abbott’s approach to 
comprehending the relation between social boundaries and social entities. Adopting such 
conceptualisation allows us to overcome the prevalent notion of “protected spaces” as black-
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boxes, whose boundaries serve to demarcate and shield inside activities from outside 
scrutiny, or empty spaces awaited to be filled up by resources and expectations from external 
social actors.   
Linked Ecologies 
Another conceptualisation that I borrow from Abbott (2005) is the notion of “linked 
ecologies”. Abbott develops this notion from the conventional ecological argument, which is 
prevalent in the literature of sociology30. In the usual ecological accounts, scholars examine 
a system of actors in a set of locations. At the boundaries of such systems, however, strong 
assumptions are made regarding the external world: i.e. they are fixed surroundings, instead 
of being conceived as subject to the same “ecological” examination. Abbott proposes to 
address this shortcoming by reconceptualising the social world in terms of linked ecologies, 
each of which acts as a flexible surround for others. 
Using professions as an example, Abbott argues that the professions constitute an ecology. 
Competing with one another, professions occupy certain areas of work, which they use to 
establish their own “jurisdictions” through professional knowledge systems. Jurisdictions can 
be won or lost due to a variety of internal and external forces, which requires professions to 
proact and react by either reinforcing or abandoning their old jurisdictions and seizing new 
openings. Being central to this conceptualisation is the argument that any events occurred 
to one profession will result in new openings or defeats for adjacent professions. 
Nevertheless, the concepts of “openings” and “defeats” imply a criterion of success that is 
external to the ecology of professions. In this view, professions’ claims are judged by various 
audiences, such as the state and the public, who eventually pick the winner amongst rival 
                                                          
30 For examples, Hughes’ (1971) study of occupations, Goffman’s (1963) study of interaction, and the 
seminal work on urban phenomena by Park, Burgess and Mackenzie (1925). A more detailed 
discussion can be found in (Abbott, 2005). 
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claims. Such a proposition invites the same drawback found in the conventional ecological 
discourse, which uncritically recognises these audiences as “fixed and unproblematic” 
entities (Abbott, 2005, p.246). In fact, these audiences are neither simple nor unified social 
entities. The state, for instance, is an ecology in in its own rights, which possesses a complex 
internal structure filled with rival parties and subgroups and is dominated by similar 
ecological forces that are found in the ecology of professions. As a result, Abbott suggests 
that the simultaneous existence of numerous adjacent ecologies requires actors to actively 
seek alliances, resources and support across ecological boundaries to ensure the success of 
their development projects. Not only do individual actors compete within single ecologies, 
but they also vie in the form of alliances across multiple linked ecologies. The outcomes of 
local contests by individual actors thus contribute to the overall result of the alliances’ 
struggle for power. In Abbott’s (2005, p.247) own words: 
Any successful development project must bring together some combination31 of 
actors across all these ecologies at once. As a result, the actor who competes in 
the spatial ecology of regions is not really a single actor, but rather a coalition that 
links one group of firms, government agencies, and voluntary associations into an 
alliance against other alliances linking other companies, agencies, and nonprofits. 
Individual alliance members compete in individual ecologies, but the alliance wins 
because the results of those local contests can be assembled into an overall 
achievement. 
To elaborate upon the formal structure of ecologies, Abbott argues that the concept of 
ecology involves three analytical components: (1) actors, (2) locations, and (3) the links 
between them. Abbott (2005, p.248) names the process of constructing the relationship 
                                                          
31 Emphasised as in the original document. 
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between actors and locations “ligation” to highlight the fact that such a process “constitutes 
and delimits32 both actors and locations”. To give an example, Abbott argues that the 
development of a psychiatric approach to shell shock in World War I (i.e. the process of 
ligation) redefined both psychiatry as a profession (i.e. the actor), and shell shock as a 
controlled task for expert work (i.e. the location). 
Despite sharing these three components, different types of ecologies appear to possess 
different characteristics when it comes to these elements. Abbott illustrates this argument 
through examples of three different ecologies: (a) profession, (b) university, and (c) politics. 
In the profession ecology, actors are professions characterised by being fixed and exclusively 
demarcated. The locations in this ecology are well-defined and relatively stable, and hence, 
they are named “jurisdictions”. In the university ecology, actors are composed of various 
disciplines, professions and inter-disciplines, which are less exclusively demarcated than 
professions. Changes amongst these actors occur at a more rapid rate, and individuals move 
between these disciplines more fluidly when compared to professions. The locations in the 
university ecology are called “settlements” due to their lack of the strong exclusivity found 
in professional jurisdictions. Academic disciplines are often overlapped in methods, theories 
and subject matters and thus, the separation between them are not always clear-cut. Politics 
is the third type of ecology, which appears to be deliberately designed to have formally 
constituted political actors contend for power in numerous formal settings (i.e. the 
legislatures, administrative councils, electoral committees, and so on). Nevertheless, these 
settings are not “locations” in Abbott’s (2005, p.252) ecological sense of “being 
endogenously created positions in a competitive space”. He argues: 
                                                          
32 Emphasised as in the original document. 
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[N]o political group is interested in dominating a legislature simply for the sake of 
dominating a legislature; what it really wants to dominate is some set of political 
issues, decisions, and outcomes. (Abbott, 2005, p.252) 
Abbott (ibid. p.252) calls these sets of political decisions, actions and outcomes “the real 
locations of the political ecology” and names them political “bundles” – the analogues of 
professional “jurisdictions” and academic “settlements”. These terminologies are employed 
to depict the differences in characteristics of the locations in the three different ecologies. 
First, in terms of stability, professional jurisdictions appear to be most stable, while academic 
settlements change somewhat more quickly, whereas rebundling of political issues takes 
place at a very rapid rate. Second, in terms of separation, jurisdictions are generally well-
demarcated, while settlements and bundles are much more overlapped. As a result, although 
every ecology is composed of three basic elements: actors, locations, and ligation, they are 
still different in terms of particularities of each element. Abbott argues that the differences 
in the internal structure of the ecologies, i.e. the dimensions, numbers, covering patterns and 
ligations of actors and locations, will shape and influence the emergence of alliances between 
these ecologies when they are linked. In addition, ecologies also have different temporal 
structures, i.e. different rhythms and cycles of actors, locations, and ligations, whose parallels 
and disparities would affect how alliances are formed between the linked ecologies. 
With regard to the notion of linkage between ecologies, Abbott theorises that events within 
any particular ecology are “hostage” in some sense to events in adjacent ecologies. Unlike 
the conventional ecological model which considers this hostage relationship as a kind of 
external judgement, being “hostage” in the linked ecologies argument is more mutual. Both 
sides are ecologies and both sides enter the relationship with the expectation of getting 
something in return. Therefore, a competitive strategy employed in an ecology is also 
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expected to provide some types of rewards to allies in the adjacent ecology. Abbott (2005, 
p.255) calls those issues that provide these kinds of dual rewards “hinges” or “the strategies 
that work as well in one ecology as in the other”. He further emphasises that not only do 
hinges provide different kinds of rewards to allies in the multiple ecologies, they can also be 
of a fundamentally different type, i.e. a hinge can be a ligation in one ecology, while being a 
contested location in the other. 
Having carefully discussed Abbott’s propositions, it becomes discernible that the notion of 
“linked ecologies” is beneficial to my research for three reasons.  
First, the linked ecologies argument could be used to overcome a lacuna in Bakker, van Lente 
and Meeus’ (2011) conceptualisation of “arenas of expectations”, which considers selectors 
to be mere audiences instead of ecologies in their own right. In the arenas of expectations, 
selectors are treated uncritically as fixed and unproblematic entities, who are in the position 
to judge expectations voiced by enactors, without any regard to the ecological forces and 
complex interactions between competing subgroups amongst selectors. This drawback 
results in the inability to provide a comprehensible account of how and why the selectors 
come to their assessments of different expectations voiced in the arenas, as concurred by 
Bakker, van Lente and Meeus (2011)33. In the follow-up paper, Bakker, van Lente and Meeus 
(2012) attempt to tackle this issue by proposing a list of external criteria used by selectors 
for assessing the credibility of expectations. Such a suggestion, however, still falls into the 
trap of uncritically attributing the external power of selectors as unproblematic “audiences”, 
as discussed at length above. Therefore, Abbott’s notion of “linked ecologies” offers the most 
appropriate solution to tackle this shortcoming. 
                                                          
33 Cross-referencing page 61. 
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Second, the linked ecologies argument emphasises the critical role of alliances in determining 
the overall achievement of any successful development project. Instead of focusing on the 
success or failure of individual actors competing within certain ecologies, Abbott urges us to 
pay close attention to the formation of alliances across ecologies and the strategies which 
actors employ to seek for resources and support beyond their own ecological boundaries. 
The concept of “hinges” – or strategies that succeed in two ecologies at once - is particularly 
useful for explaining why certain strategies and alliances are successful when others do not. 
It also suggests a way to conceptually link multiple arenas of expectations together by 
considering them as a separate (but connected) series of configurational movements which 
members of an alliance must fight in order to win the general war. This argument is also in 
line with recent development in the literature of strategic niche management, which 
refocuses the attention on sequences of projects, instead of individual projects and their 
associated successes or failures34. 
Third, Abbott’s discussion of “linked ecologies” also helps foreground the need for analysis 
of the interior forms of neighbouring ecologies, as well as analysis of their differing temporal 
structures. These aspects of the complex interactions between different ecologies are often 
neglected or overlooked in previous social studies of technological expectations and thus, a 
further layer of contingency (and a source of explanation) is identified. In the case of the 
Copyright Hub, for example, the differences in: (a) the interior forms of the state (i.e. having 
two major actors surrounded by lesser groups) and of the creative industries (i.e. having 
actors in various sizes and shapes, mostly of small and medium sizes, with no major actor 
dominating the market), as well as (b) the temporal structures: the rhythms and cycles of 
actors and contested locations in politics change at a rapid rate, whilst their counterparts in 
                                                          
34 Cross-referencing page 70. 
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the creative industries remain stable over a long period of time. Understanding these 
differences not only provides insights into the ways alliances are made between the two 
ecologies, but also helps explain how and why the Copyright Hub, as a development project, 
is shaped and moulded under these ecological forces. 
To conclude, in this research, I choose to adopt (a) the Biography of Artefacts and Practices 
(BOAP) approach, (b) Abbott’s discussion on “things of boundaries” and (c) his concept of 
“linked ecologies”, for reasons which have been carefully justified above. While the latter 
two notions provide useful guidance for analysing the case study in question, the BOAP 
approach serves primarily to guide the design of this research, which is the focus of discussion 
in the remainder of this chapter.    
B. Methodology 
Research Data 
According to Blaikie (2009), data used in social research can be categorised into three main 
types: primary, secondary and tertiary data. These types represent the distance between 
researchers and the source of data. In other words, the further a researcher is away from the 
data source, the less control he has over the production and quality of the data. What is 
more, each type of data has its own strengths and weaknesses and therefore, the decision to 
use one type over another in a research is dependent upon these characteristics, the type of 
research questions that have been asked and the state of the field.  
First, regarding data characteristics, primary data are generated in a direct contact between 
researchers and the subject. As a result, researchers can control and make judgment about 
the quality of data that are produced. With secondary data, researchers are one step away 
from the source and only have access to data once they are collected. Consequently, 
secondary data analysis comes with a certain number of disadvantages: previous researches 
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were done with different aims and objectives; collected data might lack of some area of 
interests; the data might be coded badly; and the quality of data is more difficult to judge. 
With tertiary data, the researcher only has access to data after they have been analysed and 
therefore the data must be treated with utmost caution.   
Second, regarding the research questions in this study, it is apparent that primary data must 
be collected in order to find answers for those questions. Moreover, taking the state of the 
field into consideration, there are only a limited number of empirical research studies which 
have been conducted in this topic. Insofar as I know, there is no secondary or tertiary data 
which this research can directly make use of. In sum, primary data provide the most control 
over data quality and are most appropriate for the purposes of this study. Hence, primary 
data is selected as the main type of data used in the research.   
Research Methods 
As suggested by Carter and Little (2007), the choice of methodology and methods in a 
research is closely related to the choice of epistemology, ontology, middle-range theoretical 
framework, research questions, research strategy and the type of data which must be 
collected. Consequently, in this research, I adopted a longitudinal, multi-sited historiographic 
and ethnographic approach to tackle the challenges posed by the chosen research 
questions35. Empirical data were collected primarily from three sources: (1) fieldnotes and 
participation in day-to-day operations of the Copyright Hub, (2) qualitative semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders recruited through snowball sampling, and (3) collection of 
official documents that are made publicly available by the IPO, the Copyright Hub and other 
organisations relevant to the case. These three sources of data follow Hyysalo, Pollock and 
                                                          
35 For the detailed criticism of “snap-shot” studies and justification for using longitudinal, multi-sited 
research, cross-referencing pages 82 - 87. 
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Williams’ (2018) suggestion on the kinds of data sources which the BOAP approach typically 
utilises.  
With regard to interviews, two types of interviewing were employed in this research: (1) 
qualitative interview and (2) elite interview. First, Bryman (2012, pp.470-499) argued that 
qualitative interview, in a direct contradiction to its quantitative counterpart, tends to be 
more flexible in structure, more general in specifying initial research questions, more 
interested in the interviewee’s point of view, more capable of producing rich and detailed 
answers, and hence its suitability for the purposes of this research. Semi-structured interview 
was chosen to avoid the complete lack of any form of structure, which helped in guiding the 
researcher during the interview. Second, elite interview was used to uncover the socio-
economic patterns and other hidden values embedded in choices and decisions, which had 
been made by elites involving in the construction of the Hub. It was suggested that semi-
structured interviews with open-ended questions36 are most suitable for this type of data 
collection (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). Finally, discourse analysis and grounded theory 
were chosen to analyse the textual intermediaries exchanged between key players in the 
UK’s digital licensing market, with the purpose of gaining more insights into the operation of 
the value chain and its associated situational definition. 
With regard to conducting fieldwork, the BOAP approach reminds us that the researcher’s 
choices of research settings and scopes of studies should be informed by theoretical and 
empirical understandings of the space where the new technology is being shaped. Following 
this suggestion, I first conducted a small pilot study between January and April 2014 for the 
purpose of gaining initial insights into the field. The pilot study resulted in five in-depth 
interviews with a leading IP scholar, two representatives of the creative industries specialised 
                                                          
36 For an example of such an interview schedule, referencing Appendix C. 
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in copyright licensing, a member of an early workstream of the Copyright Hub project, and 
the then newly-appointed CEO of the Copyright Hub. These interviews yielded a great 
number of insights, which were then used to tailor the research questions and research 
design, as well as determining the scope and sites where the study would finally take place. 
The initial contact with the gatekeeper of the Copyright Hub project also proved to be helpful 
in propelling the researcher into the (relatively) close37 community behind the project. The 
CEO of the Copyright Hub participated himself numerous times in the research as an 
interviewee. He also helped introduce the researcher to a great number of other important 
participants, whom I would have had difficulties in getting hold of without such introductions. 
Afterwards, the process of sampling participants for the full-fledged research began with key 
members of the Copyright Hub Ltd. and members of the development team from the Digital 
Catapult. From there, the population of research participants continued to grow via snowball 
sampling38 method. In addition to snowball sampling, a few key participants, such as 
Professor Hargreaves – the author of the 2010 UK government’s review of the IP framework 
– and Richard Hooper – chairman of the Copyright Hub - were strategically targeted due to 
their critical roles in the biography of the Copyright Hub. 
In addition to these methods of data collection, there are also other alternative approaches 
to conducting the proposed research. For instance, focus groups could be used, instead of 
qualitative interviews, to gather data about individual perspectives. However, focus groups 
would be much more difficult to organise, more time-consuming to manage, transcribe and 
                                                          
37 Here, the meaning of the word “close” is twofold: (1) this community was (and still is) carefully 
guarded and not widely opened to public scrutiny. It was not at all common to see an outsider, as a 
social scientist, mingling amongst high-ranking civil servants, chairmen and CEOs of various types of 
organisations working in the creative sector; (2) this is a close-knit community, whose most 
members know one another for extended periods of time and might have worked with one another 
in a wide variety of project.   
38 Snowball or chain referral sampling is a method which yields a study sample through referrals. 
These referrals are made by people who have knowledge of others who possess characteristics that 
are of research interest. For a detailed discussion, see (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). 
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analyse data, and participants are expected to be more prone to concealing their individual 
perspectives due to group effects and/or the syndrome of ‘expressing culturally expected 
views’ (Bryman, 2012, p.518). Similarly, unstructured interviews could be used for 
interviewing the elites. However, this approach risks overlooking important questions of the 
research and complicates the process of data analysis.  
 
C. Risks and Mitigation Plans 
This research was conducted within the framework of a PhD programme and therefore it had 
several inherent limitations regarding time, budget, research skills and accessibility. I was 
successful in mitigating these constraints, to a certain degree, by making the best use of the 
resources available at the RCUK Centre for Copyright and New Business Models in the 
Creative Economy (or CREATe) – a consortium of seven UK universities of which the 
University of Edinburgh is a member. For example, the very first interview I conducted to gain 
insights into the field was with the director of CREATe – a world-leading lawyer in the field of 
intellectual property. Furthermore, I was awarded some funding from CREATe to do 
fieldwork as a part of a bigger research project, which studied the development of new IP 
infrastructures in the creative economy. Finally, participating in various CREATe’s events, 
seminars and workshops had proved to be useful for my research, in terms of exchanging 
insights, sharing knowledge and disseminating my research findings to a wider academic, 
industrial and public audiences. 
With regard to risks associated with the chosen research methods, one of the most 
important, as well as, time-consuming tasks in conducting qualitative interviews was 
recording and transcribing interviews. As suggested by Bryman (2012, p.484), the ratio 
between transcription hours and interview hours was normally five or six to one. In my own 
experience, this ratio was even higher: i.e. seven or eight hours were needed to fully 
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transcribe a one-hour interview. This was due to the fact that it was not always possible for 
the researcher to conduct an interview in a quiet setting. In fact, interviews were often 
conducted in noisy environments, such as a crowded private club for artists in the centre of 
SOHO, a busy Starbucks coffee shop near King’s Cross railway station, or someone’s backyard 
garden whose neighbourhood happened to be under construction. In such cases, the 
peripheral noises from background became the biggest obstacles for the researcher to make 
progress with his transcription. To alleviate this challenge, I used digital recording devices 
and computer-assisted software, such as Transcriber, to facilitate the transcription process. 
The validity and potential of such an approach had been confirmed by previous studies 
(Bringer, et al., 2006) (Alcock & Iphofen, 2007). In addition, a small part of the funding from 
CREATe was used to hire a third party to transcribe some of the interviews, and hence, 
reducing the workload on the researcher. For elite interviews, the main problem was 
securing and scheduling interviews with a few policy makers and high-ranking managers of 
big organisations in the creative industries. There were cases where the researcher had to 
wait more than three months before the interview could be set up. I had mitigated the risk 
of not being able to secure those elite interviews by actively seeking introductions made by 
the community’s gatekeepers, by making arrangements for the interviews well in advance, 
and making my schedule flexible in order to accommodate the participants’ availability. In 
cases where it was not possible to meet in person, the mitigated option of conducting online 
interviews via platforms, such as Skype, was utilised, although the quality of the recordings 
(and the interviews themselves) were inferior compared to face-to-face meetings.  
With regard to research ethics, obtaining consents from participants was mandatory before 
any interviews were to be recorded or demographic information of the interviewees was to 
be documented. The participants were also appraised of the purpose and further use of the 
research, as well as being informed their right to withdraw from the research at any moment, 
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before any data were collected. Measurements for safeguarding data were carefully 
considered to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of individuals and organisations 
involved in the research. Ensuring anonymity and confidentiality was ever more important in 
this case study due to two main reasons. First, at the time when the researcher embarked 
upon his fieldwork, the Copyright Hub was a high-profile technological initiative which was 
in its early stages of development. Consequently, a large portion of the data, which the 
researcher collected during fieldwork, were confidential and sensitive. These data had the 
potential of producing adverse effects on the development of the project if they were 
disseminated prematurely or carelessly. If such an incident had happened, the researcher’s 
access to the field might have been cut off completely. As a result, the researcher was 
extremely careful while discussing the topic with people he met in the field so that neither 
unnecessary information nor the identity of the sources was disclosed. Second, the 
community behind the Copyright Hub project was a close-knit one, whose members usually 
had knowledge of or had worked with one another for extended periods of time. Therefore, 
the problem of keeping the sources of information anonymous became even more acute as 
one might be able to guess “who had said what” based on the subtlest hints in exchanges 
between the interviewer and interviewees. In cases where the recorded interviews 
contained information which could lead to the identification of the participants, further 
measures were employed, including the removal of reference data in the transcripts or the 
complete erasure of the recorded interviews. 
Finally, ethics policy and procedures of other organisations that were involved in this study 
were considered and appropriately incorporated into the design of this research. The 
proposed study was fully adhered to the research ethics procedures developed by the School 
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of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh. The research was at level 1 of the 
assessment, indicating that no special ethical issues were identified39. 
II. Fieldwork, Data Collection & Analysis 
A. Planning Fieldwork 
The process of designing fieldwork in this research was strongly influenced by the BOAP 
perspective. To recapitulate40, Pollocks and Williams (2009a) propose an approach called 
“strategic ethnography”, which emphasises that the researcher’s choice of settings and 
scopes of studies should be informed by provisional understanding (both theoretical and 
empirical) of the spaces where the innovation is being developed. As a result, this approach 
requires the research to engage with multiple locales and moments that are strategically 
crucial in the innovation journey, as well as addressing extended timeframes through 
complex temporal designs consisted of longitudinal studies, follow-up studies and long-term 
historical investigations. Such a gigantic feat of research is undoubtedly the result of a 
decade-long programme of interrelated studies shared amongst a community of enquiry. 
Therefore, the BOAP perspective could not be applied exactly as specified, but instead, the 
approach was tailored down to fit the constraints and limitations of doctoral research. 
As mentioned above, a pilot study had been conducted to help the researcher gain insights 
into the Copyright Hub project before full-fledged research was carried out. Outcomes of this 
pilot helped identify a few critical “ecologies of interconnected actors” (Hyysalo, Pollock and 
Williams, 2018) rallied behind the development of the Copyright Hub initiative, which 
included publishing, images, music, and audiovisual sectors of the creative industries, the 
                                                          
39 Referencing Appendix A for Level 1 Ethics Form. 




Linked Content Coalition, the Digital Catapult and the Copyright Hub Ltd. The next step was 
to pinpoint “interstices”41 or the critical moments and sites where various focal actors in 
these ecologies shape and influence each other, as well as the evolving technology. Based on 
preliminary findings from the pilot study, it was anticipated that most of these interstices 
would occur in London, where both the Digital Catapult and the Copyright Hub Ltd. were 
based. By the time the researcher embarked upon his fieldwork, it had been revealed that 
the Digital Catapult was constructing a brand-new office in King’s Cross, where it would house 
both the development team of the Copyright Hub project and the management team of the 
Copyright Hub Ltd. Future events related to the Copyright Hub project were also expected to 
be held in this place. Consequently, the Digital Catapult centre became the ideal site for the 
researcher to observe not only the daily operations of these two organisations, but also 
committee meetings, press conferences and other special events associated with the 
Copyright Hub project. 
Having firmly secured funding for fieldwork from CREATe as a part of a bigger research 
project, I began my full-fledged data collection in January 2015. The fieldwork was designed 
so that the researcher would spend one full week every month in London interviewing people 
and collecting data, while the rest of the time was spent on transcribing recorded interviews, 
conducting preliminary data analysis, and most importantly, contacting potential participants 
and arranging interviews for the next fieldwork trip. There was no rigid timeframe dictating 
when the next fieldwork trip should take place. Following Pollock and Williams’ (2010a, 
p.532) suggestion that choices of research design could be “necessarily influenced by 
opportunism and pragmatic exigencies”, decisions about the time for each fieldtrip were 
made based on the progress of the Copyright Hub project, the occurrences of important 
                                                          
41 For a more detailed discussion of the concepts of “interstices” and “ecologies of interconnected 
actors”, cross-referencing page 85. 
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events, and the number of interviews the researcher had managed to arrange. By the time 
the fieldwork ended in June 2016, seven fieldwork trips had been made to London and a few 
other cities in the UK, which yielded, in total, 49 in-depth interviews and over 36 hours of 
recording. For a summary of the interviews conducted for the case study of the Copyright 
Hub, see Appendix B. 
In addition to fieldwork in the UK, it was originally planned that the researcher would conduct 
some data collection in Singapore, where he spent two semesters (between July 2015 and 
May 2016) as a student of the Joint PhD Programme between the University of Edinburgh 
and the National University of Singapore. The initial prospect of such an arrangement was 
particularly promising as the Singapore government, in April 2013, had announced their ten-
year master plan to guide the country towards becoming a global Intellectual Property Hub 
in Asia (IP Steering Committee, 2013). Furthermore, the Intellectual Property Office of 
Singapore (IPOS) was also in contact with the Copyright Hub Ltd. to discuss the potential for 
future exchange and collaboration between the two initiatives. The CEO of the Copyright Hub 
Ltd. eventually visited Singapore for such a meeting in September 2015, at the time when 
the researcher was already in Singapore. These circumstances suggested great potential for 
further fieldwork in Singapore, which could supplement the one I had conducted in the UK. 
Nevertheless, this attempt was later proved fruitless due to two reasons: (1) the focus of the 
Singapore government’s master plan at the time was on establishing “a strong and reliable 
IP regime that is well plugged into international networks” (Intellectual Property Office of 
Singapore, 2017, p.1); this strong focus on the legislative aspect thus had little in common 
with my research interest; and (2) the talks between the Copyright Hub and IPOS did not lead 
to any concrete actions due to the stagnation of the Copyright Hub project. As a result, I had 
no choice, but abandoned the original plan to conduct fieldwork in Singapore. 
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After returning to the UK in June 2016, there were strong signals in the field that called upon 
the researcher to make another fieldtrip to London. This was due to a series of resignations 
from both the Copyright Hub Ltd. and the Digital Catapult, beginning with the departure of 
Richard Hooper as chairman of the Copyright Hub in early May 2016, to the withdrawal of 
the CEO of the Copyright Hub at the end of the same month, to the stepping down of the 
Digital Catapult’s CEO in June 2016. These critical changes in personnel indicated the change 
of direction of the Copyright Hub project under a new leadership, as well as the closure of a 
phase in the innovation journey, which naturally constituted the conclusion of fieldwork for 
this research. Hence, the researcher made his final round of data collection in London in June 
2016, mainly re-interviewing key actors who were closely associated with the development 
of the project. A small batch of three post-fieldwork interviews via Skype and a number of 
email exchange with several crucial stakeholders, whom the researcher could not meet in 
person, were done in order to supplement the data collected in the last fieldwork trip. 
B. Data Collection, Data Analysis and Writing up 
Interviews, Fieldnotes and Documents 
As mentioned above, data in this study were collected from three sources: (1) in-depth 
qualitative interviews and elite interviews; (2) fieldnotes; and (3) publicly (and semi-publicly) 
available documents.  
With regard to interviews, the process generally began with the researcher contacting the 
potential participants and making arrangements for interviews. In each fieldwork trip, the 
researcher first prepared a general outline of important topics and issues that were of 
research interests for each visit. The researcher then studied the interviewees’ background 
through platforms, such as LinkedIn or companies’ websites, to learn about their experience, 
expertise and professional interests. Based on this information and the general interview 
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guidelines, a specific interview schedule would be devised for each individual participant. As 
a result, each interview schedule could provide a stable structure that covered all important 
research topics, while being relevant enough to appeal to the interviewee and flexible 
enough to allow the interviewer to pursue unexpected points of interest when they emerged 
during the interview.  
Intriguingly, the empirical fieldwork revealed a wide spectrum of interviewing patterns 
ranging from the most “normal” qualitative interviews to the most “elite” interviews. In the 
former cases, interviewees tended to shy away from providing sophisticated answers to the 
questions being asked and they were usually timid by being recorded during the interview. 
As a result, the interviewer had to take charge of the interviewing process by adopting a 
structured approach to asking questions (usually in the pre-prepared order), as well as 
attempting to elicit as much information from the participant as possible through probing 
and follow-up questions. By contrast, the interviewees in the latter cases were much more 
comfortable with being recorded and they often took charge of the interview by responding 
in a free-flowing manner, or deliberately ignored the order of the questions being posed and 
provided (highly elaborate) insights into matters which they deemed important. Therefore, 
the interviewer’s role in such cases were less about leading the interview, but rather ensuring 
that important research topics were addressed, and unexpected themes emerged during the 
interview were explored by means of follow-up questions. The rest of the interviews fell 
between these two extremes, where the interviewer and interviewee alternately took charge 
of the interviewing process and loosely followed the pre-prepared interview schedule. 
With regard to fieldnotes, there existed a fascinating phenomenon about the shift in the 
interviewee’s attitude after the recording device had been turned off at the end of each 
interview. It had been found that participants were generally off their guard and became 
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more inclined to speak their minds once the exchange went off the record. Although this 
information could not be used directly as quotes, some of them were deeply revealing 
insights which served either as background information or suggestions for novel themes and 
topics that needed further investigation during fieldwork. Consequently, the researcher 
often found himself looking for a quiet corner on the busy roads of London in order to scribble 
down as much as he could the off-the-record conversation he had with the participant after 
the interview42. These data, together with a daily research diary43 the researcher kept during 
fieldwork, constituted fieldnotes – the second source of data used in this research. 
With regard to documents, there were two main types of documents that the researcher 
collected to help guide and strengthen his research. The first type was publicly available 
documents that anyone could find with the help of a search engine, e.g. Google, and proper 
uses of key words. These documents came in various sizes and shapes: from a one-page press 
release from the Copyright Hub, to a few pages of a minute meeting, to a hundred-page 
document from the government’s report. These official documents, whose information was 
specifically related to the Copyright Hub project, were supplemented by data collected from 
online newspapers, professional magazines and companies’ websites, which offered broader 
overviews of the socio-political context in which the project was taking place. The second 
type of documents was semi-public or private documents, which were neither easily 
identifiable nor accessible online using the former method. These documents were collected 
with the assistance of a few research participants, who kindly shared those documents from 
their private collections. These documents were either so venerable that they could not be 
found on the Internet, e.g. historical documents of previous initiatives that were similar to 
the Copyright Hub, or too recent and sensitive to be widely distributed, e.g. confidential 
                                                          
42 For an example, see Appendix E. 
43 For an example, see Appendix D. 
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reports of the Copyright Hub project, and thus were only circulated within a small circle. 
These documents undoubtedly offered unique insights into the case study, which could never 
be found in publicly available data sources. 
The overall process of data collection, data analysis and writing up 
The overall scheme of data collection, data analysis and writing up employed in this research 
is summarised in Figure 8 below. The research process began with the initial literature 
review, the purpose of which was to determine relevant theories to be used as a point of 
departure for the research, in conjunction with a pilot study aiming at obtaining some early 
empirical insights into the case study. The pilot study, during which data were collected 
through a small number of in-depth interviews, was theoretically informed by the initial 
literature review and in turn, the insights obtained through these interviews were used as 
feedback to help refocus the effort to narrow down the relevant literature. This effort 
resulted in a First Year Board Paper, which identified the “social learning framework” and 
“infrastructure studies” as potentially relevant literature for studying the Copyright Hub.  
 
Figure 8 The overall scheme of data collection, data analysis and writing up 
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The Social Learning Framework was proposed by Stewart and Williams (2005) as an extension 
to the Social Shaping of Technology (SST) perspective with a focus on the development 
process of technologies. The meaning of ‘social learning’ is twofold. First, it illuminates the 
fact that properties of a technology are not always taken for granted by users, but are learnt, 
experienced, and enhanced through their exercises and practices with the technological 
artefact. Second, it also implies that, by learning about the product’s deficiencies and 
potentialities through users’ experiences, suppliers would gain considerable advantage from 
having access to an invaluable source of knowledge for subsequent product innovation. 
Stewart and Williams (2005, p.7) remark: 
This underlines the importance of the linkages between users and producers that 
can act as a vehicle for this kind of knowledge exchange. To innovate successfully, 
producers may depend critically on information from users, and vice versa… The 
social learning framework draws attention to the way in which these knowledge 
flows are achieved (often by the efforts of key intermediaries) through processes 
that Sørensen (1996) describes as ‘learning by interaction’. 
In addition, this framework also identifies two different, but interrelated, social learning 
processes for technology development and use. First, innofusion emphasises the fact that 
technology innovation does not stop at the supplier’s site, but continues to throughout the 
life of the artefacts as they are diffused and adopted by users (Fleck, 1993). Second, 
domestication refers to the efforts of users to incorporate a technology into their contexts 
and purposes, ranging from integrating new innovations into their families’ settings to 
tinkering and using artefacts in ways that are not anticipated by the designer (Silverstone and 
Haddon, 1996; Haddon, 2006). These two differing sides of the innovation process are 
combined in the social learning framework to form an integrated approach to studying the 
evolution and biography of technological artefacts and user practices, which is appropriate 




On the other hand, literature on infrastructure studies (Star, 2002) was deemed fitting 
because the Copyright Hub initiative was initially regarded as an attempt to develop a new 
e-Infrastructure for streamlining the copyright licensing market. Four core concepts 
highlighting distinct aspects of infrastructures were selected to help guide the process of data 
collection and analysis in the early days of this research.  
The first concept was “boundary objects”, which was developed by Star and Griesemer 
(1989) to depict objects which are flexible enough to meet the informational needs and 
constraints of various parties, and yet durable enough to make them recognisable across 
different sites. Boundary objects are thus at once “ambiguous and clear”, they are “loosely 
structured in common use, and become more tightly bound in particular locations” (Star, 
2002, p.18). Consequently, boundary objects can give researchers an intriguing window into 
different stakeholders’ perspectives and the ways mutual understanding and relationships 
are shaped within heterogeneous environments. Therefore, during the early stages of my 
fieldwork, I paid particular attention to visions acting as boundary objects, such as “the 
answer to the machine is in the machine” or the Copyright Hub as a “one-stop shop for 
licensing” or a “maker of a new market”, which helped facilitate the communication and 
understanding of the project between various stakeholders across the ecologies of policy-
making, business, and standard development.  
The second concept revolves around the development of standards and classifications. 
Bowker and Star (2000, pp.149-152) define a classification as a spatial, temporal 
segmentation of the world, which arises from a historically situated system of activities; while 
standards are “any set of agreed-upon rules for the production of (textual or material) 
objects”. Together, standards and classification become a key site of work, politics, and 
struggles within any infrastructure. By focusing on examining standards and classifications, I 
was able to identify the data model, which the Copyright Hub adopted from the Linked 
Content Coalition (LCC), as a key site of tensions and activities within the project. Studying 
this site early on helped reveal and enabled the researcher to follow the dynamics between 
key stakeholders involved in the development of the Copyright Hub and hence, offered a 
plausible explanation for the trajectory of the Copyright Hub’s development. 
The third concept is about the “master narrative” or a single voice representing “the pseudo-
inclusive generic [which] does not problematize diversity” (Star, 2002, p.19). This is a bias in 
infrastructural and material representation, in which things that are deemed important by 
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the master narrative are made visible through normal categories, while the outliers – things 
that do not fit in any categories or standards – are rendered invisible or disappeared into the 
nearest file holder, which is normally labelled as “not elsewhere specified” or “other” (Star, 
2010, p.609). This notion of marginality emphasises the importance of revealing the master 
narrative, as well as reconstructing voices of “the other”, prior to conducting any further 
analysis of an infrastructure. As a result, great effort was placed upon reconstructing and 
examining various IP narratives, their struggle and dynamics, which set the stage for the 
emergence of the Copyright Hub (see Chapter 5, section I).  
The final concept is concerned with “invisible work”. It is argued that as boundary objects, 
standards, classification and master narratives become taken for granted, they create a false 
sense of easiness which devalues much of the work that contributes to the construction of 
infrastructures. In this sense, certain work is embedded in the background and becomes 
invisible. As Star and Strauss (1999) argued, this creates different layers of silence and arenas 
of voice for work in practice. Consequently, what is counted as work and who gets to define 
it has profound implications for understanding how work is organised, displaced, and valued 
in certain circumstances, which eventually leads to a more comprehensible account of how 
the infrastructure is constructed. This concept was thus important to help remind the 
researcher to pay closer attention to the invisible work that had gone into the construction 
of the Copyright Hub, as well as those silenced voices which could not be easily identified 
through other publicly available data sources. 
After the practicality of applying literature on infrastructure studies and the social learning 
framework to the case study of the Copyright Hub was affirmed by the First Year Board 
Review, the researcher began to conduct full-fledged research in the field. The main research 
activities in this period included literature review, followed by data collection and analysis, 
the preliminary findings of which were further developed into workshop presentations, 
conference papers, and drafts of journal papers. This interim work was eventually compiled 
to assist the researcher in the writing process of the final thesis. It is crucial to note that these 
research activities did not follow a liner model, but instead they occurred in a complex, 
iterative manner. While the literature review helped guide the process of data collection, 
data analysis, and writing up, collecting and analysing data in the field, as well as writing up 
the thesis, also provided critical feedback on the feasibility and appropriateness of the 
chosen methods and literature. For instance, the four core concepts in the literature on 
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infrastructure studies were initially used to remind the researcher of what he should be 
looking for during fieldwork. Yet, empirical insights collected during fieldwork effectively 
foreclosed any possibility of the Copyright Hub becoming an infrastructure44 in the copyright 
licensing market due to slow technical progress. As a result, although the literature on 
infrastructure studies was helpful as a theoretical point of departure at the early stages of 
this research, it soon proved inappropriate for the purpose of studying the Copyright Hub as 
an innovation-in-the-making. 
The iterative nature of the process of reviewing literature, collecting and analysing data, and 
writing up thus had substantial implications for determining the research methods and 
theories that eventually appeared in the final form of this thesis. A more thorough review of 
the literature disclosed that the social learning framework belongs to a well-established 
tradition, known as the Social Shaping of Technology (SST), developed mainly by scholars at 
the “Edinburgh school” of innovation studies (Williams and Edge, 1996; MacKenzie and 
Wajcman, 1999). The social learning framework was argued to belong to the second wave of 
SST research emerging in the 2000s, which advocated methodologies and frameworks 
engaging with a broader conception of relevant actors and sites of technological 
transformation (Hyysalo, Pollock and Williams, 2018). Built on the strength of this wave of 
research, Pollock and Williams (2010a) developed what they called the Biography of Artefacts 
(BoA) approach, which aims to address the short-comings of “snap-shot” studies by means 
of strategic ethnography, or theoretically-informed, multi-site and longitudinal studies. As a 
result, the social learning framework was soon replaced by the BoA approach, and the notion 
of strategic ethnography consequently played a crucial role in guiding the design of this 
research.  
In the last instance of literature review during the writing up process, the researcher was 
informed of the latest development of the BoA approach since the mid-2010s. By 
incorporating insights from a similar strand of Finnish studies of health technology 
innovations, a more coherent approach, which emphasises the evolution of not only the 
technology in question, but also organisations and practices involved in the process, was 
developed and the BoA approach was renamed the Biographies of Artefacts and Practices 
(BOAP) framework to reflect such change (Hyysalo, Pollock and Williams, 2018). This thesis 
                                                          
44 Here, I followed Star and Ruhleder (1996, p.113) in defining an infrastructure as “a fundamentally 
relational concept. It becomes infrastructure in relation to organized practices”.  
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eventually adopted the BOAP framework as the state-of-the-art development of the BoA 
approach and incorporated a number of newly-developed concepts from the BOAP 
framework, such as a “series of configurational movements” and “ecologies of 
interconnected actors”, to help facilitate the process of data collection and analysis.  
With the literature on infrastructure studies being dismissed due to being irrelevant, there 
was a pressing need to find appropriate literature that could help analyse the case study of 
the Copyright Hub, which was characterised as an innovation-in-the-making that was driven 
primarily by expectations and promises. The researcher soon identified the sociology of 
expectations as suitable literature for the purpose of guiding the process of data collection 
and analysis in this empirical context due to its proven track record of successful application 
to similar case studies in a wide range of scientific fields and technical domains45. Further 
empirical insights collected from the field also suggested that the Copyright Hub was a 
project of divergent pressures: while the UK government sought to stimulate the economy 
through fostering sustainable digital industries, the creative industries at the same time 
appealed to the government against further erosion of copyright and IP protection by means 
of using digital technologies to streamline the copyright licensing process. Consequently, the 
case study of the Copyright Hub occurred not within a single ecology of actors, but across 
multiple ecologies of policy makers, businesses and IP standard developers. This 
circumstance called for additional literature, which could provide the necessary conceptual 
tools to help analyse the dynamics of expectations in multiple ecologies. Such a theory was 
found in Abbott’s (2005) notion of “linked ecologies”, which conceptualises the social world 
as linked ecologies that act as a flexible surround for one another. The iterative process of 
reviewing literature on “linked ecologies”, collecting and analysing data, and writing up drafts 
of the thesis gradually proved the merit of this notion in dissecting the complex dynamics of 
expectations occurring within the case study of the Copyright Hub.  
Studying “linked ecologies” also led to another discovery of Abbott’s (1995) earlier work on 
the relation between social entities and boundaries. In his seminal paper titled “Things of 
boundaries”, Abbott put forward an explanation for the origin of social entities, in which he 
argued that social entities emerge from the process of social actors “yoking” various proto-
boundaries together. This conception inspired me to reconceptualise the notion of 
                                                          
45 Cross-referencing Chapter 2, page 22, for examples of the successful application of the sociology of 
expectations to various fields.  
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“protected spaces” in the context of technological innovation by arguing that protected 
spaces emerge through a similar process, in which various actors yoke different pre-existing 
sites of differences together. This reconceptualisation showed great potential for discarding 
the notion of “protected spaces as black-boxes”, as well as explaining not only the formation, 
but also the dissolution and the dynamics occurring within those spaces. Unfortunately, since 
the Copyright Hub was a high-profile, ongoing project whose data still largely remained 
confidential by the time this thesis was written, this argument has not been developed 
thoroughly due to the lack of available data to back up the theoretical discussion.    
  
In comparison with grounded theory methods 
Since there was no clear rule dictating the processes of analysing qualitative data (Spencer, 
Ritchie and O’Connor, 2003), the author did not conform to any strict form of data analysis. 
Nevertheless, the process, which I adopted for analysing data in this research, could be 
argued to resemble grounded theory methods (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). According to 
Charmaz (1996), grounded theory methods possesses the following six characteristics: (1) 
simultaneous involvement in data collection and data analysis; (2) analytic codes and 
categories are developed from data, not from pre-conceived hypotheses; (3) the 
development of middle-range theories to explain processes; (4) writing analytical memo as 
the crucial intermediate step between coding data and writing drafts of the paper; (5) 
theoretical sampling or sampling for theory construction; and (6) delay of literature review. 
In the following section, I will discuss in more detail several aspects of the processes of data 
collection and analysis and compare them with Charmaz’s prescription of grounded theory 
methods in order to highlight the similarities and differences between the two approaches. 
First, as mentioned above, the boundaries between data collection and data analysis phases 
were blurred in this research. The early-collected data were subjected to preliminary analysis 
during fieldwork, which in turn provided feedback on which further data would be collected. 
In other words, the emerging analysis during fieldwork had play a crucial role in shaping my 
data collection procedures. For example, it was revealed during the first fieldwork trip that 
the data model, which the Copyright Hub adopted from the Linked Content Coalition 
initiative, was central to the successful development of the project. Early interviews indicated 
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that this data model was the most contested site of the technical implementation process 
due to competing ideologies, differences in development practices and professional believes. 
This finding led the researcher to enquire further into the subject and subsequently 
discovered a number of critical themes (e.g. how different professions justified their claims 
of expertise and authority over the data model; how this data model had been developed 
through a series of loosely-connected initiatives since the mid-90s; and how key actors 
migrated through a string of different projects, and yet, still contributed to the development 
of the same data model), all of which provided new insights into the topics of interest in this 
research. 
Second, I began this study with certain research interests (i.e. how the dynamics of 
expectations shape the development of the Copyright Hub) and a set of analytical concepts 
(e.g. arenas of expectations, linked ecologies, hinges etc.). These concepts served as points 
of departure for developing new ideas and provided focus for data collection, listening to 
interviewees, and thinking analytically about their narratives. I was thus not limited by 
preconceived ideas and theories, but I was able to address both my initial research interests 
and other emerging topics deemed crucial by the research participants. Through such 
processes, I was capable of deriving my own analytical categories directly from the data, 
which Charmaz (1996, p.32) claimed such an indicator to be “the hallmark of grounded 
theory studies”.  
Third, the types of data which I collected for this research were what Charmaz’s (1996) 
described as the “rich, detailed data”, which were generally gathered for grounded theory 
studies. She wrote: 
When I ask for rich, detailed data, I ask for full or ‘thick’ […] written descriptions 
of events observed by researchers, extensive accounts of personal experience 
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from respondents and records that provide narratives of experience […]. 
Participant observers’ field notes, interviewers’ transcriptions, patient 
autobiographies, student journals, may all produce rich, detailed data. (Charmaz, 
1996, p.33) 
The research diary (see Appendix D) and field notes (see Appendix E), as well as transcriptions 
of in-depth interviews and documents, which I accumulated during fieldwork afford me a 
comprehensive understanding of the empirical context where the Copyright Hub project took 
place and the individual meaning and experiences from the points of view of each participant. 
Furthermore, the process of data collection was closely-coupled with the process of data 
analysis, which resulted in the data gathered became increasingly focused, with the aim of 
ultimately developing new theories (e.g. the new conceptualisation of protected space, 
theorisation of how multiple arenas of expectations could be “linked” together, and so on). 
Such an aim was another archetype of the grounded theory research. 
Fourth, Charmaz (1996, p.36) argued that “the most important basic rule for a grounded 
theorist is: study your emerging data46”. Studying data had always been central to the process 
of data analysis in this research. From the very beginning of my fieldwork, I kept a daily 
research diary of events which I observed in the field47. Such notes were written in the 
evening to help me reflect upon important events occurred during the day and were 
reviewed in the next morning to remind me of critical points of interest and emerging themes 
that needed further enquiry. In addition, I transcribed the majority of the recorded interviews 
myself to learn the nuances of the research participants’ language and meanings. After each 
fieldwork trip, preliminary analysis of the data was conducted, and early findings were then 
                                                          
46 Emphasised as in original document. 
47 Referencing Appendix D. 
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presented to my supervisors. Based on these insights and with the aid of my supervisors, I 
learnt to identify promising venues, themes and future directions which my data could take 
me in the subsequent fieldtrips.  
Another crucial aspect of the data analysis process was coding the data. After an interview 
had been fully transcribed, I conducted initial coding by examining each line of data and made 
detailed comments on any actions, events or topics which were deemed important either by 
the participant or by myself. The process of initial coding was particularly useful for breaking 
data into categories and for helping me look at the data critically and analytically, without 
being lost in the “forest of details”48. The next step of coding involved applying a number of 
codes, which continually appeared in the initial coding, to a large set of data49. This process 
of coding was thus much more focused and directed than the initial coding, which helped me 
identify the most significant codes capable of categorising my data most accurately. 
Compared with the processes of coding prescribed by Charmaz (1996), the two processes 
that I described above were equivalent to “line-by-line coding” and “focused coding” in 
grounded theory methods. 
However, the next step after “focused coding” was when my approach to data analysis 
diverted from Charmaz (1996), who recommended “memo-writing” as the intermediate step 
between coding and the first draft of the completed analysis. Charmaz argued that memo-
writing was similar to free-writing or pre-writing – the process in which the researcher 
explored ideas about their categories, without the need to worrying about making the writing 
presentable to an audience. Consequently, memo-writing emphasised the importance of 
jotting ideas down as quickly and clearly as possible, while accepting overuse of prepositional 
phrases, repetitive structures, and lengthy sentences. In the case of this research, however, 
                                                          
48 For an example of the initial coding, see Appendix F. 
49 Referencing Appendix G.  
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I was placed under mounting pressure to present my data and findings to a wide array of 
audiences very early on, as a way to fulfil my obligations to CREATe – the research consortium 
which provided funding for my fieldwork50. As a publicly funded body, CREATe was 
committed to demonstrating the high level of impacts of those studies, which they had 
funded, through a variety of channels: from weekly blog posts, to conference presentations, 
to journal papers. The constant pressure to produce presentable pieces of work did not 
afford me the luxury of developing lengthy and “for my eyes only” memos, but instead I was 
engaged in developing a number of blog posts, conference presentations (see Table 2 below), 
and a draft of a journal paper for various types of audience. Although these pieces of work 
did help me explore and develop further my ideas about the categories which had been 
identified from focused coding51, they were proved to be not as efficient as Charmaz’s 
“memo-writing” method in terms of bridging the gap between coding and writing the first 
draft of a completed analysis. As a result, I had to go through a much more complex and time-
consuming process of translating presentations and ideas, which I had developed in various 
venues for different audiences, into the draft of this thesis whilst having no intermediate 
layer of writing to draw upon. 
Table 2: A list of conferences, at which I presented during my doctoral research 
No. Conference Name Location Date Prime Audience 
1 4th Innovation in Information 
Infrastructures (III) Workshop 







2 40th Annual Meeting of the Society 
for Social Studies of Science (4S) 




                                                          
50 Cross-referencing page 101. 
51 For an example, see Appendix H. 
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3 CREATe Festival London, UK June 2016 Academics 
Policy Makers 
Industries 
4 8th Annual Workshop of the 
International Society for the 
History and Theory of Intellectual 
Property (ISHTIP) 
CREATe 






5 41st Annual Meeting of the Society 
for Social Studies of Science (4S) 






Finally, I did not leave the exhaustive process of literature review until the very end of the 
writing process when I had fully developed my conceptual analysis of the data. Instead, as 
discussed above, the literature review went through numerous iterations, which provided 
guidance for, and subsequently received feedback from, the data collection, data analysis 
and writing up process. In the final iteration of the literature review, I had covered the chosen 
literature (e.g. on sociology of expectations, linked ecologies, boundaries and social entities, 
etc.) thoroughly and explicitly weaved it into my work. With the gaps in the existing literature 
carefully identified and explained, I had managed to juxtapose this research with the state of 
the art of scholarship on social studies of technological expectations, while ensuring that my 
analysis was derived from the data and was not dictated by preconceived ideas and theories. 
The process of literature review employed in this research was thus dissimilar, yet it still 
shared certain characteristics with the process of deferring literature review, which Charmaz 
(1996) identified as one amongst the distinguishing characteristics of grounded theory 
methods.    
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Chapter 4 – Understanding the Backdrop of 
the Copyright Hub’s case study 
 
I. Dreaming a Dream of Silicon Valley 
On 4th November 2010, to the surprise of many spectators, the then newly-elected Prime 
Minister David Cameron announced his ambition to turn London’s East End into a world-
leading technology city which could potentially rival Silicon Valley (GOV.UK, 2010d). This 
speech was also accompanied by announcements of an independent review of the UK’s IP 
framework, which was later known as Hargreaves Review, and the establishment of an elite 
network of Technology and Innovation Centres to help businesses accelerate their route from 
R&D to commercialisation (HM Government, 2010). Underneath Cameron’s persuasive 
speech on what over a hundred high-tech companies around Old Street and Shoreditch might 
offer and the government’s readiness to turn this vision into reality, one could not help but 
notice three interrelated threads running through his rhetoric (GOV.UK, 2010b). 
First, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the significant downturn of the UK’s 
economy had compelled the government to deal with a number of pressing socio-economic 
issues by throwing them back at the private sector. As David Cameron (ibid.) had succinctly 
put it:  
… [I]n a world where money is incredibly tight… [the role of government is] to 
agitate for, cajole and inspire the change we want to see… [Businesses, on the 
other hand, will be] using their expertise and applying their resources to making 
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London a centre for innovation for putting Britain on the path to economic 
dynamism. That’s what I mean when I say we’re all in this together. 
Second, from the perspectives of the UK’s creative sector, Cameron made evident the bias in 
the government’s plan towards the so-called “Google-model” of innovation (Sherwin, 2011). 
Considering Silicon Valley both as the role model for development and as important investors 
in the government’s plan, Cameron bluntly remarked (GOV.UK, 2010b): 
The founders of Google have said they could never have started their company in 
Britain… Over there, they have what they are called ‘fair-use’ provisions, which 
some people believe gives companies more breathing space to create new 
products and services… I want to encourage the sort of creative innovation that 
exists in America. 
Consequently, it was conceived by the creative industries that Cameron’s favouritism of the 
American model would directly benefit technology companies and start-ups at their own 
expenses (Sherwin, 2011). In addition, some leading laws firms also warned the government 
against proposals to introduce fair use exceptions52 into UK copyright laws, which was (and 
still is) stringently dictated by European Copyright Directive (Harbottle & Lewis, 2010; 
TaylorWessing, 2010). Therefore, any changes to copyright exceptions, they argued, would 
need to be discussed at European level and the UK cannot act unilaterally on this matter. As 
a result, Cameron’s announcement of another review of the UK’s IP framework was received 
with contrasting attitudes: it was warmly welcomed by Google and the Internet campaigners 
                                                          
52 Fair use provisions in the US laws allow any copying of copyright-protected materials for a limited 
and transformative purpose, such as commentary and criticism, parody, teaching and research, etc. 
(For more details see Stanford University Libraries 2010) 
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at large, while being strongly detested by the creative industries and legal practitioners (BBC, 
2010d). 
Third, Cameron’s address also made clear the light-touch approach, which the government 
would adopt in carrying out this strategy, as a result of ‘instructive lessons’ from Silicon 
Valley. In Cameron’s words (GOV.UK, 2010b): 
We understand where previous governments have gone wrong. They believed 
that they could design and create a technology cluster from on-high. But the 
lessons from Silicon Valley are instructive. There was no grand centralised plan… 
This teaches government some simple things. Go with the grain of what is already 
there. Don’t interfere so much that you smother. But do help out wherever you 
can. 
In short, Cameron’s speech was characterised by three interrelated threads: (1) an attempt 
to shift the socio-economic burden of reforming the UK’s economy onto businesses; (2) a 
strong bias toward the American model, especially the provisions of fair use in copyright; and 
(3) a light-touch approach to carry out this strategy. Nonetheless, the real motives behind 
this move toward building a technology city were still left unanswered. Under what 
circumstances did David Cameron make his speech in Shoreditch? What was the social, 
political, and economic context in which the newly-elected coalition government devised and 
adopted such a plan? The following sections are dedicated to giving some insights into these 
issues.   
II. UK Through the Looking Glass 
Before going into more details of the empirical case study of the Copyright Hub, it is essential 
for one to take a step back to apprehend the bigger picture in which this story unfolded. 
125 
 
Three important factors of the UK’s socio-political context, in which David Cameron made his 
announcements, are carefully chosen to be discussed at length in this section, which aims at 
providing not only background information, but partial explanation of why certain decisions 
was made. 
A. The Great Recession 
The first factor deals with the impact of the recent global financial crisis on the UK’s economy. 
Starting in early summer of 2007 when the U.S. sub-prime53 mortgage market began to 
collapse, the crisis rapidly spread throughout the global banking and financial systems as 
banks refused to lend to one another, citing concern over asset-backed securities (BBC, 
2009b). This resulted in “the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments” 
(BNP Paribas, 2007), which eventually pushed a great number of major banks to bankruptcy 
(Sorkin, 2008) and many countries into recession (Allen, 2008; Roubini, 2009). The UK was 
amongst the hardest hit in what was later called the Great Recession (Grusky, Western and 
Wimer, 2011).  
In January 2009, the UK was officially in deep recession after two consecutive quarters of 
negative economic growth, witnessing the contraction of gross domestic product (GDP) by 
1.5% in the last three months of 2008 (BBC, 2009c). It was also projected that the economy 
would further shrink by 2.8% in 2009, the worst prospect amongst developed countries (BBC, 
2009d). Unemployment rate, in addition, had been raising sharply between April 2008 and 
June 2009, and finally reached its peak in October 2011 at approximately 2.7 million - the 
highest level in the UK for 17 years (BBC, 2015). This time, the labour market was by no means 
a lagging indicator of the crisis (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010). The recession also left the 
government with the largest budget deficit of £175 billion and the total government debt of 
                                                          
53 Sub-prime loans are high risk loans to people with poor or no credit histories.  
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£1 trillion by 2014 (BBC, 2009a). As a result, cuts in public spending was expected to be 
‘deeper and tougher’ than Margaret Thatcher’s in the 1980s and the country would need 
‘two parliaments of pain’ to mend ‘the black hole in the state’s finances’ (Elliott, 2010). The 
UK’s recovery from the crisis was indeed found to be relatively weak in comparison with 
previous recessions (UKCES, 2014). The UK finally managed to exit the Great Recession in the 
third quarter of 2013 when GDP returned to its peak in the pre-crisis period (Chan and 
Spence, 2014). 
B. A Newly-Elected Government  
It is also equally important to note the forming of the Conservative - Liberal Democrat 
coalition government in May 2010, against the turbulent backdrop of the economic 
downturn (BBC, 2010b). In his first speech as prime minister, Cameron emphasised the 
urgent need to “rebuild trust in the political system”, by reducing budget deficit and 
reorganising the parliament, and to build “a more responsible society” where “everyone pulls 
together”, indicating the government’s plan to shift some of its responsibilities onto the 
private sectors (Cameron, 2010). In order to achieve these goals, the coalition government 
introduced a number of measures, two of which are of particular interest to this story. On 
the one hand, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which received the Royal Assent on 15th 
September 2011, guaranteed the fixed-term existence of five years for every parliament 
(Legislation.gov.uk, 2011). As a result, the Act gave significant support for the coalition 
government to embark on its long-term strategies, without fear that they would be 
interrupted by an early general election. On the other hand, the government considered its 
most urgent task was “to implement an accelerated plan to reduce the [budget] deficit” (HM 
Treasury 2010, p.1), which resulted in six billion pounds of public spending cuts in 2010 alone 
(Osborne, 2010).  
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In the second and third quarters of 2010, the UK’s economy witnessed unusual rapid growth 
due to stimulus packages introduced by the previous government (BBC, 2010e). Despite 
these optimistic indications, the recovery appeared to be short-lived as data of the final 
quarter of 2010 indicated the shrinking of GDP once again by 0.5% (Wearden, 2011b). While 
the government blamed “icy weather” for the disappointing GDP reading54, opposition 
politicians immediately seized this opportunity to challenge the government’s austerity 
programme, arguing against public spending cuts which they considered being made too 
deeply and too rapidly. Ed Balls - the then new Shadow Chancellor - condemned Cameron 
and Osborne’s deficit-reduction plan as a “reckless gamble”, which “put political ideology or 
expediency before economic logic” (Balls, 2011). Furthering this argument, the outgoing 
general director of Confederation of British Industry (CBI) - Sir Richard Lambert - criticised 
the coalition government for not only being ruthless in pursuing public spending cuts, but 
also lacking a vision for long-term economic growth. Lambert (2011) remarked: 
Rather than a big picture of the kind of economic eco-system that the Government 
wants to champion, we are left with a few rather vague ideas about the scope for 
supporting a number of predictable sectors, and the promise that more ideas will 
be forthcoming at the time of the spring budget. And when it comes to micro 
policy initiatives, politics appear to have trumped economics on too many 
occasions over the past eight months. 
In the face of negative economic growth and mounting criticisms, it came as no surprise that 
the government did everything they could to defend their standing, which partially explained 
why both the independent IP review and the implementation plan for Technology and 
                                                          
54 The then Business Secretary Vince Cable commented on Today Programme: “There is a reasonable 
consensus that this was a pretty bad quarter, mainly because of the weather” (Wearden, 2011a) 
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Innovation Centres were set to be reported within only six months after their 
announcements. This politico-economic context indeed made short-term concrete 
achievements particularly appealing to the government, as these figures are the only proper 
ammunition one can use to fight ‘the war of visions’. 
C. Previous Attempts to Review the UK’s IP framework 
Prior to David Cameron’s call for an independent review of the UK’s IP framework in 
November 2010, numerous attempts had already been made by previous administrations in 
order to intervene in this domain. To this end, one can go as far back as December 2005 when 
the Labour government commissioned Andrew Gowers - the former editor of Financial Times 
- to establish whether the UK’s IP system was fit for purpose in the digital age (Out-Law, 
2006). Twelve months later, a comprehensive 147-page document, which was later known 
as Gowers Review, was published alongside the annual pre-budget report of the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer (HM Treasury, 2006). In his review, Gowers found ‘the current [IP] system 
to be broadly performing satisfactorily’ and thus ‘[it is not] in need of radical overhaul’ 
(Gowers 2006, pp.1-4). Instead, Gowers proposed an exhaustive list of 54 recommendations 
divided into three main areas: (1) strengthening IP enforcement, (2) reducing costs of IP 
registration and litigation, and (3) creating balanced and flexible rights, which aimed at 
tweaking the current legal framework to better serve the interests of all parties involved 
(ibid. pp.6-9). Moreover, Gowers admitted that he had not “shied away” from making 
recommendations at European and international levels where amendments were deemed 
necessary (ibid p.1). Despite Gowers’ attempt to strike a balance in his approach to protect 
the rights of all parties involved, the Labour Administration took forward these 
recommendations with a clear bias towards right-holder businesses and IP enforcement. In 
an immediate response to Gowers Review, the government affirmed its position in 
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‘endorsing the full Gowers enforcement package to tackle piracy and other IP infringement’, 
while mentioning virtually nothing about how the other two areas of recommendations 
would be approached (HM Treasury 2006, p.60).  
The same narrative was found echoed in subsequent Labour government’ strategic reports 
on digital economy, including the Creative Britain report in 2008, the Digital Britain report in 
2009, and the Digital Economy Act (DEA) in 2010. Especially in the case of DEA, the bill was 
rushed through the parliament and received Royal Assent on 8th April 2010, in the wash-up 
period right before the general election (BBC 2010c). The most controversial aspects of DEA 
were that it imposed obligation on Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to inhibit illegal peer-to-
peer file sharing and granted the Secretary of State unprecedented power to intervene in 
domain name registration (Parliament.uk, 2010). Under the provisions of DEA, ISPs were 
obliged to track down subscribers, who appeared to have engaged in infringing activities, and 
notified them through a series of three warning letters, before enabling legal and technical 
actions against serious offenders. The new power also allowed the government to use court 
orders to block access to websites identified with infringing content (Legislation.gov.uk, 
2010). These measures were, unsurprisingly, met with angry denunciation and legal 
challenges from ISPs, Internet-based service companies and end-users (for detailed stories, 
see Arthur 2010; TaylorWessing 2011; BBC 2011; Hörnle 2012). As a result, a large proportion 
of DEA’s original measures were either completely removed (DCMS, 2011), or significantly 
delayed (BBC, 2012), or reserved without being actually implemented (Parliament.uk, 
2013a). 
One of the main arguments underlying criticism of DEA and its precursors was that the 
legislature had failed to strike the right balance between protecting the interests of the 
creative industries, especially those which are still clinging persistently to their old business 
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models of the pre-digital era and preserving the rights of others who participate in the 
thriving digital economy. Mansell and Steinmueller (2013) argued that this imbalance was 
largely due to the dominant lobbying power of the creative industries and the inaccurate 
‘economic calculus’ of tightening control over digital copyright infringement, which was 
based on false assumptions and misleading methods. Consequently, these statutory 
interventions were largely perceived by ISPs and Internet users as the negative outcomes of 
policy initiatives, which were driven by lobbying instead of empirical evidence (BBC, 2009). 
Against this backdrop, it is reasonable to argue that Cameron’s announcement of another IP 
review was, at least to a certain extent, a political move to gain credit for the then newly 
elected government by means of redressing fiercely contested policies introduced by the 
prior administration. In fact, as discussed in more details in the following section, conscious 
decisions had been made to ensure that outcomes of the Hargreaves Review were everything 
that the Gowers Review was not. 
D. Summary 
In summary, the Great Recession, the coming into power of a new government and prior 
attempts of the Labour administration to intervene in the UK’s IP framework had had a 
profound impact on how decisions were subsequently made. Due to the economic crisis, 
pulling the country out of recession was at the top of the government’s agenda. Blaming the 
Labour administration for the colossal budget deficit and government’s debt, the then 
incoming government shifted its focus from economic stimulus packages to austerity 
programme with deep and sudden cuts in public spending. Nonetheless, poor GDP reading 
in the final quarter of 2010 provided political ammunition for the opposition to fight back 
and put the new government in defence of their standing and visions. Consequently, the 
coalition government expressed a strong preference for a long-term plan which, at the same 
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time, could produce immediate quantifiable achievements to boost the economy, without 
the need to deepen the hole in the government’s pocket. In addition, the ill-perceived 
controversy around the Digital Economy Act and previous administration’s approach to 
statutory interventions in IP were exploited to give the coalition government credit for 
rectifying a controversial topic. Ironically, the premature judgement on adopting fair-use 
provisions and explicit favouritism towards technology companies in Cameron’s narrative 
had brought even more chaos to the issue.  
III. The Dreamer, the Co-ordinator & the Geek 
In the turbulent context of the UK, and more generally Europe, in 2010, how did the story of 
the Copyright Hub begin to unfold? The following section is devoted to detailing three series 
of events occurring in parallel with one another (i.e. the first two took place within the UK’s 
context, while the last one arose at European level), which laid the foundations for three 
crucial strains of work in the story of the Copyright Hub: (1) the formation of creative 
industries’ alliances which provide socio-political support for the project, (2) the 
accumulation of necessary resources for technical development, and (3) the distillation of 
decades’ worth of experience and expertise into a workable data model for interoperation 
across different media types. Alongside these, sketches are provided in order to introduce 
three main organisations in this story, namely the Digital Catapult, the Copyright Hub, and 
the Linked Content Coalition, before we delve into their mutual shaping relationships and 
interactions in subsequent chapters. 
A. A Tale of two UK Policies  
Blueprint for Technology was the title of an official document published by the government 
to accompany Cameron’s speech in Shoreditch (HM Government, 2010). In this document, 
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the government detailed a number of new policy measures, ranging from the introduction of 
a new Entrepreneur Visa to a new ‘peer to patent’ system, and a framework, which could 
help make these goals achievable (GOV.UK, 2010a).  
Amongst these propositions, there are two announcements, which are of utmost importance 
and interest to this case study. First, it was the announcement of an independent review of 
the UK’s IP framework, which was to be reported on six months later, in April 2011. This 
decision was mainly justified on the grounds that existing IP laws were no longer fit for 
purpose in the digital age and hence, the review should evaluate and identify room for 
improvement, which includes considering whether the introduction of US-styled fair use 
provisions would benefit the UK’s economy. Second, the government also announced the 
establishment of an elite network of Technology and Innovation Centres, which would help 
businesses bridge the gap between research and commercialisation and thus shortening the 
time to market. The Technology Strategy Board was put in charge of developing a strategy 
and implementation plan for this network of centres and was scheduled to report in April 
2011 - at the same time as the independent review of IP framework. 
The reason for highlighting these two announcements is that they mark the beginning of two 
lines of work within the UK, which were crucial to the development of the Copyright Hub 
later on. In particular, the announcement of IP review resulted in the Hargreaves Review, 
which was followed by Richard Hooper’s feasibility study and the proposal for the 
construction of the Copyright Hub itself. On the other hand, the elite network of Technology 
and Innovation Centres, which was later renamed Catapults, has been implemented by 
Technology Strategy Board throughout the period between 2011 and 201555. One of these 
                                                          
55 As of August 2015, nine Catapults have been established, including Cell Therapy, Digital, Future 




centres - the Digital Catapult - plays a vital role in moving the project forward by providing 
the Copyright Hub with necessary resources and technical capabilities to design and build its 
foundation technology. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the relationship between 
the Copyright Hub and Digital Catapult came as a result of contingent circumstances and by 
no means the fruit of a carefully crafted government’s strategy. As examined in more details 
below, these two lines of work were running in parallel, but completely independent from 
one another, until an equal partnership between Digital Catapult and the Copyright Hub were 
formed. 
Policy 1 - Building an elite network of Technology and Innovation Centres 
In March 2010, Dr. Hermann Hauser published a seminal report titled The Current and Future 
Role of Technology and Innovation Centres in the UK, in which he urged the government to 
provide ‘sustained and substantial support for an elite group of Technology and Innovation 
Centres’ in order to bridge the critical gap between research findings and commercial 
propositions (Hauser 2010, p.1). Hauser (ibid. p.5) defined Technology and Innovation 
Centres (TICs) as ‘organisations focused on the exploitation of new technologies, through an 
infrastructure which bridges the spectrum of activities between research and technology 
commercialisation’. These activities constitute different levels of technology readiness, as 
shown in Figure 8 below.   
 
Figure 9: TICs in the spectrum of Technology Readiness Levels. (Reproduced from (Hauser 2010, p.5) 
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Drawing his conclusions from case studies of similar ‘translational infrastructures’ all over the 
world, Hauser (ibid.) recommended the government to focus its efforts on limited areas 
where: (1) multibillion pound worth of global markets exist; (2) the UK has the leading edge 
in scientific research; and (3) a significant part of the value chain can be anchored in the UK 
once the capacity has been developed. Furthermore, it was also emphasised that this elite 
network of TICs should be benefited from ‘sustained and predictable flows of public funding’ 
in the order of £5-10m per annum per TIC, over an average period of ten years (ibid. p.24). 
In response to Hauser’s report, PM David Cameron announced the government’s 
commitment to invest £200 million in TICs in his speech in Shoreditch and assigned the 
Technology Strategy Board to oversee this initiative (Geere, 2010). In January 2011, a 
prospectus was published to found the primary principles underlying operational aspects of 
TICs, as well as announcing the establishment of the first centre in high value manufacturing 
(Technology Strategy Board, 2011a). It was also envisaged that each TIC would be funded 
using the one-third model (i.e. one third of their budget is predictable core funding from 
public money; a further third from business-funded research contracts won competitively; 
and the final third from collaborative applied research projects funded jointly by public and 
private sectors, also competitively bid for). In December 2011, the elite network of TICs was 
officially branded Catapults by the Technology Strategy Board (2011a).  
By the time Hauser published his review of the Catapult network in November 2014, seven 
Catapults had been established, which attracted approximately £1.4 billion from public and 
private investments over the period of five years (Catapult, 2014), and the Technology 
Strategy Board had been renamed ‘Innovate UK’ to reflect its new focus on supporting 
innovative businesses to boost the UK’s economy (ICOM, 2014). In his review, Hauser (2014, 
pp.3-6) concluded that the programme has ‘excellent performance’ and urged the UK 
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government to maintain its focus and commitment ‘with a view to having 30 Catapults by 
2030… [and] bringing the Innovate UK budget closer to £1 billion per annum by 2020’. 
The Digital Catapult 
The Connected Digital Economy Catapult (or Digital Catapult) was the fifth centre established 
by the Technology Strategy Board (2012). Becoming operational in June 2013, the main 
emphasis of Digital Catapult was placed upon unlocking new value from the data value chain. 
As a result, the Digital Catapult was constructed by default to engage horizontally with all 
other sectors and TICs. As Neil Crockett - CEO of the Digital Catapult - revealed: 
So, the interesting position for us was we have the creative sector - digital 
creatives - and we have the ICT sector… And our engagement has been designed 
not to be sector-engagement, to be horizontal engagement… So it was set up in a 
way that was creating us as a layer in all sectors, including the digital creatives, not 
being a digital creative, if that makes sense. (Transcript F3) 
As of 2015, the Digital Catapult had identified and worked with its partners to address 
four major challenge areas in the data value chain: (1) personal data, privacy and trust; 
(2) integrating diverse data sets; (3) next generation connectivity labs and city 
demonstrators; and (4) reusing creative digital content. It was within the last area that 
the Digital Catapult collaborated with the Copyright Hub to develop a new digital 
infrastructure for copyright licensing. 
Policy 2: Reviewing the UK’s IP framework 
On 10th November 2010, only six days after Cameron made his speech in Shoreditch, it was 
announced that Professor Ian Hargreaves would be put in charge of the independent review 
of the UK’s IP framework (GOV.UK, 2010c). Despite being a well-respected figure in 
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journalism and the current chair of Digital Economy at Cardiff University, the appointment of 
Hargreaves to lead the review was a surprise for many spectators, including Hargreaves 
himself. As revealed in a later interview: 
I don’t even know for sure who the key signatory [for the appointment] were 
because they never talked to me about it. Nobody discusses anything. They just 
rang me up on… the day before they were due to announce it and said would I 
made myself available at the event tomorrow morning because they were going 
to announce this. And I said “Actually, I can’t make myself available tomorrow 
morning…” But they announced it anyway and off it went. So it’s a close process. 
Certainly close from the point of view of the person who is nomination being 
discussed and then eventually being chosen. (Transcript E5) 
Apart from being a hasty decision, this appointment was also cautiously received by many 
due to Hargreaves’ lack of experience and expertise in the IP domain. Considering himself as 
an ‘interested and honourably intentional outsider’, Hargreaves later conceded: 
Well, I had very little background in intellectual property issues prior to being 
asked in 2010 to take on a review of UK’s intellectual property laws and 
framework. To the extent that I have encountered intellectual property issues, 
that happened a little, but only a very little in my work as a journalist, which is 
what I’ve spent most of my career doing prior to this review. And I certainly had 
no expertise in laws or in any detailed ways in technology. So I was very much the 
interested and honourably intentional outsider brought in to make some 
judgements on fiercely contested arguments. (Transcript E5) 
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Leading the review under such circumstances, Hargreaves pointed out a number of critical 
factors to the design of the study, which were not elected by him but rather being 
“predetermined” by the government, and thus making his review much less ‘independent’. 
As recalled by Hargreaves: 
The other fact is that… how was the review conducted were determined by others. 
So, for example, it was predetermined that the staff support for the review would 
come from within the Intellectual Property office… At the beginning, one of its 
point of important was that it enabled me to be reasonably confident that this 
team of people would not allow me to make errors, given my lack of detailed 
knowledge of IP as I became more familiar with the subject.  
It was clear that they were looking to me to make judgement, but I was looking to 
them to reassure me about the quality of the evidence. They looked to me for 
ideas about gathering evidence and places where we didn’t have good evidence. 
For example, among smaller technology companies who everybody talked about 
a lot but nobody seemed to talk to…  
There was also an advisory group, which was an important part of the process. 
They were largely pre-selected. Not chosen by me. They were not people that I 
knew personally… I hoped that they would prove to be a group that would give 
good advice, and they did. (Transcript E5) 
Consequently, Hargreaves admitted that he had to make two “arbitrary” decisions very early 
on in order to lead the reviewing process. First, a definite decision was made that the review 
would meet the strict deadline imposed by the government, which allowed Hargreaves and 
his team only six months to compile their report. Second, Hargreaves had made a political 
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judgment on what could be done to distance his work from previous government’s attempts 
to intervene in this arena, particularly from the Gowers Review. As Hargreaves clearly 
remarked: 
It’s fair to add as well that in terms of what came before prime minister Cameron 
called for the review that I conducted, the outgoing Labour-led government had 
itself conducted a review of Intellectual Property issues. It was so called Gowers 
Review, named after Andrew Gowers. And it had led to proposals for change. And 
those proposals had pretty much imploded just before the general election in the 
parliamentary queries... So that was quite important precedent, even though it 
was largely a precedent of undelivered promises because it’s all got broken up in 
the election… And I think the other important thing that you had was the recent 
experience of failure, [which] tends to make people think “we need to try to get it 
right this time and get something that is workable”. And I was very mindful of 
that… 
I made one or two, you can say quite “arbitrary” decisions early on. One was that 
we would meet our deadlines. Two was that we would produce a report that 
would not have more than ten recommendations. The Gower report I think had 
fifty-four or fifty-something recommendations. And I thought if we produced a 
report with fifty-something recommendations, the chances of the ones that are 
really most important getting acted upon is much smaller. If you give politicians 
fifty-four choices, they’re quite likely to choose the ten things you least want them 
to choose. So I said to the team that was formed around this “We’re aiming for 
ten!” and we delivered ten in the end. (Transcript E5)  
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Against this backdrop, the Hargreaves Review was swiftly compiled and reported back to the 
government in May 2011 (GOV.UK, 2011a). In this report, Hargreaves (2011) concluded that 
the UK’s IP framework was falling behind the advancement of digital technologies, especially 
in the area of copyright. As mentioned above, a list of ten recommendations for reform was 
proposed, three of which will be discussed in detail due to their relevance to this story.  
First, perceiving copyright law as regulatory barrier to innovation and creativity, Hargreaves 
urged the government to ‘take long overdue action’ to modernise the existing framework by 
(1) supporting moves to achieve cross border licensing in the EU, (2) enabling licensing of 
orphan works, and (3) taking advantage of European Copyright Directive to introduce more 
exceptions at national level (ibid. p.4). Most importantly, Hargreaves proposed the 
construction of the world’s first Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE), which was expected to help 
in streamlining the licensing process and contributing towards an open and efficient digital 
market for content in the UK. In his vision, the main aim of such DCE was ‘to establish a 
network of interoperable databases to provide a common platform for licensing transactions’ 
(ibid. p.33). Hargreaves recommended that the government should not itself create the DCE, 
but appointed a ‘highly respected figure’ to lead the initiative. It was also suggested that these 
arrangements should be put in place by the end of 2012 and the DCE could be 
straightforwardly self-funded by small user charge (ibid. p.34). 
Second, regarding concern over fair use provisions, the Hargreaves Review concluded that 
“importing Fair Use wholesale was unlikely to be legally feasible in Europe” and suggested 
introducing EU-compliant copyright exceptions to UK’s law as an alternative measure (ibid. 
p.5). To support this conclusion, entrepreneurship, risk-taking and investor culture were cited 
as the prime reasons for Silicon Valley’s success, rather than the shape of IP laws in the US. In 
addition, Hargreaves also warned the government against any attempts to transpose fair use 
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into EU legal framework, as the benefits cannot be “expeditiously obtained” in the UK due to 
“protracted political negotiation, against a highly uncertain legal background” (ibid. pp.45-
46). 
Third, Hargreaves regarded enforcement as a theme which connects all areas of IP and 
therefore, an integrated solution, consisting of (1) modernising copyright law, (2) promoting 
copyright education, (3) enhancing enforcement, and (4) encouraging an open digital market 
for licensing, was presented as a viable proposition to replace prior policies, which 
emphasised solely on enforcement factor. In addition, Hargreaves requested that the 
government should ‘carefully monitor’ the strong enforcement measures of the Digital 
Economy Act and make necessary adjustment ‘in the light of evidence’ (ibid. p.6). 
On 3rd August 2011, the government announced its ‘broad acceptance of recommendations’ 
in the Hargreaves Review (GOV.UK, 2011b). In its official response, the government stated: 
Our overall goal is to have measures in place by the end of this Parliament that will 
do justice to the Review’s vision and will already be delivering real value to the UK 
economy and to the creators and lawful users of IP. We have committed to no 
further major review of the IP system in this Parliament. (HM Government 2011, 
p.1) 
In addition, the proposition of a Digital Copyright Exchange was wholeheartedly accepted 
and fully embraced by the government. Believing in the prospect of ‘a functioning digital 
market in rights clearance’ enabled by the DCE and the estimated benefits of additional £2.2 
billion per annum to the UK’s economy by 2020, the government promised to make 
‘arrangements [for an enquiry into DCE] in due course’ (ibid. pp.4-5). Evidently, the 
Hargreaves Review was largely successful in getting its message across and securing support 
from the government.  
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Outside the government’s immediate circle, however, attitudes towards the review were 
found to be much more diverse (Sweney, 2011). On the positive end, one could find a number 
of organisations like Open Rights Group, which warmly welcomed the Hargreaves Review 
and described it as ‘significant but sensible copyright reforms to allow a huge range of 
creativity and economically useful activity to take place’ (Bradwell, 2011). On the negative 
end, discontented responses were raised by a few, especially those working in the music 
industry, which considered these changes to be made at the expense of their own businesses 
(Music Ally, 2011). Between these two extremes, an ambivalent attitude towards the 
Hargreaves Review was proved to be more common. In general, these responses all shared 
the same position on applauding the rejection of US-styled fair use and expressing caution 
towards the idea of DCE due to the lack of implementation details (see Thomas 2011).  
The Copyright Hub 
On 22nd November 2011, the government appointed Richard Hooper - a renowned civil 
servant for his proven track record in leading projects converging media, telecommunications 
and information technologies -  to chair the feasibility study on DCE (GOV.UK, 2011c). From 
the very beginning, Hooper decided to divide his work into two distinct phases. The first 
phase was designed with a particular emphasis on meeting key stakeholders and gathering 
empirical data in order to determine the challenges facing the licensing market. Building on 
this understanding, the second phase was dedicated to producing a feasible solution for 
implementing the DCE suggested by Hargreaves.  
In March 2012, Hooper published the first report in the series, entitled ‘Rights and Wrongs - 
Is copyright licensing fit for purpose for the digital age?’ (Intellectual Property Office, 2012). 
In this report, Hooper (2012) argued that although the UK licensing system performed 
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relatively well in comparison with other countries’, there was still room for improvement. In 
his own words: 
Copyright licensing can be made more streamlined, easier and cheaper to use, 
especially for the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which make up 90% 
of the creative industries, without eroding the rights of rights owners. (ibid. p.6) 
Furthermore, the report also revealed significant problems with copyright licensing within 
certain sectors of the creative industry, as well as across sectors and national boundaries. 
These problems include (1) unjustified complexity of the licensing process, (2) repertoire 
imbalance56 between the physical and digital world, (3) difficulty in identifying right owners, 
(4) difficulty in making accurate payment, (5) lack of mechanism for support high-volume, 
low-value transactions, and (6) lack of common standards for cross-sectoral communication. 
As a result, Hooper concluded that the construction of the DCE, as outlined in Hargreaves 
Review, was justified.  
On 31st July 2012, the second report entitled ‘Copyright works - Streamlining copyright 
licensing for the digital age’ was published, co-authored by Richard Hooper and Dr. Ros Lynch 
(GOV.UK, 2012a). In this report, the authors proposed the construction of an Internet-based 
portal, named the Copyright Hub, which has the capacity for connecting to the ever 
increasing networks of licensing databases and legacy systems, using cross-sectoral and 
interoperable open standards for communication and data building blocks (Hooper and 
Lynch, 2012). The Copyright Hub was expected, by design, to serve the long tail of users and 
uses of copyright occurred at the bottom of the market, where the existing system had no 
                                                          
56 Repertoire imbalance refers to the shortage of equivalent legal content in digital formats (e.g. 
available for legally downloading and/or streamlining directly from the Internet), compared with its 
counterpart in physical forms (e.g. CDs or DVDs)  
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available mechanism to cultivate, and hence portraying itself as a maker of a new market, 
rather than a threat to current business models. In Hooper’s and Lynch’s vision, the Copyright 
Hub would provide five main services: (1) signposting and navigation; (2) copyright 
education; (3) copyright registration; (4) digital copyright licensing; and (5) an authoritative 
place for the use of orphan works. 
Unlike Hargreaves Review, the ‘Copyright works’ report was warmly received by both public 
and private sectors. The then Business Secretary Vince Cable described the idea of the 
Copyright Hub as ‘an ambitious undertaking and one that could clearly yield great benefits 
for the UK’s creative industries and consumers’ (GOV.UK, 2012a). Strong support for the 
Copyright Hub also came from various key stakeholders in the world of copyright licensing, 
including Copyright Licensing Agency (Fitzgerald, 2012), Newspaper Licensing Agency (Pugh, 
2012), Publishers’ Association (2012), PRS for Music (2012) and so on. This time, the UK’s 
music industry at large appeared to be united under the banner of ‘streamlining copyright 
licensing in the digital age’ and became avid supporters of the Copyright Hub, despite their 
initial criticism of the idea of DCE in Hargreaves Review (UK Music, 2012). 
B. Brave New (Copyright) World 
Apart from those aforementioned events occurred in the UK, the emergence of the Copyright 
Hub was also set against a wider backdrop of substantial changes in the copyright narrative 
at European level. These changes are presented most lucidly in two interwoven aspects: (1) 
effective and collaborative control of vocabularies in order to depict copyright as neither 
complicated nor confusing, but an inherently complex system which needs to be simplified; 
and (2) a shift of emphasis in portraying copyright users as compliant, instead of the 
prevalent negative image of pirates and copyright infringers. This shift in narrative 
consequently demanded a shift in approaches to reforming copyright, which placed 
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emphasis upon streamlining organisations and licensing processes, instead of imposing 
enforcement and copyright laws upon businesses. The two aspects of this shift are discussed 
in detail below.   
First, the ways in which vocabularies are effectively controlled are illustrated through our 
conversation with a manager of a major British education licensing agency. The interviewee 
remarked that prior to Hooper’s reports, the creative industries had already begun 
collaborating through an initiative called the Rights Industry Forum and, in their opinion:  
[A] lot of the stuff that appeared to have come out of the Hooper’s reports, we 
were doing it already. But the government review lit a fire underneath us. It 
[heated up] the situation. (Transcript A3)  
One of the main outcomes of this initiative was a concerted shift in discourse on copyright, 
which was characterised by the effective control of vocabularies used collectively by the 
creative industries to deliver their desirable narratives.  
We were told as if we didn’t know by the Hooper’s report that copyright licensing 
in education is complicated and it was confusing. You will now never hear anyone 
in my job using a word ‘complicated’ or ‘confusing’. Those words have been 
banned from our vocabularies… We eliminated those words from our vocabularies 
and our new words were ‘simplify’, ‘streamline’… What people want is one plug 
point that plug into the wall and looks neat. Behind that plug point, there is a 
complex massive wiring and that’s my best analogy for copyright. And I believe our 
role is to hide the wiring. (Transcript A3) 
The deliberate abandonment of certain words, such as ‘complicated’ and ‘confusing’, and the 
collective use of carefully chosen terms, such as ‘complex’, ‘simplify’ and ‘streamline’, whose 
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evidence was found in numerous interviews across sectors of the creative industries, 
indicated conscious, concerted efforts in creating the new discourse. As discussed earlier, the 
debate on reforming intellectual property since Gowers Review in 2006 has always been 
about striking a balance in statutory interventions between protecting the rights of right 
holders and fostering creativity through innovative use of content. In contrast, the new 
narrative depicted copyright laws as a well-functioning legal framework, while insisting on 
the inherently complex nature of copyright itself. Accordingly, just like any other 
sophisticated technical systems, its complexity needs to be hidden away from end-users; and 
practitioners should be the ones who take charge of this process. As a result, creative 
industries and copyright practitioners were well-placed within the new discourse, while 
legislators were effectively ruled out. 
Second, although the new image of copyright users was presented in a number of sources, it 
was particularly vivid in our discussion with Macbeth (pseudonym), an expert who has 
witnessed the transformation of the publishing industry over four decades: from metal- to 
film-setting, to computerised back office, and to the digital age. He narrated a story of a 
Polish IP lawyer, who makes stop-motion animations as his hobby. The problem, which this 
copyright user/ amateur creator encountered, was articulated as follow: 
I’ve been trying to get a synchronisation licence to put music with these 
[animations] for the last ten years, he said. I’m an IP lawyer, I have to be compliant. 
I can’t even get the music societies to reply to my question. None of them will even 
answer. (Transcript B3) 
This story, within Macbeth’s narration, implied a typical case of individual copyright users, 
who want to be complaint, but are usually ignored by right holders. This portrayal is distinct 
from the conventional image of copyright users in three ways. First, common users are no 
146 
 
longer passive consumers of content but increasingly engaging in producing new materials. 
They thus constitute an emerging group of stakeholders, namely the digital ‘prosumer’ in the 
copyright licensing value chain, whose importance is increasingly felt as the Internet is 
inundated with user-generated content (Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010; Ritzer, Dean and 
Jurgenson, 2012). Second, this new group of users and their uses of copyright are 
characterised by granularity. In other words, they are individuals instead of companies or 
collectives. They tend to use (and thus need licenses for) only small parts, instead of the 
whole piece, of content. Third and most interestingly, they are portrayed as compliant users, 
rather than being normally framed as IP thieves, illegal file-sharers, and so on. This new image 
of copyright users consequently requires a new way to look at how copyright works: i.e. it 
should work for, rather than against, copyright users. As evident in Macbeth’s response: 
[T]he only way we’re going to win [this fight] is on the back of making life easier 
for ordinary people to be compliant. We can’t expect ordinary people to go 
through immensely complicated difficult licensing processes in order to do stuff 
which seems to them to be straightforward and obvious. We’ve got to make it 
really easy, and technology is the way that will make it really easy… 
My view is that for as long as we, as an industry, leave people who want to be 
compliant unable to be compliant, we have only ourselves to blame for the lack 
of, for anybody using stuff, and also for the threat of exceptions. Because if we 
don’t make it possible for people to license then they deserve to have exceptions. 
We can’t say we’re going to have these rights and we’re going to sit on them and 
we’re not going to let anybody else have them because it’s inconvenient to us to 
do it. So from my point of view, the user point of view is really strong and it’s all 
about saying we’ve got to make it simple for people like me, and for other people 
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like my friend - the Polish lawyer - to get the permissions that they need. We’ve 
got to make it really simple. (Transcript B3) 
In November 2010, this shift in master narrative regarding copyright management was 
recognised by the European Commission as one of seven ‘Big Ideas’ to advance its Digital 
Agenda strategy (LCC 2010). The proposal, entitled ‘The Answer to the Machine is in the 
Machine’57, was submitted to the commission by the European Publishers Council (EPC), 
representing the voices of owners and CEOs of leading book, magazine, newspaper, database 
and online publishers in Europe. In this document, EPC (2010, pp.1-2) argued: 
Our thesis is straightforward. Copyright as law is entirely fit for the new 
environment of networks and digital dissemination. But traditional practice for the 
management of copyright – individually lawyer‐crafted licences, communication 
on paper, people‐heavy processes – is a thing of the past. 
We need to find ways of managing copyright that go with the grain of technology 
rather than falling back on cross‐grained attempts to maintain a vanishing status 
quo… 
The primary issue is about using technology to do what technology is really good 
at – managing data, particularly managing well‐structured and standardised data, 
and using that data to automate the processes that control everything around us. 
Rights and permissions data needs to move centre stage, particularly in the 
regulation of business‐to‐business transactions. 
                                                          
57 This is a famous aphorism accredited to Charles Clark, a renowned publisher and copyright expert 
(Hugenholtz, 1996).  
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In retrospect, it was evident that a new narrative was arising in the European copyright world 
at approximately the same time as the UK government’s call for another review of its IP 
framework. Interestingly, these two strains of work had been evolving from completely 
contradicting premises. On the one hand, the underlying assumption in Cameron’s 
Shoreditch speech was “an IP system created in the era of paper and pen may not fit the age 
of broadband and satellites” and thus, efforts should be focused on updating IP law so that 
“it meets the needs of the digital age” (BIS, 2010). On the other hand, EPC advocated 
modernising the practice of copyright management via deployment of digital technology, 
while arguing strongly against unnecessary changes to copyright laws and legislations. This 
contrast in narrative had not only had significant consequences for a later shift in approaches 
to copyright reform within the UK, but also set the stage in Europe for the emergence of 
Linked Content Coalition - another essential character in this case study. 
Linked Content Coalition (LCC) 
Following up from the proposal ‘The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine’, EPC 
presented a demonstration of how their vision could be realised at the Digital Agenda 
Assembly in June 2011 (LCC, 2016). Using examples from twenty-five use cases spanning 
across numerous sectors, including software, music, publishing and audiovisual, EPC’s Project 
Director, Mark Bide (2011), noted three common themes under which the creative industries 
needed to improve their effectiveness: (1) communicating rights and permissions within the 
supply chain; (2) communicating rights and permissions with copyright users; and (3) 
developing a voluntary and effective market for automated and semi-automated rights 
trading. Highlighting the siloed, sector-based nature of existing approaches to tackling these 
problems, Bide advocated the establishment of a Creative Content Access Alliance in order 
to help develop a standardised communication layer across the creative industries. In 
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September 2011, EPC opened up 
the project and invited 
stakeholders to participate in the 
new alliance, which was then 
renamed the Linked Content 
Coalition (LCC) (EPC, 2011d).  
In a briefing paper to the 
creative industries in October 
2011, EPC (2011, pp.1-2) 
announced: 
We have tentatively called this alliance of interests the Linked Content Coalition. 
Our aim is to encourage existing standards organisations to work together to 
create interoperability and commonality in the area of rights management on the 
internet. We are not proposing the creation of a new standards organisation; 
rather we are seeking to harness and coordinate the energies of existing standards 
initiatives in the media – driven primarily by sectoral trade standards 
organisations. 
Apart from issuing a formal definition of LCC as a ‘meta-organisation’, EPC also provided 
insights into two crucial aspects of the new alliance. First, they depicted a three-layer model 
of a ‘networked market in rights’, which consists of ‘Registries’, ‘Exchanges’ and 
‘Communication’, and clarified the scope of contribution, which LCC could make to this 
market (see Figure 9).  
In this model, Registries are databases containing information about who owns what rights 
to what content in what jurisdiction. Registries therefore play a critical role in managing and 
Figure 10: A simple schematic of three layers of the rights 
management infrastructure. (Reproduced from (EPC 2011)) 
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supplying data to the market and serve as interfaces between the market and rightsholders. 
On the other hand, Exchanges provide transactional services to rights users and therefore 
serve as interfaces between the market and right users. Between these two layers is 
Communication layer, whose responsibilities include standardised identification, 
comprehensible description of content via metadata, and effective cross-sectoral messaging. 
Communication layer consequently ‘provides the “glue” to hold the entire system together’ 
(EPC 2011, p.2). While leaving the market to create sector-based, proprietary solutions for 
Registries and Exchanges layers, EPC (ibid. p3) argued strongly for ‘an open infrastructure 
underpinned by standards [which] provides the critical element of choice and low switching 
costs for both rightsholders and rights users - in a market that might otherwise be 
monopolised’ and thus urging the creative industries as a whole to support a meta-
organisation, like LCC, in creating and managing such a standardised Communication layer.  
Second, a comprehensive list of characteristics was provided by EPC as guiding principles for 
building LCC or any organisations with similar aims and objectives. In essence, these 
characteristics included: (1) be cross-media and global in reach; (2) be flexible and supportive 
of any and all business models and technologies; (3) be open to participation from all 
stakeholder communities; (4) be built on the best existing solutions and avoid ‘not invented 
here’ attitudes; and (5) be a facilitator and not a market participant. These principles played 
a vital role, not only in guiding the development of LCC, but also in shaping ideas and 
directions of the Copyright Hub in subsequent stages. 
The LCC Project 
In late October 2011, EPC (2011a) disseminated a detailed plan for the LCC project, which 
aimed at undertaking an initial programme of work in order to form the basis for the new 
alliance. The project was expected to be completed within twelve months and required one 
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million euros of funding to proceed. Distinguishing the LCC project from previous attempts 
to create sector-based standards for communication, EPC (ibid. p.5) argued: 
Standards creation is not in itself the answer to any of these questions [of how to 
build an open, cost-effective, and user-appealing environment for IP trading] – it 
is the implementation of the standards within a comprehensive technical and 
commercial environment which matters. (Italicised emphasis as in the original 
document) 
As a result, activities of the LCC project were divided into four different workstreams: (1) 
Non-technical deliverables dealing with a business case for implementing cross-media 
communication standards and recommendations for long term governance and further 
development of outcomes of the LCC project; (2) Technical deliverables composed of a 
generalised conceptual data model for rights and licensing, as well as numerous sets of 
functional requirements for identifiers, semantics, interoperability between different data 
schemas deployed in different sectors, messaging and syntax, and so on; (3) Project 
management concerning with activities related to the project itself; and (4) Technical 
demonstrator providing ‘proof of concept’ for the otherwise intangible outputs of the LCC 
project. Amongst them, the work of Technical deliverables and Technical demonstrator 
workstreams is of great interest to this case study and therefore will be discussed at length 
in sections below. 
The LCC project was initiated in March 2012 as an unincorporated coalition of more than 
forty stakeholders from across sectors of the creative industries, including multiple 
representatives of creators and artists (LCC, 2015a). The project finally concluded in April 
2013 with the publication of the LCC Framework. In order to maintain the framework and 
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help develop further the work initiated by the LCC project, the Linked Content Coalition Ltd., 
a not-for-profit global consortium of standard bodies, was established in March 2014. 
To conclude, this section serves as a brief introduction to three series of events occurring in 
early 2010s, which resulted in the establishment of the Copyright Hub, the Linked Content 
Coalition, and the Digital Catapult. In addition, it is interesting to find a stark contrast in 
narratives between the UK’s and EU’s remits on “the fit for purpose” of current IP legislations 
and copyright laws in the digital age. What happened when these competing narratives grew 
out of the discursive realm and collided in the real world? What consequences did this 
collision have on the trajectory of the Copyright Hub, as well as the Linked Content Coalition? 




Chapter 5 - Connecting Boundaries & 
Forming Alliances:  
How the Copyright Hub was born 
 
I. The Collision of Narratives 
In November 2010, there was a stark contrast in narratives between the UK government and 
European Commission regarding the functionality of the current IP framework, especially 
copyright, in the age of Internet and digital technology. The UK’s government, on the one 
hand, asserted that the current IP system was created in ‘an era of paper and pen’ and thus 
updates were needed to keep it ‘fit for purpose’ in the digital age (BIS, 2010). With 
unambiguous intention of creating a favouring environment for Google-like companies, as 
well as introducing more exceptions to the UK’s copyright framework, it is not surprising to 
find the government’s narrative received “overwhelming” support from Internet start-ups 
and technology companies (BBC, 2010a). In line with this assertion, Hargreaves (2011, p.1) 
conceded that his review was set out to answer Cameron’s “exam question” on whether or 
not “[IP] laws designed more than three centuries ago… are today obstructing innovation and 
economic growth?”. Consequently, the government’s call for another IP review led by 
Hargreaves was met with hostility and anger from the creative industries when it was first 
announced. This was reflected vividly in Hargreaves’ memories of one of his earliest meetings 
with people working in the music sector, when he had “a good hour of” listening to 
comments about how “unhelpful” the review would be: 
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And it was a curious meeting because, on the one hand, they clearly felt that they 
had been clever and fortunate to have arranged to meet the person who was going 
to do this job so quickly. But it was also obvious that they were really, really angry 
that there was to be another review of copyright issues. That’s the bit they were 
concerned about. I had, you know, a good hour of: “this is not needed”, “what’s 
going on”, “we’ve spent all our lives being reviewed”, “we don’t want to be 
reviewed”. So even though, I had quite a bit of relationship with them at that 
point, otherwise we wouldn’t even be meeting to talk about other things, but they 
did not conceal their view that this was unlikely to be helpful to them - the 
assessment. (Transcript E5) 
To give an explanation for this overwhelmingly negative reaction, Hargreaves castigated the 
creative industries for their “lobbyist” position on reforming IP laws, which focused solely on 
preserving their diminishing commercial interests via increasing enforcement.  
And this was the period when the official music industries, film industries, to a 
slightly less extent publishing industries, and television industries’ stand on 
copyrights was: “The only thing that matters is more intense enforcement”; “Don’t 
talk to us about anything, other than how you are going to increase the resources 
[into] enforce with and the penalties attached to breaches of the law”. That was 
what these lobbyist industries spokes people have been employed to say and to 
argue. (Transcript E5) 
Consequently, from Hargreaves’ point of view, the creative industries were perceived as a 
major impediment to IP progression. This was in stark contrast with a concurrent narrative 
in Europe, which placed the creative industries at heart of the IP advancement process. In 
particular, the European Publishers Council (EPC) proposed “Big Idea for the Digital Agenda: 
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The Answer to the Machine is in the Machine”, which accumulated significant political and 
financial support from both the European Commission and the creative industries ever since 
its germination in late 2010.  
The differences between the two narratives were polar opposite. While the UK’s government 
sided with the tech sector to denounce the existing IP framework as a barrier to innovation 
and economic growth, EPC was advocating on behalf of the creative industries that the core 
principles of IP laws, especially copyright, were still functioning well in the networked 
environment. What needed to change, however, was the practice of management of rights 
and permissions, which was still far too complicated, time-consuming and people-intensive 
(EPC, 2011c). The fact that these two competing narratives were arising at the same time in 
proximate IP landscapes of the UK and Europe made their collision and mutual shaping 
somewhat inexorable (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 11: The intermingling of two IP-related series of events occurred in the UK and Europe between 2010 and 
2012 
A. Planting a Seed of Change 
In March 2011, EPC submitted a response to the ‘Independent Review of IP and Growth’ in 
order to inform Hargreaves and the UK government of existing initiatives and emerging 
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movement in Europe. Emphasising that “this is not a tired call for a tightening of copyright 
regulation”, EPC's submission was an attempt to pitch the idea of moving away from 
traditional people-intensive mechanisms to machine-to-machine management of 
permissions and rights (EPC 2011b, p.3). In particular, they urged the government to create 
“a copyright-aware internet” through provision of two main kinds of support: (1) political 
support for upholding the basic values of copyright, and (2) practical support for facilitating 
industry initiatives which aim at automating copyright management. They wrote (ibid., p.5): 
Unwavering support for the basic values of copyright, in the face of the continuing 
assault on its most fundamental precepts from those in whose commercial 
interest it is to see copyright diminished. 
Practical support for copyright industry initiatives in the development of 
approaches to the automated management of copyright and permissions, such as 
that proposed by the European Publishers Council’s project The Answer to the 
Machine is in the Machine. (Emphasised as in the original document)  
Not only employing the formal channel to advance the creative industries’ newly formed 
narrative, Amelia (pseudonym) - a senior management of EPC - also made a great deal of 
effort to present the idea to Hargreaves in person, in an attempt to divert the seemingly 
predetermined course of his review. As it was later recalled, Amelia introduced the 
alternative IP narrative to Hargreaves at an industry meeting in early 2011 (Transcript D1): 
I’m not saying I personally changed [Hargreaves’] mind but I was at an industry 
lunch meeting, where there were lots of people… All the copyright industries were 
very defensive about not changing copyright and they weren’t… very open-
minded. So I expect this lunch was probably in the first quarter of 2011 because it 
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would have been after we launched the big idea. And when it came to my turn, I 
just said:  
“Look! You’ve heard everybody… Everyone here wants to kind of protect what I 
regard as a vanishing status quo. And I would like you, professor Hargreaves, to 
use your intellectual ability to think about this in a different way: It’s not to do with 
the law of copyright. It’s to do with the way we manage our rights” and to sort of 
giving him the whole pitch.  
This initial contact resulted in a series of personal exchanges, which were claimed to become 
the origin of the idea of establishing a Digital Copyright Exchange as a new way of 
streamlining copyright management in the Hargreaves’ report: 
And he was absolutely fascinated and he said ‘How does this work? How would it 
work?’… And he really took this up and we had several conversations and several 
exchanges of emails and he put it into his report. I mean he didn’t call it, what we 
were calling it. And it was before the Linked Content Coalition has been founded. 
But he put the whole thing in there, called the Digital Copyright Exchange. 
(Transcript D1) 
Thus, the next section is dedicated to examining how well this planted idea had been 
developed in the Hargreaves Review and the ways it was received by the creative industries 
at the time of the report’s publication. 
B. The Hargreaves Review: Outcomes and Responses 
Six months after the government’s first announcement of the new IP review, the 
independent study led by Hargreaves came to an end with the publication of the final report 
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in May 2011. In this report, Hargreaves concluded that the UK’s IP system had fallen behind 
the advancement of the digital economy and become “a regulatory barrier to creation” of 
new, internet-based businesses. Consequently, the report urged the UK government to 
update its legal framework, especially introducing further exceptions to the copyright laws, 
in order to facilitate innovation and economic growth in emerging business sectors. The 
report stated: 
We have found that the UK’s intellectual property framework, especially with 
regard to copyright, is falling behind what is needed… The UK cannot afford to let 
a legal framework designed around artists impede vigorous participation in these 
emerging business sectors58… IP law must adapt to change. Digital 
communications technology involves routine copying of text, images and data, 
meaning that copyright law has started to act as a regulatory barrier to the 
creation of certain kinds of new, internet based businesses.  
(Hargreaves, 2011, pp.1-3) 
Nevertheless, Hargreaves also added to his list of recommendations for legal changes a 
proposal to establish a Digital Copyright Exchange – a technical solution which was deemed 
to protect the rights and commercial interests of the “hugely important creative industries” 
against the side effects of legislature intervention (ibid. pp.1-4):  
This does not mean, however, that we must put our hugely important creative 
industries at risk… In order to grow these creative businesses further globally, they 
need efficient, open and effective digital markets at home, where rights can be 
speedily licensed and effectively protected… [The] review proposes that 
                                                          
58 My own emphasis.  
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Government brings together rights holders and other business interests to create 
in the UK the world’s first Digital Copyright Exchange. 
Elaborating upon his idea of the proposed solution, Hargreaves wrote (ibid. p.4): 
[The Digital Copyright Exchange] will make it easier for rights owners, small and 
large, to sell licences in their work and for others to buy them. It will make market 
transactions faster, more automated and cheaper. The result will be a UK market 
in digital copyright which is better informed and more readily capable of resolving 
disputes without costly litigation. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that Hargreaves’ initial vision of a Digital Copyright 
Exchange (DCE) had been strongly influenced by ideas championed by EPC and the creative 
industries at the time. Although Hargreaves, in the end, did not divert far from the 
government’s predetermined perspective on updating their legal framework, his proposal 
for establishing a DCE still served as a good indicator of the raising of an alternative narrative 
in the UK’s IP landscape.     
The Hargreaves Review provoked a storm of ambivalent responses from the creative 
industries at the time of its publication. On the one hand, Hargreaves’ intention of 
broadening exceptions to copyright sparked not only fear, but also fury from the creative 
industries, who believed copyright exceptions were to be unfairly introduced and considered 
constant statutory intervention a nuisance to their businesses. In a response to the Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS) Committee inquiry on Hargreaves Review, for instance, News 
Corporation (2011) stated: 
We are concerned about any proposals to introduce mandatory cross-border or 
extended collective licensing, or broader copyright exceptions, where there is no 
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evidence of market failure. Introduction of these measures could inhibit News 
Corporation and other companies in the creative industries from contributing to 
such growth. 
From the creative industries’ perspectives, what lay at the root of Hargreaves’ distorted 
review of the UK’s IP framework was the government’s bias toward technology companies. 
As Sophie (pseudonym) - CEO of a major society representing publishers in the UK - recalled:  
[The Hargreaves Review was perceived] not very well [by the creative industries]. 
Because we felt that it started from the wrong premise. And it started on the basis 
that copyright was a problem and it was obstructive. And in fact, you know, we 
didn’t agree with that view. But it seemed to be a Google’s view that David 
Cameron was adopting... [Hargreaves] started off very hostile towards copyright 
and so, when we read his report that, you know, said we need a lot of exceptions 
to copyright, we didn’t really agree with that. Didn’t agree with his reasoning. He 
didn’t provide any evidence to support what he was saying. And we didn’t really 
think that the problems he was trying to save existed. (Transcript D3) 
Apart from this, the creative industries also felt that their views were not heard and taken on 
board during the Hargreaves Review. To them, the conclusion seemed to have already been 
formed before the review was even started. Recalling her conversations with stakeholders 
immediately after this period, Ros Lynch - co-author of the feasibility study on the Digital 
Copyright Exchange (DCE) - commented: 
From the stakeholders’ point of view - the creative industries’ point of view - they 
didn’t feel that they had the same kind of open, honest conversation with 
professor Hargreaves. They felt that [Hargreaves] came to meetings with fixed 
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ideas already of what he wanted to see happen and irrespective of what they said. 
(Transcript C5) 
Finally, many rightsholders and IP practitioners also discredited Hargreaves’s conclusion on 
the grounds of his lack of experience and expertise in intellectual property. The strict 
deadline imposed by the government made the review even more ill-conceived. This was 
emphasised by Selena (pseudonym) - a senior civil servant and IP lawyer - who had been 
closely involved in responding to Hargreaves Review and later participating in the 
establishment of the Copyright Hub:  
So the previous reports were written by people who had a much greater 
knowledge of what it was that they were writing about and what the law was and 
how it worked in practice. Whereas Hargreaves just has a very limited knowledge 
of a very small area of copyright. And he was only given six months to produce a 
report, which I think was a tour for anybody and indeed it was very ambitious of 
him to accept it… So he produced a report in which he said that copyright was not 
working in the 21st century. That’s the view with which I am, most practitioners, 
and indeed most copyright owners disagree. (Transcript E3) 
On the other hand, the review was also received in a much less negative light by a number 
of organisations working in the creative sector, most notably EPC. This was primarily due to 
the fact that EPC had managed to get their narrative across and eventually succeeded in 
getting part of it woven into Hargreaves’ arguments. Evidently, in chapter 4 of the review, 




It is widely acknowledged that the solution to these difficulties lies in the very 
technologies that created the problem. Just as digital technologies provide new 
and exciting ways of using content, they offer a means of transforming the 
efficiency of licensing. As the submission from the European Publishers Council 
states: “the answer to the machine is in the machine”. 
Having successfully planted the first seed of their narrative in Hargreaves Review, EPC 
exploited the idea of DCE as rhetorical leverage to oppose the government’s attempt to 
broaden exceptions to copyright. In a press release issued immediately after the publication 
of Hargreaves Review, Amelia (pseudonym) - executive director of EPC - plainly remarked:  
Exceptions should always be an instrument of last resort and strictly limited in 
order that they do not undermine the commercial exploitation of copyright 
material. Harnessing technology to innovate in licensing should be the preferred 
route… In a well functioning technological environment we should need fewer, not 
more, exceptions…  
This digital rights exchange idea has the potential to benefit everyone in the 
copyright chain - creators, producers and distributors along with citizens and all 
consumers of digital content and services. We call on the Government to move 
this proposal forward quickly. (EPC, 2011e)   
In reply to this and other calls from the creative industries for a change in the course of action, 
in August 2011, the government issued a formal response to Hargreaves Review, in which 
their concern for the ‘falling behind’ of the UK’s IP framework and the urgent need for its 
adaptation, especially in the realm of copyright, was reaffirmed (HM Government, 2011). In 
this document, the government stated (ibid. p.2): 
163 
 
There is a constant need for the IP system to adapt to new forms of innovation, 
creativity and technology, but that need is now particularly marked in copyright 
because technology has made copying and communicating many works very easy 
and created opportunities for the widespread and efficient use of digital content… 
The challenges of today are around digital copying. That is where most adaptation 
is currently needed. 
It was from this perspective that the government proceeded to confirm their initial support 
for establishing “the world’s first” DCE in the UK: 
The Government agrees it is right to help develop effective markets in copyright 
licensing where they are not emerging spontaneously. We believe a Digital 
Copyright Exchange (Recommendation 3) has the potential to offer a more 
efficient marketplace for owners and purchasers of rights, as well as opening up 
new markets to creators who may not have previously been able to access them. 
(ibid. p.4) 
Therefore, the idea of DCE was portrayed as an additional solution to the falling behind of 
legislations on copyright and thus it helped strengthen, instead of weakening, the 
government’s narrative on reviewing its IP framework. 
To summarise, the Hargreaves’ proposal for establishing the DCE was perceived very 
differently by different stakeholders. It could be seen either as an additional technical 
solution to strengthen the government’s narrative on statutory intervention or a rhetoric 
leverage to prevent further changes to the IP framework by the creative industries. This is 
due mainly to the fact that neither the Hargreaves Review nor the subsequent government’s 
response succeeded in providing a precise prescription for what would entail in the 
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construction of the proposed DCE. From Hargreaves’ point of view, the vagueness in the 
proposal was purposely put in place so that the idea of the DCE could be further developed 
by relevant businesses:  
I didn’t try to imagine in details what it would be because, I thought, if I did that it 
would be likely to be an obstacle to the idea being developed. The idea needed to 
be developed in real life, in real time by interested parties. (Transcript E5) 
Nevertheless, Hargreaves also warned against the prospect of which such malleability of 
visions would be exploited by the creative industries to help them triumph over the 
government’s narrative. Reflecting upon this matter, Hargreaves remarked: 
Well, it’s important to recall what I proposed should happen. I proposed an outline 
idea, which was an interoperable single-click route via which you could purchase 
digital materials that have enjoyed copyright protection. And I, in launching the 
idea, said that this was something that would only succeed if the relevant 
businesses wanted it to succeed. But that, it may be an example where the 
convening power of government would help get the things started...  
But I thought that we need a defence in that proposition against the right-holders’ 
businesses making the argument that this was going to be the answer to all 
difficulties in the market faced by consumers in getting digital content and digital 
media. Because I felt sure that they would use this up as an argument against 
making another legal reform. And indeed that’s exactly what they did. (Transcript 
E5) 
From the creative industries’ perspectives, an ambiguous vision of the DCE represented a 
problem, but also a window of opportunity to turn the tide of the battle over copyright 
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narratives. It was apparent that no matter how visions of the DCE would have been moulded 
and shaped, such a proposal would only succeed if it were able to gain sufficient support 
from the rightsholders. Therefore, the DCE became a pivotal point of determination in this 
battle, in which the creative industries could engage at full strength to turn the idea to their 
advantage. 
C. Defining the DCE 
Evidence of the proactive engagement of the creative industries in defining the DCE and its 
associated characters were not difficult to find. The most notable example of such attempts 
was EPC’s (2011a) submission to the Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) Committee enquiry 
in September 2011. In this document, entitled ‘Creating a Digital Copyright Exchange’, EPC 
made an unequivocal account of the need to build “a global market infrastructure” for the 
automated management of rights and how the DCE initiative should be developed to fulfil 
this vision: 
What we need is the development of a global market infrastructure which enables 
the automation of managing rights on the Internet; this is not Digital Rights 
Management as commonly understood but rather the development of a 
standardised data infrastructure for the management of digital rights. (ibid. p.4) 
Elaborating upon their proposal, EPC suggested that the DCE, as a standardised data 
infrastructure, should be built in “a distributed way, not through huge and costly centralised 
IT development projects” (ibid.). In addition, they argued that the majority of the technical 
components required to achieve such an infrastructure had already existed in sectoral and/ 
or territorial silos. Therefore, the main challenge lay in implementing these technologies and 
standards, rather than inventing new ones.     
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To reinforce these arguments, EPC first referred to the Hargreaves Review for legitimation. 
Citing a section in the report which, EPC claimed, “best captured” the initial ideas of the DCE 
in Hargreaves’ vision, they wrote (ibid. pp.4-5):     
The Hargreaves vision of the DCE is best captured in Section 4.31 of his report: 
“The aim is to establish a network of interoperable databases to provide a 
common platform for licensing transactions.” The report stresses the need for 
standardisation “to facilitate open competition between services based on 
different technologies”. It also stresses that this should not be seen as a 
Government IT Project. “That way lies a nightmare of IT procurement followed by 
the birth of a white elephant. The task for Government is to use its convening 
power, to show leadership to achieve an outcome which others have not been 
able to manage.” We agree with this entirely. 
In this excerpt, the DCE’s projected qualities of being interoperable, standard-based, pro-
competition, and a non-centralised IT project were especially emphasised. Unsurprisingly, 
these qualities were highly compatible with EPC’s vision of the DCE as a standardised data 
infrastructure. Furthermore, EPC argued that this definition of the DCE as “an infrastructure” 
was significantly different from other interpretations of the initiative, such as “a service” or 
“a single, publicly accessible register”, which could be found in other parts of the Hargreaves 
Review, and subsequently, in the government’s response:     
However, the [Hargreaves] report goes on to talk about the DCE as “a service”. 
This we find considerably more worrying. There is a considerable difference 
between a DCE as a distributed standards based market infrastructure (open, 
voluntary and non-proprietary) and a specific market place. It is clear that this 
distinction has been lost. 
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This distinction is even less clear in the Government response, which speaks at one 
point of “a single, publicly accessible register”. This looks more like a Government 
IT project than the creation of a standards infrastructure; indeed this is to some 
extent confirmed by the proposal that it should follow the “model of independent 
traders using amazon.co.uk”. Amazon is not providing a standards infrastructure 
but a highly sophisticated trading floor (in which it acts as a principal). (ibid.) 
The differences between these interpretations of the DCE are stark. On the one hand, the 
DCE could be developed as a standard-based infrastructure, which is highly distributed, non-
exclusive, voluntary and industry-led. On the other hand, it could be built as a centralised, 
government-controlled IP service or registry, whose properties are inherently exclusive, 
compulsory and policy-led. As a result, choosing either of these interpretations has significant 
consequences not only in shaping the trajectory of the project, but also in inscribing the roles 
of the government and other stakeholders associated with it.  
It was, therefore, not surprising that EPC went the extra mile for persuasion in their 
submission. They warned the UK government against “a one size fits all approach”, which 
would certainly be “unworkable” due to lack of participation from the creative industries 
(ibid. p.5): 
Participation in a distributed standards based market infrastructure can only work 
if [it is based on the] voluntary and evolutionary model. Every content sector is in 
a different position regarding licensing models, existing registries, metadata etc., 




Furthermore, the government was also reminded that the DCE initiative, no matter how it 
would be defined and developed, could “only ever be a component in a global system”. 
Similarly, any changes to the UK’s IP framework would still be regulated by international laws 
and treaties, such as the Berne Convention, and therefore, the UK government would be 
more likely to encounter legal challenges if they were to make “the DCE registration de facto 
mandatory” (ibid.): 
We also reject the notion that participation could be incentivised, linked to the 
ability to enforce rights. Not only might this make DCE registration de facto 
mandatory which would run contrary to the Berne Convention, but the aspiration 
should be for a market-led initiative in which there is a clear commercial incentive 
to participate. 
[…] There is a further challenge to a UK initiative. It can only ever be a component 
in a global system. The UK has an opportunity to provide leadership on the global 
stage and the potential for first-mover advantage, but nothing more. 
Extending their arguments to address the overarching narrative on IP and standardisation, 
EPC wrote: 
The building of this right management infrastructure is not an exciting, headline-
grabbing opportunity to build a one-off, high-profile system that someone can 
point to and say: “It’s complete”. Rather, we should be talking about development 
in the relatively unglamorous world of standardisation of automated rights 
communication and content asset identification. This is a task that like all 
standardisation simply continues over time, and is never complete. (ibid.) 
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Evidently, EPC refuted not only the notion of the DCE as a “quick technical fix” for IP 
problems, which had been hinted at in the government’s narrative, but also the significance 
of the government’s roles in leading this project. By emphasising the ‘unglamorous’ and 
‘never complete’ nature of developing such a standard-based infrastructure, EPC vouched 
for a voluntary and market-led model of development, in which the creative industries would 
be primarily responsible for delivering the desired outputs over an extended timeframe. The 
government, on the other hand, was expected to use its convening power to create a 
favourable environment for the initiative to grow and flourish. In other words, it was the 
rhetoric of power delegation, in which the majority of control over resolving current IP issues 
was deemed to be shifted from the government’s hands to the creative industries’. 
As discussed above, the act of defining the DCE was inseparable from the act of determining 
the roles of the UK government, the creative industries, and the overarching narrative on IP 
and standardisation. Consequently, it was unsurprising to witness the influence of the DCE 
initiative reaching far beyond the boundaries of the British Isles. In fact, events occurred in 
the UK had significant impact on bringing IP reform to the forefront of discussion at the 
European Commission. As Amelia (pseudonym) - a senior manager of EPC - recalled: 
So the UK was very important in the development of all these things because they 
brought prominence to the questions in play, which was really good. And the 
European Commission took note of what the UK was doing. European Commission 
copyright people felt very besieged. You know, I think they felt that Ian Hargreaves 
and everyone else were telling them what to do and was making it very difficult 
for them. (Transcript D1) 
At a more granular level, the perils of substantial changes to IP laws and the possibility of 
new copyright exceptions being introduced to the UK’s IP framework also had a positive 
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effect on catalysing the formation of the Linked Content Coalition (LCC). Understandably, the 
UK’s creative industries were more eager to join force when they were put under the 
imminent threat from statutory intervention. In the first project plan for the LCC released in 
October 2011, EPC (2011b, p.3) justified the urgency to form their proposed consortium by 
referring to adverse events occurred in the UK as follow: 
We believe that this project is now timely and needs to move ahead with due 
urgency in the light of the current political and commercial climate. It will take a 
considerable period of time for implementation to become widespread, so early 
development is essential. 
D. Summary 
IP-related events occurred in the UK and Europe between 2010 and 2011 were intertwined, 
shaped and being shaped by one another. As shown above, movements in Europe had left 
an undisputed mark on the development of initial ideas of the DCE. In turn, the UK 
government’s review of its IP framework also brought prominence to the IP debate and 
stimulated the establishment of the LCC project. Interestingly, these two series of events 
came from two opposing IP narratives, which rendered their collision unavoidable. Which 
narrative would finally win the day under the UK’s social and political climate? How was one 
able to navigate one’s way through the maze of conflicting interests and disparate ideologies 
in order to turn a DCE feasibility study into a Copyright Hub project? The next section is 




II. The Establishment of the Copyright Hub 
In August 2011, the government’s acceptance of Hargreaves Review posed an imminent 
threat of introducing new exceptions to the UK’s IP framework and thus threatened to make 
inroads into existing businesses of many segments of the creative industries. The political 
pressure was further increased when three months later, Richard Hooper was appointed to 
lead an independent review of the DCE proposal. The review resulted in two consecutive 
reports penned by Richard Hooper and Ros Lynch, a civil servant who was assigned by the 
Secretary of State to work with Hooper on the feasibility study. Lynch later described the 
two-phase process by which the review had been conducted: first, they attempted to identify 
existing copyright licensing issues through intensive exchanges with the creative industries; 
and second, in collaboration with these stakeholders, they proposed establishing the 
Copyright Hub as a solution for these problems. As she recalled in an interview in March 
2015:  
Richard was asked to do a feasibility study as an independent reviewer, and 
practice in government is that whenever there’s an independent review, you get 
to find a civil servant to work with you. So I was assigned by the Secretary of State 
from the department of Business to work with Richard on the feasibility study…  
Richard came with a clear idea of how he wanted to do this. First of all, to identify 
what the issues were; and then to look for solutions, rather than jumping straight 
into (a) either select solution or (b) trying to do it all together… So we spent the 
first three months largely just talking to people and also issues to people to 
sending comments. And then in March published the first report. And then went 
back and talked to the same people plus a few others to arrive at the solution. And 
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I worked with Richard until we published [the second] report in July 2012. 
(Transcript C5) 
As a result, the inception of the Copyright Hub was officially marked with the publication of 
the two Hooper’s reports and thus, they constitute a point of departure for our discussion in 
this section. Nonetheless, before moving on to examining Hooper’s findings and solutions, it 
is imperative to highlight the close engagement of the creative industries, most notably 
publishing, music, image, and audiovisual sectors, in producing these outputs. As Lynch later 
conceded: 
It was across all of them, so music, publishing, audiovisual and photographs. And 
we spoke to people in all four of those main sectors. We didn’t really have much 
engagement with [other sectors]. Well, we had no engagement at all with the 
game industry. And we had a small bit of engagement with the technology type 
sector. And we only had very limited engagement with consumers. So, it’s the 
main four big industries that we normally [engaged]. (Transcript C5) 
It is interesting to point up the fact that Hooper, from the very beginning of his journey with 
the Copyright Hub, took an opposite stance on IP issues to the one which had been generally 
adopted by the UK government. Instead of sidelining the creative industries on the IP reform 
process as in the case of the Hargreaves Review, Hooper put them in the position to lead and 
drive the DCE feasibility study forward, in what he called a “bottom-up” exercise: 
That was from the industries. So no, [the Copyright Hub is] absolutely driven by 




The implications of such a decision for the future of the Copyright Hub, as well as the 
consequences for the collision of two opposing IP narratives which concurrently initiated by 
the UK government and the European Commission, will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
A. Two Milestones of the DCE Feasibility Study 
Rights and Wrongs - Is copyright licensing fit for purpose for the digital 
age? 
‘Rights and Wrongs’ was published in March 2012 as the first-phase report of the DCE 
feasibility study. In this paper, evidence from the UK’s creative industries was collected to 
identify existing problems in the copyright licensing process. Declaring his aims and 
objectives, which was to “interrogate the [Hargreaves] hypothesis”, Hooper (2012, p.21) 
stated: 
This first phase of the Digital Copyright Exchange Feasibility Study seeks to 
interrogate the hypothesis which emanates from the Hargreaves Report… The 
hypothesis can be described thus: 
Copyright licensing, involving creators, rights owners, rights managers, rights 
users and consumers across the different media types and the different industry 
segments is not fit for purpose for the digital age59. 
Having analysed responses to the Call for Evidence and numerous face-to-face meetings with 
the creative industries, the first Hooper’s report suggested that answers to this hypothesis 
were much more diverse and nuanced than the one which had been claimed by Hargreaves. 
                                                          
59 Bold type as in the original document. 
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It was found that, although copyright licensing processes in the UK were functioning well in 
comparison with other countries in the world, there was still room for improvement, 
especially in the cross-sectoral areas. In particular, seven problems of the copyright licensing 
processes were identified: (1) complexity of processes; (2) complexity of organisations 
involved in those processes; (3) the lack of equivalent contents in digital format compared 
with physical ones; (4) the lack of mechanisms for identifying appropriate rightsholders of 
content in different territories; (5) the lack of mechanisms for fairly distributing revenues for 
creators of content; (6) the incapability of existing copyright licensing processes to support 
high-volume, low-value transactions due to their labour-intensiveness, complexity and high 
expenses; and (7) the lack of common standards and of a common language for sharing and 
managing rights across sectors and national borders.  
These problems were specifically found in six sectors: (1) libraries, archives and museums; 
(2) educational institutions; (3) audiovisual; (4) publishing; (5) music; and (6) images. With 
regard to cross-sector problems, Hooper reasoned that the “agglomeration” of the creative 
industries was proved to be much less efficient, while being compared to specific 
organisations and sectors scrutinised separately in close-up (ibid. p.45): 
It is a consistent finding of this diagnostic report that specific organisations or 
sectors scrutinised on their own, seen in close-up, are often sensibly efficient and 
modern in outlook. But when one pulls back to the wide shot and looks at the 
totality of sectors within the creative industries or the agglomeration of 
organisations often within a sector doing similar things (for example collecting 
societies), the picture is not so efficient and not so modern, due to the differences 




The sources of these problems and inefficiency, Hooper argued, lay in not only technical 
difficulties, but also a number of social and legal factors which hindered the integration of 
rights management across sectors and media types. Amongst them, the lack of commonly 
agreed standards for “expressing, identifying and communicating rights information” was 
especially emphasised (ibid. p.45): 
The barriers to integrated cross-border and mixed-media rights management are 
only partly technological. A combination of differences in law, in custom and 
practice, and in commercial interests is equally influential. 
Copyright licensing is siloed and is insufficiently international in focus and scope 
and is therefore difficult to use and difficult to access - in one very particular sense. 
There are no agreed and operational standards across the creative industries in 
the UK and internationally for expressing, identifying and communicating rights 
information. These standards can and do exist within a specific sector but often 
end there60. 
These findings thus constituted the foundation upon which solutions for streamlining the 
copyright licensing processes could be built in the second phase.  
 
Copyright works - Streamlining copyright licensing for the digital age 
‘Copyright works’ was published in July 2012 to provide a conclusion to the second phase of 
Hooper’s DCE feasibility study. In this report, Hooper and Lynch (2012) made a number of 
recommendations to tackle existing problems of the UK’s copyright licensing processes. 
                                                          
60 The whole quote above was highlighted using bold letters in Hooper’s report. The part which is 
bolded here is my own emphasis.   
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These recommendations were categorised under four main topics: (1) data building blocks; 
(2) orphan works and mass digitalisation; (3) repertoire imbalance; and (4) streamlining 
copyright licensing. Only through understanding these recommendations that one would be 
able to grasp the true extent of the emergence of the Copyright Hub. Therefore, this section 
is dedicated to examining at length these four categories.   
First, data building blocks highlighted the essential role of data in the licensing processes. It 
was strongly recommended that international standards for identifiers, whenever they 
existed, should be accurately and consistently used to identify creators, creative works, and 
their associated rights. In sectors where such identifiers had not been established, relevant 
organisations were advised to join forces in order to develop common approaches that work 
for the industries as a whole. In a similar vein of argument, Hooper and Lynch condemned 
the practice of metadata stripping on a commercial scale, while advocating the development 
of the Global Repertoire Database and Global Recording Database as exemplars of good 
practices for creating “better databases… of who owns what rights for what in which country” 
(ibid. p.3). In addition to these projects, the Linked Content Coalition (LCC) was explicitly cited 
as “a very real and necessary building block for the Copyright Hub” due to its potential for 
establishing a common language for cross-sector communication: 
We are supporting the Linked Content Coalition (LCC), an international project 
that emanated from the European Publishers Council, but is now moving into new 
sectors beyond publishing. The LCC is all about developing a common language 
and a set of communications standards so proper interoperability is achieved, a 
very real and necessary building block for the Copyright Hub and its associated 
databases and DCEs. (ibid. p.3) 
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Second, orphan works refer to those contents whose rightsholders cannot be identified or, if 
identified, cannot be located for numerous reasons, which contributes to the complexity and 
effort needed in order to acquire licenses for using them. In addition to this complication, 
the lack of a legal framework and appropriate mechanisms also makes any attempts to 
digitalise orphan and non-orphan works in mass quantity extremely difficult to achieve. This 
represents the problem of orphan works and mass digitalisation, which results in the denial 
of users’ access to a significant amount of culturally and commercially value content. 
Consequently, both legal and technological measures are required in order to tackle this 
problem.  
Having decided to leave legislative responses to the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), Hooper 
and Lynch focused their attention on existing technological projects, which could potentially 
provide solutions to the problem. In particular, they expressed support for the ARROW and 
ARROW Plus projects, whose objectives were to demonstrate ways in which due diligent 
search for orphan works can be done automatically via interlinking and searching libraries 
around the world. What is more, Hooper and Lynch’s feasibility study also pointed out the 
criticality of “a public-private partnership” in developing such practicable solutions. This 
approach, which will soon be discussed in the following section, bore significant implications 
for the development of the Copyright Hub in later stages. As Hooper and Lynch stated in their 
report: 
We support the work that is being done to develop and further enhance the 
technological solution to the orphan works and mass digitisation issues across 
Europe. ARROW and ARROW Plus have demonstrated both the value in seeking 
cross border solutions and the benefits of a public-private partnership in finding a 
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workable solution. The latter relationship is one we believe is crucial for taking 
forward many of the recommendations outlined in this report. (ibid. p.33) 
Third, repertoire imbalance represents the lack of contents in digital formats compared with 
the wide range of equivalents in physical forms. This phenomenon has been repeatedly used 
as justification for copyright infringers to defend their practices of sharing and consuming 
copyright-protected materials from illegal sources when legitimate services are unavailable. 
The problem was found to be most notorious in, but not exclusive to, the audiovisual sector, 
which persistently advocated that repertoire imbalance was more perception than reality. 
They argued that, although repertoire imbalance did exist between the digital and physical 
worlds, the phenomenon did not significantly affect the users’ consumption of content in 
practice owing to the most popular titles had already been made available online.  
Despite such claims from the creative industries, Hooper and Lynch insisted that perceptions 
could drive public opinion, as well as political views, and thus, they urged the content 
business “to remain vigilant and do all it can to reduce the imbalance” (ibid. p.34). This aspect 
especially reflected the political dimension of Hooper’s and Lynch’s report in which the tense 
relationship between the government and creative industries was carefully mediated, i.e. the 
more and better copyright services are in place, the stricter measures the government are 
willing to enforce in order to protect the rightsholders. In Hooper’s and Lynch’s own words: 
The political dimension of our work constantly reappears. The industry must make 
licensing easier thus providing more and better services for the consumer, but the 
Government must in response do all in its power to defend legitimate copyright 




Fourth, streamlining copyright licensing consisted of measures aiming at reducing the 
complexity and expense of organisations and processes involved in copyright licensing within 
three main areas: (1) educational institutions, (2) the music industry, and (3) across all 
creative sectors, and where possible, across national borders. Interestingly, the measures 
proposed by Hooper and Lynch in this section were emphatically characterised by the notion 
of “one stop shop”.  
Within the educational sector, Hooper and Lynch praised the effort of the Rights Industry 
Forum61 in creating a new ‘one stop shop’ website (www.copyrightandschools.org) to 
provide comprehensive information on copyright-related activities in schools, as well as 
pointers on relevant sources where appropriate licenses could be procured (ibid. p.26). In 
addition, they promoted initiatives, which helped reduce the number of licensing points for 
educational organisations, most notably the one in which copyright licenses for state-funded 
schools in England would be purchased centrally by the Department of Education and thus 
removing local authorities from the process.  
Within the music sector, copyright licensing consists of two main categories: blanket or 
collective licensing62 and direct licensing63. The first type of licensing requires two separate 
licenses to be obtained from two different collecting societies (i.e. from PPL which represents 
performers and record companies; and from PRS for Music which collects royalties on behalf 
                                                          
61 Rights Industry Forum was a working group comprising representation from the Copyright Licensing 
Agency (CLA), Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL), Education Recording Agency (ERA), PRS for 
Music, Christian Copyright Licensing International (CCLI), Public Video Screening Licence (PVSL), 
Motion Picture Licensing Corporation (MPLC) and News Licensing Agency (NLA). 
62 Blanket/collective licenses cover the rights to use music in radio and TV broadcasting, public 
performances (e.g. nightclubs, restaurants, etc.) and not-on-demand Internet uses (e.g. radio services 
on the Internet).  
63 Direct licensing covers sales of CDs to retailers, on-demand sales over Internet such as iTunes 
downloads, and other uses which might raise concerns over moral or artistic rights (i.e. uses of certain 




of songwriters, composers and music publishers). This arrangement thus created two, 
instead of one stop shop for blanket/ collective licenses. As a result, the effort of PPL and PRS 
for Music to create more joint licensing, which allowed organisations to deal with only one, 
instead of two societies, was fully supported. With regard to direct licensing64, it was argued 
that aggregators and intermediaries played a crucial role in simplifying the licensing 
processes.  
Finally, to illustrate how the licensing system might be further streamlined, Hooper and Lynch 
cited the words of Geoff Taylor, CEO of British Phonographic Industry (BPI), in which the 
benefits of having a new mechanism for ‘better signposting’ in the short term and the 
potential of developing a DCE platform in the medium term were clearly articulated. This 
quotation provided more than a hint of how Hooper and Lynch envisaged fitting their 
Copyright Hub’s proposal into the big picture of the copyright licensing landscape:   
[The industry] believes that in the short term the licensing process can be 
simplified by much better signposting for users how and where to go about 
obtaining direct licences for specific uses. In the medium term, it believes that the 
creation of a DCE platform would offer the opportunity for direct licensing to be 
automated in appropriate cases, so that rights for uses that are already 
established in the market could be simply obtained, while retaining the ability for 
copyright owners to compete on price. (ibid. p.29) 
To summarise, the ‘Copyright works’ report can be considered as a well-crafted dialogue 
between Hooper and Lynch and the three interested parties involved in the UK’s copyright 
                                                          
64 Direct licensing is inherently more complex and less streamlined than collective licensing due to 
the sheer number of stakeholders involved in the process, which normally ranges from eight to ten, 
or even more. 
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reformation process. First and foremost, it was a call for rallying the UK’s creative industries 
behind an oppositional IP narrative, which focused on streamlining organisations and 
processes, instead of changing the laws. As a result, collaboration, standardisation and 
togetherness were emphasised as key elements of success for the creative industries to 
continue fighting (and eventually winning) the copyright war. Secondly, the report promoted 
digital technology as an agent of change and drew the majority of its inspiration from 
European initiatives, such as the Global Repertoire Database and Linked Content Coalition 
(LCC). Not only it provided the UK’s creative industries with a feasible option to move ahead, 
but also assisted in drawing them closer to their counterparts in Europe, and thus gaining the 
support needed to help kick-start the construction of the Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE) in 
question. Thirdly, with regard to the UK’s government, the report offered a neat resolution 
to defuse the tense relationship with the creative industries at the time. Rather than having 
to balance the interests of the creative sector and Internet-based companies via legislative 
means, the government was invited to join in “a public-private partnership”, whose objective 
was to create a “one stop shop” for copyright licensing. Hooper and Lynch named this 
initiative the Copyright Hub and presented an embryonic form of their ideas in the ‘Copyright 
works’ report. The following section is thus dedicated to a careful examination of their 
proposal. 
The Copyright Hub - An Embryonic Proposal 
Creating the Copyright Hub was the main recommendation made by Hooper and Lynch in the 
“Copyright works” report. In particular, it was recommended that “a not-for-profit, industry-
led, industry-funded Copyright Hub with some possible Government pump-priming in the 
early stages” would be built around agreed data building blocks and common standards 
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(Hooper and Lynch 2012, p.20). A definition was further provided, albeit sketchy, to help 
clarify the authors’ vision: 
The Copyright Hub will be based in the UK and will link via spokes interoperably, 
scalably and intelligently to the growing national and international network of 
private and public sector digital copyright exchanges, right registries and other 
copyright-related databases, using agreed cross-sectoral and cross-border data 
building blocks and standards, on a “voluntary, opt-in and non-exclusive basis”. 
(ibid.) 
Although Hooper and Lynch used the “hub and spoke” model as a metaphor for the 
development of the Copyright Hub, they acknowledged that the actual implementation of 
the IT solutions would be “much more sophisticated” and the report could only provide some 
“early thinking on the IT aspects of the Hub” (ibid. pp.20-21). In particular, it was suggested 
that the Copyright Hub would fulfil four main purposes: (1) copyright education and 
information, (2) registries of rights, (3) a marketplace for copyright licensing, and (4) an 
authoritative place for dealing with orphan works. These functional requirements were 
expected to be delivered in consecutive phases commencing with the launch of a simple 
website for copyright education, signposting and navigation. This would then be followed by 
the introduction of a more sophisticated mechanism for multi-media searching, which would 
enable potential licensees to identify both the content they required and its associated 
rightsholders. Afterwards, the Copyright Hub would be instituted as a new market place 
where rights could be registered and monetised; where licenses would be generated, paid 
for and delivered through automated processes; and where diligent searches for orphan 
works could be sufficiently performed and recorded. Finally, Hooper and Lynch envisioned 
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the Copyright Hub to offer “a single licence for multiple-media types” when the project 
reached its eventual stage (ibid. p.53). 
Despite such an illustrative account of the Copyright Hub’s phasing solution, the lack of 
technical specifications was evident in the “Copyright works” report. To compensate for this 
shortcoming, Hooper and Lynch elaborated upon a number of vital principles which, they 
proposed, would ensure the successful development of the project. First, it was 
recommended that the Copyright Hub would, whenever possible, reuse accomplishments 
made by other initiatives in the area, rather than attempting to reinvent everything from 
scratch. Announcing the banishment of what they called “the Not Invented Here (NIH) 
syndrome”, Hooper and Lynch (ibid. p.21) wrote: 
The NIH syndrome (Not Invented Here) should, we believe, be banished from any 
thinking about the Copyright Hub. There is not time or money for reinventing 
wheels, hubs and spokes. The Hub will only work on the basis of much 
collaboration within and across sectors, within and across nations and much 
learning from each other and from past investments. 
Second, the Copyright Hub should be able to serve the needs of licensors and licensees across 
multiple sectors of the creative industries, as well as reaching to those who are well beyond 
the UK’s border. The project was therefore determined to be multi-media in form and 
international in scope from the very beginning. Third, the report urged that the Copyright 
Hub should focus particularly on the high-volume, low-monetary value transactions 
originating from the “long tail” of smaller users and uses65, which was expected to create 
                                                          
65 Examples of the “long tail” of users and uses, according to Hooper and Lynch, included: 
- Start-ups offering novel services, which are built upon the creative use of images, music and 
text.   




greater revenues for the creative industries via more licensing and novel services tailored to 
this new market. The Copyright Hub was thus projected as a maker of a new market and a 
viable solution to the rapidly declining revenues of analogue sales in many sectors of the 
creative industries: 
Increasing the size of the overall pie will be a major benefit to come from 
streamlined copyright licensing as a result of more licensing and more services 
especially from the long tail of users. A key incentive driving industry funding and 
industry leadership for much of the work in this report is that revenues, especially 
revenues from the internet, increase as a result of better licensing procedures. At 
a time when analogue revenues continue to decline, in some cases rapidly, this is 
vital to the health of the creative industries. (ibid. p.21)   
Furthering this line of argument, Hooper and Lynch reiterated the final, and perhaps most 
critical, guiding principle of all: the creative industries should take, and should always remain 
at, the helm of the Copyright Hub’s development. Attributing the success of their feasibility 
study to the close involvement of the four creative sectors - music, publishing, images and 
audiovisual - the authors gave more than a hint on how continuing industries’ support would 
further ensure the prosperity of the project: 
[W]e need solutions to the very high volume of low monetary value copyright 
licensing transactions that are the hallmark of the digital age... The Copyright Hub 
and its federation of linked computer systems is that solution in the view of the 
four UK industries closely involved in this work – music, publishing, audiovisual 
                                                          
- The individual user, who creates new content by using works of other creators and posts it 
on social media platforms, such as YouTube.  
- A broadcaster wanting a particular film clip for a documentary programme. 
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and images. The Copyright Hub was presented in draft form at a stakeholder event 
held on 29 June 2012 and received a high level of support from those present with 
valuable suggestions as to how it should be taken forward and where the risks also 
lay. (ibid. p.22)  
Not only did this aid in reaffirming the industries’ commitment to the idea of the Copyright 
Hub, it was also a call for the UK’s government to adopt an alternative political stand to the 
one which they presented in Shoreditch (GOV.UK, 2010b), and to take a new course of action 
accordingly. This political dimension of the proposal was especially highlighted in Hooper’s 
and Lynch’s concluding remarks, when questions regarding “the connection” between 
streamlining copyright licensing and future changes to copyright legislation were posed (ibid. 
p.36): 
The creative industries have, we are pleased to report, agreed in principle to fund 
and provide an office to continue this work for one year in the first instance, 
subject to more detailed discussions with the Government. In those discussions 
with Government, industry would like to understand the connection between the 
work being carried out to streamline licensing described in this report and future 
proposed changes to the law, for example in relation to exceptions. Would, for 
example, the work to streamline licensing in education obviate the need for an 
educational exception? Would the creation and operation of the Copyright Hub 
with its satellite of digital copyright exchanges and rights registries obviate the 
need for other changes to the law? It is for Government ultimately to reach a view 




It was clearly evident from the above excerpt that, from the point of view of the creative 
industries, the Copyright Hub was regarded as the most crucial bargaining chip in their 
negotiations with the UK’s government. The industries indeed promised to fund the 
Copyright Hub in exchange for the prospect of having fewer copyright exceptions and a legal 
framework which would work in their favour. Consequently, the Copyright Hub, which 
emerged from the urgent need of the creative industries to fend off statutory interventions 
from the government, was inherently a political initiative. Meanwhile, the demand for and 
specifications of the project from a technological point of view were of much less significance 
to the creative industries.  
In support of the creative industries’ proposition, Hooper and Lynch argued that “the ball is 
firmly at the feet of the politicians” and urged the government to act swiftly in order to retain 
the momentum of the initiative (ibid. p.37). Laying their recommendations in concrete action 
points, Hooper and Lynch proposed the establishment of two interim working groups: (1) the 
Copyright Hub Launch Group (CHLG) to oversee the design, funding, governance and 
technical implementation of the Copyright Hub, and (2) the Copyright Licensing Steering 
Group (CLSG) with a wider mandate to ensure both continuing coordination across sectors 
of the UK’s creative industries, and where possible collaboration with stakeholders operating 
outside the country’s border.  
To summarise, the embryonic proposal of the Copyright Hub was rich in prescriptive accounts 
of the political discourse behind the project, as well as the guiding principles on how it should 
be phased and governed, yet the lack of technical specifications on how it should be 
implemented was prominent. While the creative industries had promised “in principle” to 
fund and continue the work for another year, they indeed were waiting for the desired 
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response from the government before committing themselves to the initiative. Against this 
backdrop, the story of the first year of the Copyright Hub continued to unfold.  
B. The First Year of the Copyright Hub (Oct 2012 - Oct 2013) 
Breaking through the Copyright Hub’s waiting game 
After the “Copyright works” report was published in July 2012, Hooper’s and Lynch’s work 
on the Copyright Hub came to a momentary halt due to lack of actions from both the UK’s 
government and the creative industries. Both sides seemed to engage in what Robinson et 
al. (2012) called a “waiting game”, in which one side was waiting for the other to take the 
first step before they made their move. Despite the fact that the creative industries had 
agreed “in principle” to provide funding for the first year of work on the Copyright Hub, they 
appeared to be indifferent to fulfilling this promise right after the publication of Hooper’s 
and Lynch’s second report. Recalling this situation, Sophie (pseudonym) - CEO of a collective 
management organisation representing British publishers - disclosed: 
And then when [Hooper] published his second report, he said “Right, you know, 
now it’s over to the industries. They need to fund this Hub. They need to lead it”. 
And I looked around and nothing was happening. No one was doing anything. I 
thought “This is terrible! He’s given us this solution. And we have to show [the] 
government that we can do something for ourselves. We can make life easier for 
everyone.” (Transcript D3) 
Being frustrated with the stagnation, Sophie took the matter into her own hands and, 
through her networks and connections, successfully rallied multiple sectors of the creative 
industries behind the project. Detailing the process through which £150,000 from publishing, 
188 
 
images, music, and audiovisual sectors was raised to fund the first year of work on the 
Copyright Hub, Sophie remarked: 
And this is a very honest [story]. So I looked around and, you know, the days and 
weeks started ticking by and I thought “This is really bad!” He’s done such great 
job. So I called together all the industries. Cause I -- having worked in the music 
industry for a very long time and then the publishing industry, I actually knew quite 
a lot of people across the industries and I pulled everyone together from different 
sectors, including the BBC. You know, there’re audiovisual sector and images and 
music and publishing. And I said, you know: “what are we gonna do about this?” 
And in the end, we agreed that we needed to raise money.  
We needed to employ someone to take it forward. Ros Lynch was up for that so 
we worked out how much money we needed and I went around to all the 
industries’ organisations and said “Look, you know, we need x, can you 
contribute?” So we raise in the first year £150,000 and I divided it between the 
four sectors and tried to make it even between them; so publishing/ text, music, 
images, audiovisual. It was quite difficult to get the images sector, particularly, but 
you know we raised the money. And we employed Ros; she has an assistant and 
then we moved on. (Transcript D3) 
Having secured firmly the financial and political support from the creative industries, the 
Copyright Hub Launch Group (CHLG) was set up in October 2012 to “oversee the design, 
funding, and implementation of the Copyright Hub” (Copyright Hub, 2013). As a result, there 
were three strands of work under the CHLG that are of particular interest to this case study. 
The first strand, which was led by Ros Lynch, looked into the opportunity to obtain additional 
funding from the government through collaboration with the Catapult project. The second, 
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which aimed at specifying the scope and functional requirements for the Copyright Hub, was 
presided by Goldman (pseudonym) - a data expert and technical architect of the Linked 
Content Coalition (LCC) project. Finally, Selena (pseudonym) - a seasoned politician and 
Intellectual Property solicitor - was put in charge of devising a governance structure for the 
Copyright Hub.  
In addition to the CHLG, the Copyright Licensing Steering Group (CLSG) was established in 
November 2012 to coordinate efforts in implementing Hooper and Lynch’s 
recommendations across four sectors of the UK’s creative industries. Under the umbrella of 
the CLSG, six workstreams were established, each of which looked into: (1) implementing the 
Copyright Hub; (2) streamlining education licensing; (3) publishing Voluntary Code of Practice 
for metadata of images; (4) introducing new joint PRS/PPL music licenses; (5) launching new 
initiatives for streamlining digital music licensing; and (6) the adoption of interoperability of 
common data standards.  
With the CHLG and CLSG in place, the impasse was finally resolved, and the government was 
soon engaged in discussion with the CHLG on opportunities to provide additional funding for 
the project. Speaking at the “Securing Growth through Intellectual Property” event on 17th 
December 2012, Vince Cable - the then Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
- acknowledged “the potential [of the Copyright Hub project] to yield great benefits for 
creators and consumers, and to increase profits for business” and commented on how he did 
not desire “progress to founder due to a lack of finance in the early days of its development” 
(Publishing Scotland, 2012). In addition, the government’s readiness to “act as a guarantor 
for the Hub” was also unveiled at this event (ibid.). In March 2013, the government honoured 
their promise by giving £150,000 of funding to help build the first phase of the Copyright 
Hub’s website for signposting and copyright education purposes, matching the amount 
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contributed by the industries (Gov.uk, 2013). In retrospect, Ros Lynch described this move as 
“a way of encouraging industries to actually put money into it if they can actually see 
something happening” (Transcript C5).  
The government’s pump-priming for the Copyright Hub and their political support for the 
new narrative on streamlining copyright licensing indeed triggered overwhelmingly positive 
reactions from the creative industries. Shortly after the disclosure of the government’s 
support, the CLSG issued a press release on 25th March, in which they announced the 
participation of twelve collective management organisations66 in providing services to the 
first phase of the Copyright Hub’s website and promised to make the site go live in that 
summer. Commenting on the progress, Richard Hooper fondly remarked “The Copyright Hub 
until now has been just an idea. Today it begins to become an exciting reality.” (Flanagan, 
2013). 
Cementing Alliances: The Usual Suspects and Strange Bedfellows 
Despite the fact that the Copyright Hub project began to build up considerable momentum 
in the first quarter of 2013, Hooper did not slack off on his efforts to convince a wide 
spectrum of stakeholders to participate in and continue to support the initiative. Presenting 
at the London Book Fair in April 2013, Hooper used his Charles Clark Memorial Lecture as an 
opportunity to cement existing alliances, as well as attempting to build new ones. His 
messages were conveyed by means of four exhortations. First, he addressed the Houses of 
Parliament, the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), the government and lobby groups on the 
current shift of narratives on copyright. Hooper argued that spending more time and effort 
                                                          
66  Twelve organizations providing services to the Copyright Hub in phase one included: the BBC, the 
British Association of Picture Libraries and Agencies (BAPLA), Copyright Clearance Centre (CCC), 
Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA), Federation of Commercial Audio-visual Libraries (FOCAL), Getty 
Images, the Newspaper Licensing Agency (NLA), Pearson, the Picture Licensing Universal System 
(PLUS), Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) and PRS for Music. 
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on debating changes to copyright laws would “only prolongs the wars of attrition”, and urged 
stakeholders to reallocate their resources on streamlining copyright licensing processes:  
We have spent years first with the Gowers Review and then the Hargreaves 
Review discussing and debating changes to copyright law… The time has come to 
move on. Let us now reallocate the immense resources of energy and time and 
money away from lobbying and into making copyright licensing processes and 
organisations more and more fit for purpose for the digital age… No more time 
needs to be spent on the legislative dimension. Legislative indecision only prolongs 
the wars of attrition. (Hooper 2013, p.10) 
Second, Hooper urged the politicians to introduce more vigorous measures to enforce and 
protect copyright which, he believed, resides “at the heart of a [thriving UK’s] knowledge-
based economy” (ibid. p.10). The third exhortation was aimed at technology companies, 
which thus far had little involvement in the Copyright Hub project. Hooper asked the 
technology companies to treat copyright in the same way as patent rights, and recommended 
them to “work with the grain of the copyright industries and not against the grain - to the 
benefit of consumers and economic growth” (ibid. p.11). The final exhortation was reserved 
to address the main audience at the London Book Fair: publishers, creators and other 
members of the creative industries. Hooper emphasised time and time again that by 
supporting the new copyright narrative, and the Copyright Hub in particular, the creative 
industries were put “in the right place” to demand favourable actions from the politicians. In 
his own words: 
It is important to be in the right place at the right time. I believe that you [the 
creative industries] have got yourself into the right place at the right time. I believe 
that your stance towards and support for innovative and streamlined copyright 
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licensing and the Copyright Hub put you in the right place. The ball now moves 
from your court to the politicians’. It is now time for the politicians to deliver the 
proposed changes to the law so that the endless debate can be closed down. And 
it is now time for politicians to deliver more rigorous and equitable enforcement 
of copyright. (ibid. p.11) 
Not only reassuring the creative industries about the prominent benefits of the Copyright 
Hub project, Hooper also made sure that it would not be perceived as a potential threat to 
existing business models. In June 2013, only one month before the Copyright Hub’s website 
went live, Hooper and Lynch published a document titled “Charting a course for the Copyright 
Hub in the Spring 2013”, which served as a timely reminder of how “innocuous” the project 
would be towards the creative industries. In this document, the Copyright Hub was neatly 
defined as two things: (1) a web portal which helps connect organisations from different 
sectors of the creative industries and allows potential users to find and acquire licenses; and 
(2) a forum for collaboration between those organisations and sectors. It is imperative to 
notice that references to some of the Copyright Hub’s initially-proposed technology, such as 
federated searches67, which had the prospect of raising a few eyebrows amongst those who 
were offering similar services in the market, were conveniently missing from such definition. 
Calling the Copyright Hub “a catalyst for change and innovation”, Hooper and Lynch (2013, 
p.1) described how “a virtuous circle” could be created to benefit the whole industries: 
[T]he Copyright Hub is already proving to be a catalyst for bringing organisations 
out of their own “silo” domains to work together on technical issues (how do you 
identify copyright works) and service provision… As the functions and services 
                                                          
67 Federated searches service allows the Copyright Hub to send queries to multiple right managers’ 
databases and the answers will be returned to the user via the Copyright Hub’s interface. This feature 
was referred to as “a multi-media search capability” in the ‘Copyright works’ report.  
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made available through the Copyright Hub grow, organisations are likely to 
collaborate, learn from and compete with each other to productive effect. The 
technical agreements reached through the Copyright Hub will also improve the 
effectiveness of registration and licensing services more generally, thus creating a 
virtuous circle. 
Furthermore, the market envisaged by the project was described as “new and largely 
untapped market… [which] is yet to be the subject of a fully-fledged business case” and thus 
avoiding any suspicion that the Copyright Hub might cannibalise sales made by existing 
stakeholders (ibid. p.1).  
Finally, it was emphasised that the project was funded and led by the industries, and 
operated under the principles of being “voluntary, opt-in, non-exclusive, pro-competitive and 
not for profit” (ibid. p.4). Hooper and Lynch promised that the Copyright Hub would be “not 
going too fast but also not going too slowly. Not building out a vast infrastructure in the hope 
that ‘they [the customer] will come’. Not duplicating infrastructure of members. Not 
competing with members.” (ibid. p.4). In other words, the Copyright Hub was destined to 
become a reliable ally of the creative industries, rather than a potential threat or a legal-
technical nuisance being imposed by the government. These promises were proved to be 
crucial for the Copyright Hub to attain significant industries’ buy-in, especially in the project’s 
early phases. Commenting on this issue, Selena (pseudonym) - a founding member of the 
Copyright Hub Launch Group - explained the ways in which the Copyright Hub, as an “industry 
project”, accumulated a vast array of supporters from publishing, images, music and 
audiovisual sectors: 
It’s been very important in the development of the Hub that it was nothing to do 
with government and government policies, but it was an industry-led and industry-
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funded project, which it remains today although it’s now getting a lot bigger and 
the funding basis may move on. But in order to get industries’ buy-in, putting their 
materials into the Hub, it was absolutely essential that the project was an industry 
project, and not something imposed from outside by government… We have buy-
in from all four sectors and we expect materials to be available from all four 
sectors. (Transcript E3) 
Such growing support from the UK creative industries played a pivotal role in transforming 
the Copyright Hub from abstract ideas and discourses into a concrete socio-technical project, 
as explored at length in this chapter. 
A Year of Innovation - Looking Back & Into the Future of the Copyright 
Hub 
On 8th July 2013, the Copyright Hub’s website - www.copyrighthub.co.uk - was officially 
launched in pilot mode with connections to 35 organisations providing information on 
licensing opportunities and copyright education (Copyright Hub Launch Group, 2013). This 
figure was nearly triple the number of organisations originally signed up to the first phase of 
the project as a direct result of Hooper’s relentless outreach work, which was deemed “a key 
part of this first year” by the CHLG (ibid. p.4). The number of affiliated organisations 
continued to grow until the end of 2013 as the site added a wide range of new suppliers to 
its hyperlinking infrastructure.   
On 25th September 2013, the Copyright Licensing Steering Group (CLSG) launched a report 
entitled “Streamlining Copyright Licensing for the Digital Age” to recount the progress made 
in implementing recommendations put forward a year ago by Hooper and Lynch in the 
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“Copyright works” report. This event was accompanied by the publication of UK Music’s68 
report entitled “A Year of Innovation - Licensing Works: A report by the Music Industry”, 
which highlighted the efforts and achievements in streamlining licensing processes within 
the music sector. The event thus became an excellent showcase for the creative industries 
to express their ardent political convictions towards streamlining copyright licensing: from 
the launch of the Copyright Hub’s website to simplified steps for licensing in the education 
sector, to the introduction of new joint PRS/PPL music licenses, and so on.  
The notions of togetherness, commitment and collaboration were found to be particularly 
prevalent in the narratives of these reports. For instance, in the preface of the CLSG’s report, 
James Lancaster - chair of the CLSG - applauded “a unique collaboration” between numerous 
sectors of the creative industries, which worked together “with a focus on developing 
pragmatic solutions” for streamlining copyright licensing, and their “close co-operation with 
Government” (CLSG 2013, p.2). Lancaster proceeded to argue that the strength of the UK 
creative industries was essentially supported by three pillars: (1) a robust framework of 
copyright legislation, (2) strong action against piracy, and (3) a streamlined licensing regime. 
As long as the industries were committed to streamlining their own regime, implied the 
argument, the UK government should do its part to ensure the other two pillars were in place 
to support and help the creative industries thrive in the ever-changing digital economy. This 
narrative thus served to strengthen the growing bond between the industries and 
government within the IP domain, as well as nudging policy makers towards issuing more 
favourable changes to the UK copyright legislation in the near future.   
This event was also held to mark the end of the first chapter in the Copyright Hub’s biography, 
as well as signalling a momentous shift in the project’s focus in the upcoming phase. It was 
                                                          
68 UK Music is an industry-backed lobbying group, whose main objective is to push the key business 
and political agenda of the music industry within the Westminster (UK Music, 2013). 
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announced at the event that the Copyright Licensing Steering Group (CLSG) and all of its six 
individual workstreams, including the Copyright Hub Launch Group (CHLG), would cease to 
exist by the end of September 2013. They would soon be replaced by a new Copyright Hub 
Board, which assumed overall responsibility for the delivery of the project from 1st October, 
with the aid of an Advisory Committee comprising a wide range of industry representatives. 
Such organisational restructuring also came with a critical change in the project’s personnel. 
It was announced that Ros Lynch would soon depart from the project to return to the 
Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills following the end of her secondment to the 
creative industries. As a result, a new Chief Executive with appropriate technical expertise 
would be appointed to replace Ros Lynch and to lead the project in the second phase, which 
placed greater emphasis upon developing and implementing the Copyright Hub’s technology. 
Richard Hooper, on the other hand, continued to serve as Chairman of the Copyright Hub 
Foundation.  
This event thus marked the end of the first year of the Copyright Hub project (see Fig. 4) 
 
 




C. Achievements and Legacies  
The first year of work on the Copyright Hub project was conducted primarily by two working 
groups. On the one hand, the Copyright Hub Launch Group (CHLG) embarked upon three 
strands of work, which looked into (1) a funding scheme for the project, (2) potential 
partnership with the Digital Catapult, and (3) the project’s scope and functional 
requirements. On the other hand, the Copyright Licensing Steering Group (CLSG) was 
campaigning on behalf of the creative industries for a pro-IP narrative and attempted to exert 
leverage over the UK government via the Copyright Hub initiative. To what extent did the 
CHLG and CLSG succeed in attaining these goals and objectives? What legacy did the first 
year of work on the Copyright Hub project leave behind? The main aim of this section is to 
provide some insights into these questions. Hence, the section is divided into four themes, 
each of which carefully examines the outcomes of the four workstreams of the CHLG and 
CLSG.     
Fundraising 
Finding suitable sources of funding was the longest running, and perhaps the most critical, 
activity with regard to the Copyright Hub project. On the first meeting of the CHLG on 2nd 
October 2012, it was agreed that the project would follow the principle of being “industry 
led and industry funded but with some pump-priming from Government” (CHLG 2012, p.2). 
Consequently, funding for the Copyright Hub had always come from a mixture of private and 
public money. In this regard, the project had been very successful in its first year by securing 
in total £300,000, which was equally divided between the creative industries and the 
Intellectual Property Office (IPO)69. This sum of money was spent on establishing the two 
                                                          
69 IPO is the official government body responsible for intellectual property rights in the UK.  
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working groups, i.e. CHLG and CLSG, as well as developing the Copyright Hub’s website into 
a trustworthy source of copyright education and navigation device.  
In addition to the immediate funding needed for the first phase of the project, since October 
2012, the CHLG continuously engaged in conversation with the Technology Strategy Board 
(TSB)70, particularly the Connected Digital Economy Catapult (CDEC) (which was later 
renamed the Digital Catapult), in order to seek a new partner to deliver the Copyright Hub’s 
technology in the second phase. It was emphasised in a series of the CHLG’s meeting minutes 
between November 2012 and May 2013 that the Catapult would not pay the full cost of 
developing the Copyright Hub, but rather contributing their own technical expertise and 
human resources to help scope the project. As a result, the Copyright Hub would benefit from 
an indirect source of funding from the government via the Digital Catapult centre. Such 
arrangement for the Copyright Hub - Digital Catapult partnership was officially announced in 
the CHLG’s final report in September 2013. The report stated: 
CHLG is working in partnership with the Connected Digital Economy Catapult 
(CDEC) to develop this phase of the Hub. As a Technology Strategy Board initiative 
supported by funding from BIS CDEC helps UK innovators across the digital 
economy to achieve sustainable economic growth through supporting 
collaborative, pioneering projects with the potential to create needle-shifting 
impact. (CHLG 2013, p.8) 
Dubbing this “an arm-length relationship” between the government and the Copyright Hub, 
Ros Lynch explained how the project was still being supported throughout its second phase 
by public money, despite the absence of any formal arrangements: 
                                                          
70 TSB, later known as Innovate UK, is a government body supporting technological innovation through 
collaboration with private businesses to “de-risk, enable and support innovation” (Gov.uk, 2017). 
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Well, obviously the Catapult has been provided with fund via the government. So 
it’s kind of an arm-length relationship with [the Copyright Hub project]. The 
Catapult is building the technology and that’s government’s funding going in 
there. We are still continuing to support it, and ministers at any opportunities they 
get to talk about the Copyright Hub, they also include it in speeches, in 
conversation that they have with other parties. So, although we’re not doing 
something very formal, we’re still supporting the Hub and still try to encourage it. 
(Transcript C5) 
Apart from public money, the second phase of the Copyright Hub was equally supported by 
funding, in kind and in cash, from the private sector. Funding for the second year of the 
project was secured once again by Sophie (pseudonym), who managed to pull four sectors 
of the creative industries together in the same way that she did in the first year and divided 
the contribution evenly between them. Sophie humorously recalled the process through 
which she “went around begging with the cap” in order to raise £200,000 from the industries: 
And then [the creative industries]’ve got to the end of the first year and we 
realised that we need another year, but we decided to restructure [the Copyright 
Hub project]. By then, the steering group has served its purpose. And we rode it 
into the main organisation and Richard [Hooper] became the main chairman. And 
we raised £200,000 in the second year. Same way, I went around begging with the 
cap. (Transcript D3) 
At the end of the Copyright Hub’s second year (i.e. September 2014), the responsibility for 
raising money resided with Richard Hooper as the project continued seeking for funding in 
the form of voluntary industry donations. As Hooper summarised the way money was raised 
in the first three years of the project: 
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Well, so basically in the final report in July 2012 in ‘Copyright Works’, Ros and I 
recommended the Copyright Hub. That idea was very much accepted by the 
industries and they are now in the third year of funding of the Copyright Hub.  
The first year, £150,000 funded, second year £200,000, and this year, we’re 
looking at funding of over £400,000… Right now, first year, second year, third year 
which we’re in, it has been funded by donations…So you’ve got, roughly speaking, 
this year, you’ve got £500,000 of government’s funding and then getting towards 
£500,000 of creative industries funding. (Transcript B1) 
It is imperative to note that there had been a steady increase in both public and private 
funding for the Copyright Hub during the period between September 2013 and September 
2015, despite the fact that the project was originally planned to be self-financing from 1st 
October 2014 (see CHLG 2013). Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that, with regard to 
funding, the Copyright Hub had been remarkably successful in not only securing the required 
money for its first year of operation, but also creating a momentum from which fundraising 
activities in the second phase (i.e. second and third years) could greatly benefit. On the other 
hand, the immense success in fundraising might also contribute to postponing the 
establishment of a resilient funding model for the Copyright Hub. While being interviewed 
about this subject in January 2015, Hooper commented: 
The answer [for a resilient funding model is] ‘We’re not sure’. Right now, first year, 
second year, third year which we’re in, it has been funded by donations… So that’s 
the pattern in the past… I’m just about [to] start chairing a funding group in March 
to look at funding option for year four, which will be around about October of 2015 
because a lot of the current funders don’t want to go on just giving money [as] in 
the past.  
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So we need to have a much more resilient system… We could easily have 
commercial ventures sitting on top of the Hub’s technology and those could give 
money to the Hub. That’s one possibility. The membership scheme is a possibility. 
Continuation with donations, although I think that’s not as a good idea because 
people have done it. So we don’t know. (Transcript B1) 
The reasons for the Copyright Hub’s tremendous success in mustering support and attracting 
funding from both the public and private sectors will be discussed in more detail below, while 
the implications of such funding for the development of the project will be carefully 
examined in the discussion chapter. 
Partnership with the Digital Catapult 
As mentioned above, the partnership with the Digital Catapult was being reviewed very early 
on by the CHLG alongside its fundraising activities. Interestingly, the relationship between 
the two associations did not begin at the organisational level. Instead, it was initiated by 
Selena (pseudonym) - a seasoned IP lawyer who was serving on the advisory boards of both 
the CHLG and the Digital Catapult. Recalling her story of “matchmaking” the two 
organisations, Selena commented on how her perception of the Digital Catapult as “a natural 
home” for developing the Copyright Hub’s technology had led her to insist on establishing a 
connection between the two newly-found organisations: 
Having got the sort of political buy in from the industries and acceptance about 
what [the Copyright Hub] should be doing in general terms, there came a point at 
which it needs to turn technical development. And I was also closely involved with 
the creation and formation of the Digital Catapult. And so, I knew that the Digital 
Catapult, which was intended to bring together the creators and digital industries 
and stimulate innovation there, was in my view a natural home for doing the 
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[technical] development for the Copyright Hub. I introduced the two to each other 
and eventually they agreed that they would develop it jointly, which was 
happening for the last couple of years. (Transcript E3) 
The crucial role of Selena in sparking the Copyright Hub - Digital Catapult partnership was 
later confirmed by Neil Crockett, who had been appointed to lead the Digital Catapult since 
January 2013. Highlighting Selena’s enthusiasm for making the introduction, he recalled how 
his organisation was put in contact with the Copyright Hub: 
It was through a lady called [Selena]... [who] was on our advisory board. And she 
was very keen that we looked at/ following up on the Hargreaves’ and Hooper’s 
reports. [They were], in her view, one of the big things that the industry couldn’t 
fix and we could maybe help fix by being neutral. And then she connected us to 
another organisation that she knew [i.e. the CHLG], because she was also in their 
advisory board. And then we met together. (Transcript F3) 
The introduction came at a critical point in time (i.e. late 2012 - early 2013) when both the 
Copyright Hub and Digital Catapult had just been established and were seeking eagerly for 
project partners. While the Copyright Hub were in need of an organisation which was capable 
of technical development, the Digital Catapult were also looking for an ideal project, which 
helped showcase the kinds of impact they would make to the connected digital economy. As 
Crockett recalled: 
We’re sort of talking a bit about how can we mix. We’re two not-for-profit 
[organisations]. We’re both [newly established]. We had to assess ourselves 
whether or not we thought we’re going to make the impact. They thought it was. 
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We thought it was… The chemistry worked… And we just progressively built from 
there. (Transcript F3)      
Commenting on the relationship from the Copyright Hub’s perspective, Hooper explained 
how the Digital Catapult was a good fit for developing the Copyright Hub’s technology and 
how the later became the former’s “most important project”. Furthermore, it was 
emphasised that the relationship was “a cooperation of equals”, in which there was “no 
money changing hands”: 
Digital Catapult was set up to sort of accelerate interests in digital innovations and 
really from the very early days, they loved the idea of the Copyright Hub. And the 
Hub became, I would say, their most important project.  
Now they did not give us money. This is terribly important. They gave us people... 
We’re given resources of human being and it’s a cooperation of equals. It’s not a 
contractor relationship. We’re not the client. They are not the contractor. It’s a 
cooperative organisation/ set of organisations. It’s collaborative. We work 
together. (Transcript B1) 
The deviation of the Copyright Hub - Digital Catapult partnership from the conventional client 
- contractor relationship was dubbed by Crockett a “self-generated” model, which he 
compared to the process of “trying to fly a new airplane while building it at the same time”. 
Furthermore, as equal partners in the relationship, the Copyright Hub and the Digital Catapult 
were expected to contribute and benefit evenly from the outcomes of the joint project. 
Elaborating on this “fifty-fifty principle”, Crockett remarked: 
It was sort of based upon a principle that we’ll both probably be contributing fifty 
percent - fifty percent… So if anything is developed from that is of value then we 
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share fifty-fifty. Any income that comes in, [cover] the costs that are done by each 
party, but then any profits, we’ll split fifty-fifty. So, this is a sort of agreement that 
when we have ownership of the materials that have been developed as well. So 
we just felt the right thing was to, you know, not try to get tied up for months in a 
big agreement; not try to get tied up when we supposed to set [the joint project 
in motion]. (Transcript F3)  
Thus, this arrangement was portrayed by Crockett as “perfect” as “two parts of the Yin and 
the Yang”: 
We got on and trusted [that] it was perfect: two parts of the Yin and the Yang. You 
know, they have the market and the knowledge of the sector and we had some 
knowledge of the sector but we also have desire to build some platforms that will 
[be capable of] enabling. (Transcript F3) 
Underneath this narrative of tranquillity and perfect harmony, a few preliminary indications 
of imbalance could readily be detected in the relationship between the two organisations, 
most notably from the Digital Catapult’s side. While commenting on the “fifty-fifty principle”, 
for instance, Crockett disclosed the perceived disequilibrium in contribution toward the joint 
project due to the intangible nature of the Copyright Hub’s contribution:  
I think we’re contributing quite a lot more [than the Copyright Hub] because we 
decided that actually it’s very hard to [assess the value of their contribution]. Their 
contribution is industry connections and presence. That’s very intangible… [What] 
they’re getting [in terms of] contribution are actual money but this’s a bit of 
intangible throwing on from their side. (Transcript F3).  
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This problem became more acute due to the fact that the amount of money which the Digital 
Catapult invested in the Copyright Hub project was “disproportionally larger than anything 
else [the Digital Catapult were doing]”. Calling this decision as a “big bet”, Crockett 
commented: 
We’re putting in a big chunk of money. It’s a big chunk of our available money in 
the first [year, i.e. 2014]. [It was] disproportionally larger than anything else we’re 
doing. So we decided to make this big bet. Our board had to approve it. (Transcript 
F3) 
As a result, the Digital Catapult was regarded, at least from their own perspective, as the 
leading partner in this relationship and thus they were comfortable with exerting greater 
influence over the course of the Copyright Hub project. Commenting on this issue after 
eighteen months working in the joint Copyright Hub – Digital Catapult initiative, Crockett 
related71: 
I think if you say on a balance, we [the Digital Catapult] actually have the most 
influence in day-to-day action and trying to bring up the technology platform and 
approach. (Transcript F3) 
This imbalance in the partnership only became apparent when frictions between the two 
organisations surfaced. From Crockett’s point of view, the Copyright Hub project was 
perceived as an “experiment” and “an act of good faith”, in which it was hoped that the user 
would be enticed to adopt the new IP infrastructure (and its practices) once it had been built. 
In his own words:  
                                                          
71 This interview with Neil Crockett was conducted on the 17th of June 2015. It was situated in the 
middle of the collaborative period (i.e. from 2014 to 2016) between the two organisations.  
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[The Digital Catapult and the Copyright Hub] both wanted to take part in this 
experiment. Just for this. It’s a problem of expenses. It’s an act of good faith: 
hoping that when people see it [i.e. the infrastructure], they will actually then start 
realising that it should be taken up. It’s the breakthrough experiment to try and 
see if we can kick-start this. (Transcript F3) 
Such perception somewhat contradicted one of the main principles which Hooper initially 
laid down for the Copyright Hub: “Not building out a vast infrastructure in the hope that ‘they 
[the customer] will come’”72. The difference in philosophy resulted in tensions between the 
two parties over what approach should be taken to develop the Copyright Hub. As Crocket 
explained how the “long-term platform” view of the Digital Catapult sometimes clashed with 
the “short-term use cases” view of the Copyright Hub: 
And then at times, we [the Digital Catapult] were probably trying to look at the 
longer term platform and they [the Copyright Hub] were looking at the shorter 
term use cases… I think there’s been some disputes. I think this thing about “Let’s 
just develop for the short-term” versus “Let’s develop for something which can be 
scalable later on”. So I think there’s a bit of a tension about that philosophy. 
(Transcript F3)  
The implications of these tensions and the imbalance in the Copyright Hub - Digital Catapult 
partnership will be examined in great details in the discussion chapter.  
 
                                                          
72 Cross-referencing this document on page 193. 
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Scope and functional requirements 
Determining the scope and functional requirements of the project was another critical 
activity of the CHLG owing to the fact that the embryonic proposal of the Copyright Hub was 
largely equivocal in terms of technical implementation. The CHLG thus delegated this task to 
Goldman (pseudonym) - a veteran data architect who had over thirty years’ experience in 
providing consultation services for the creative industries on information management, as 
well as being a leading figure in the development of identifier and metadata standards in the 
content industries. Goldman was also the author of the data model, which had been adopted 
by the Linked Content Coalition. 
In November 2012, Goldman issued the first version of such a document entitled “The 
Copyright Hub: Operating Policies”, in which he proclaimed (CHLG, 2012b, p.1): 
The Copyright Hub's main task is to facilitate the identification and licensing of 
rights to enable more extensive legitimate use of all kinds of digital content. 
In order to fulfil this task, Goldman identified and articulated the following six mandatory 
services for the Copyright Hub project: (1) enabling users to discover information about 
content and its associated rightsholders; (2) enabling users to make requests for licenses; (3) 
enabling rightsholders and/or intermediaries to make offers and to issue licenses to potential 
users; (4) empowering the Copyright Hub to play a role in the resolution of rights conflicts 
emerging as a result of multiple queries made through the Hub; (5) providing an educational 
and information service for both right users and rightsholders about copyright and related 
rights; and (6) promoting best practices in data standards and management for rightsholders 
and intermediaries. Amongst them, only the last two services were addressed within the first 
year of the Copyright Hub project. Accompanying these mandatory services were two 
optional functions with regards to (1) discovering potential orphan works and performing 
208 
 
diligent search for their rightsholders, and (2) reporting and/or monitoring of the usage of 
rights. 
In Goldman’s vision, the Copyright Hub’s services would be built upon a technical solution, 
known as the Linked Identifier Network. Goldman argued that the inefficiency of traditional 
rights management systems was due largely to a dearth of shared identifiers (i.e. identifiers 
recognised by more than one party and/or process within a network) and hence, the 
excessive reliance of many processes upon “manual recognition of ambiguous names” (ibid. 
p.8): 
Rights management (which includes licensing, usage reporting and settlement) is 
a set of processes that is critically dependent on networks of identifiers, but is one 
in which the absence of shared identifiers, and of reliable links between them, is 
at times severe. Many processes still rely upon manual recognition of ambiguous 
names, and making major improvements in this Linked Identifier Network is 
essential for the success of the Copyright Hub and of copyright licensing in general. 
To address this problem, the Linked Identifier Network exploits shared identifiers, and 
especially a process called mapping, which allows non-shared, private identifiers to be 
mapped to at least one other identifier within the network. In this way, the need for human 
intervention can be greatly reduced and rights management processes within such a network 
can become highly automated. Emphasising the importance of the mapping process to the 
Linked Identifier Network, Goldman stated (ibid.): 
The more widespread, accessible, transparent and secure those mappings are, the 
more highly automated the network can become. […] It is not essential everyone 
uses the same identifiers (although the more that happens, the simpler the 
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processes are), but that identifiers are securely mapped to one another so that 
they can be automatically translated. 
Within a Linked Identifier Network, Identifiers are used to identify different types of Entities, 
including: (1) Parties (e.g. creators, users, and rightsholders of content), (2) Creations (i.e. the 
content itself), (3) Controlled Vocabularies defining different types, categories and concepts, 
most notably relations between parties or relators, (4) Time and Place, and (5) Rights and 
RightsAssignments. These identifiers are then used as materials for the creation of Links – 
the basic building blocks of a Linked Identifier Network – which are defined as statements in 
which a wide range of Identifiers of Entities are connected through relations and roles, as 
specified in the Controlled Vocabularies.  
Interestingly, in this document, Goldman also stated that “the most important types of Link 
for the Linked Identifier Network are set out in the Rights Reference Model of the Linked 
Content Coalition” (ibid. p.10). This statement thus made “The Copyright Hub: Operating 
Policies” the first documented evidence of the intended connection between the Copyright 
Hub and the LCC project in term of technological implementation. Furthermore, Goldman 
also revisited his definition of the Copyright Hub’s main task and provided a very different 
take on the subject, compared to the one mentioned above. As he wrote at the end of the 
report (ibid. p.10): 
The task of the Hub may be summarized by saying that it aims to give widespread 
access to the Linked Identifier Network; but as there are many elements of that 
Network still without shared identifiers, one task of the Hub Organization is to 




Although the shift from “facilitating the identification and licensing of rights” to “giving 
widespread access to the Linked Identifier Network” seemed marginal at first, its implications 
were indeed substantial. While the former description of the Copyright Hub’s mission was 
general and technology agnostic, the latter was deemed to specifically bind the development 
of the Copyright Hub to the Linked Identifier Network technology, and particularly the Linked 
Content Coalition (LCC) project. In other words, the Copyright Hub was meant to be, at least 
from Goldman’s point of view, “the production version” of the LCC and its subsequent 
project: 
So, LCC had moved forward and it had some success in terms of gaining support 
and then moving into the RDI project - the Rights Data Integration project - which 
is, of course, very much like a prototype of the Hub. RDI and the Hub are, as I 
would -- as I describe them, the Hub is the production version of RDI. (Transcript 
B7) 
Such a view on the relationship between the Copyright Hub and the LCC was later approved 
by members of the Copyright Hub Launch Group (CHLG). As documented in the minutes of 
the group’s meeting in February 2013, it was generally accepted that the RDI project “is in 
effect a prototype Hub and could be useful to the Copyright Hub as it will be able to prove 
some of the issues the Copyright Hub will face” (CHLG 2013, p.7). In addition, the LCC was 
enthusiastically endorsed by Richard Hooper as standards on which the Copyright Hub should 
be built, and its adoption should be considered “one quick win” for the Data Building Blocks 
workstream of the CHLG. The minutes noted: 
The Chair [Richard Hooper] made a plea not to lose sight of the rule to build the 
Copyright Hub on the LCC standards. 
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It was noted that one quick win from the Data Building Blocks workstream will be 
to endorse the LCC. (ibid.) 
Nevertheless, the CHLG had to take the Digital Catapult into consideration before fully 
embracing the LCC standards. In March 2013, the CHLG held a meeting with the Digital 
Catapult to help scope the technical aspects of the project in the second phase (CHLG, 
2013b). This meeting ultimately yielded a number of market and financial questions, for 
which the CHLG had not been able to provide definitive answers. A subsequent proposal for 
hiring an external consultant to produce an initial three-year business plan for the Copyright 
Hub was also disapproved by a majority of the group’s members (CHLG, 2013c). As a result, 
the CHLG postponed the decision to proceed immediately to the second phase with the 
Digital Catapult as its technical partner, but instead focused on refining and improving the 
Copyright Hub as a web portal (which was launched in July 2013). 
In short, the scoping activities of the CHLG addressed some of the technical issues and 
functional requirements of the Copyright Hub project, yet they still fell short of expectations 
of a solid business plan. Through these activities, the CHLG came increasing to favour the LCC 
standards to adopt them for the technical development in the second phase, prior to any 
discussion with its technical partner – the Digital Catapult. This decision added a further 
complication to the dynamics between the three key stakeholders involved in the 





The Triumph of the new IP narrative 
As mentioned above, the main aim of the Copyright Licensing Steering Group (CLSG) was to 
advocate an alternative narrative on intellectual property (IP), which positioned the creative 
industries at the forefront of the IP advancement process and promoted digital technologies 
as the solution to contemporary problems of copyright. This narrative contradicted the 
government’s initial intent to impose substantial changes to the UK’s IP framework, 
especially copyright laws, so as to support emerging businesses and innovation within the 
technology sector. Such contrast in approaches led to mounting tension between a wide 
range of stakeholders involved in the subject, and consequently turned the Copyright Hub 
initiative into a spearhead for the crusade against copyright erosion.  
By the time the CLSG issued its final report in September 2013, there had been a dramatic 
turn of attitudes within the government’s circle towards protecting the economic interests 
of the UK’s creative industries, while clamping down on tax avoidance by multinational 
corporations, especially Google and other US-based giants of the technology sector. The first 
indicator of such a shift in attitudes occurred on 3rd December 2012, when the House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee (PAC) issued the result of their investigation into tax 
avoidance by multinational companies (Parliament.uk, 2012b). The PAC’s report listed a 
series of damning criticisms of both Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) and the 
multinationals in question73. While denouncing the HMRC for being “persistently unable to 
get a grip” on large corporations and “too passive in its approach” to closing the tax gap 
(Parliament.uk, 2012a), PAC also condemned the multinational businesses for “using the 
letter of tax laws both nationally and internationally to immorally minimise their tax 
                                                          
73 Google, Amazon and Starbucks were asked to provide evidence at a hearing organised by PAC. The 
committee insisted that their invitations were not intended to “single out” these companies but “to 
provide an illustration of what we perceive to be a wider problem of possible corporation tax 
avoidance” (Parliament.uk, 2012d)  
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obligations” (Parliament.uk, 2012d). The report concluded that, by not paying their “fair 
share of tax”, multinational corporations had thus gained “an unfair competitive advantage 
over British businesses which have no choice but to pay their corporation tax” 
(Parliament.uk, 2012c). Voicing the committee’s concern over the implications of such 
findings for public perception of the government’s competencies in tax administration, PAC 
wrote: 
There is genuine public anger and frustration because there is an impression that 
rigorous action is taken against ordinary people and small businesses and British 
companies based wholly in the UK but, apparently, lenient treatment is given to 
big corporations, of which almost half have a head office overseas. (Parliament.uk, 
2012d) 
In direct consequence of this report, the UK government started introducing new action to 
tackle tax dodgers in December 2012, targeting multinational corporations and marketers of 
aggressive tax avoidance schemes (GOV.UK, 2012b). In May 2013, PAC conducted a further 
investigation into how multinational technology companies, particularly Google, used 
“elaborate corporate structure” to avoid paying UK tax (Parliament.uk, 2013c). The report 
found that Google had set up “manifestly artificial tax arrangements” to evade its UK tax 
liabilities by billing the vast majority of its non-US transactions in Ireland (ibid. pp.3-10). Only 
a small proportion of these transactions were eventually taxed in Ireland owing to the fact 
that Google subsequently shifted most of its profits to a subsidiary in Bermuda in disguise as 
royalties paid for using Google’s non-US intellectual property (Ahmed, 2014). What is more, 
these profits were strategically shifted through a conduit company incorporated in the 
Netherlands to avoid withholding taxes on profits leaving the European Union. As a result, 
the Google’s model for IP-based profit shifting became known as the “Double Irish Dutch 
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Sandwich” structure74 (Fuest et al., 2013). Condemning Google for its behaviour over such 
tax arrangements, Margaret Hodge, chair of PAC, branded the company’s actions “devious… 
calculated and… unethical” (Parliament.uk, 2013c, p. Ev 23). The Labour MP continued: “You 
are a company that says you ‘do no evil’, but I think you do do evil, in that you use smoke and 
mirrors to avoid paying tax” (ibid.). 
While the reputations of Google and other multinational technology companies were being 
tainted in the eyes of the public75 and governments both in the UK and Europe76 over the tax 
avoidance scandal, the UK’s creative industries77 were characterised in the government’s 
official report78 as critical contributors to the recovery and growth of the national economy. 
Such a sharp contrast in these portrayals had been exploited by the creative industries to 
strengthen their calls79 for re-evaluating the government’s plan to foster the technology 
sector at the expense of the UK’s creative industries. Describing these calls as “amazingly 
powerful”, Macbeth (pseudonym) – a veteran publisher who had been closely involved with 
                                                          
74 For additional studies on the subject, see (Thorne, 2013; Brothers, 2014).  
75 For a detailed report, see (Barford and Holt, 2013) 
76 In France, for instance, Google faced a €1 billion bill of overdue tax, after its office had been raid 
by the tax authority in June 2011. Other technology companies, including Microsoft and Amazon, 
were landed with similar bills, which amounted to approximately €5 billion. In a similar movement, 
the OECD embarked upon international co-operation to tackle profit shifting and tax avoidance, 
witnessing the UK joined force with Germany, France, Japan, Canada and Australia to exchange 
information on the tax strategies of multinational technology companies. For a detailed report, see 
(Ahmed, Houlder and Parker, 2016)   
77 The definition of the “creative industries” used by the UK government in the Creative Industries 
Economic Estimates report was much broader than the one I used in this thesis, which confined the 
meaning of the term “creative industries” to publishing, images, music and audiovisual sectors. 
Nonetheless, the argument presented here still remained valid due to the fact that the four 
aforementioned sectors were able to piggyback on the official statistics to project their images as 
significant contributors to the UK economy. 
78 The Creative Industries Economic Estimates report revealed that, in 2012, the creative industries 
contributed £71.4 billion per year to the UK economy and employed 1.68 million people, which 
accounted for 5.2 per cent of the UK economy and 5.6 per cent of total number of jobs in the UK 
respectively. The value of services exported by the creative industries was estimated to be worth 
£15.5 billion in 2011. For detailed findings, see (Department for Culture Media & Sport, 2014).  
79 See, for instance, Stop43 campaign (http://www.stop43.org.uk)  
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the establishment of the Linked Content Coalition and the Copyright Hub initiatives – 
commented: 
The IP industries represent a very large piece of European GDP, even higher in the 
UK… You could argue whether it’s six, seven or eight per cent [of the GDP] but it’s 
in that size. All you have to say to a politician is:  
“This is the piece of GDP you’re putting at risk, it’s a significant piece of your GDP… 
You’re willing to give that up in order to improve the lot of the technology 
companies? […] They’re all American. They’re not paying any tax. So why do you 
want to give more money to these American businesses, which are not paying any 
tax in Europe at all, and take it away from companies that are actually contributing 
to the European economy in a big way?”  
That’s an amazingly powerful argument. (Transcript B3) 
In September 2013, the Culture, Media and Sport (CMS) committee adopted a similar stance 
on the subject and issued a notable report, entitled “Supporting the creative economy”, in 
which they strongly criticised the Hargreaves Review and its recommendations on changing 
the UK’s IP framework. Censuring Hargreaves for adopting “a significantly low standard” in 
conducting his review, the committee insisted that Hargreaves had been wrong on his claims 
of the benefits which further copyright exceptions might bring to the UK’s economy, and the 
recommendations had failed in adequately gauging the dangers of destabilising “the 
established system of copyright… for no obvious benefit” (Culture Media and Sport 
Committee, 2013, pp.4-5). The CMS wrote in their report: 
Following all the evidence we have received, we think Hargreaves is wrong in the 
benefits his report claims for his recommended changes to UK copyright law. We 
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regret that the Hargreaves report adopts a significantly low standard in relation to 
the need for objective evidence in determining copyright policy. We do not 
consider Professor Hargreaves has adequately assessed the dangers of putting the 
established system of copyright at risk for no obvious benefit. 
In addition to the critical view of the Hargreaves’ report, the CMS fiercely condemned the 
technology sector, most notably Google, for its “underlying agenda”, which strived to meddle 
with the policy making process. Stating their unequivocal opinions on the topic, the CMS 
proclaimed: 
We are deeply concerned that there is an underlying agenda driven at least partly 
by technology companies (Google foremost among them) which, if pursued 
uncritically, could cause irreversible damage to the creative sector on which the 
United Kingdom's future prosperity will significantly depend. (ibid. p.25) 
Furthering this line of argument, the CMS argued that the “evident reluctance” of technology 
companies to block access to copyright-infringing websites was based on “flimsy grounds” 
and thus, their inadequate responses to the rightful requests of the creative industries were 
viewed as “unacceptable”: 
We strongly condemn the failure of Google, notable among technology 
companies, to provide an adequate response to creative industry requests to 
prevent its search engine directing consumers to copyright-infringing websites. 
We are unimpressed by their evident reluctance to block infringing websites on 
the flimsy grounds that some operate under the cover of hosting some legal 
content. The continuing promotion by search engines of illegal content on the 
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internet is unacceptable. So far, their attempts to remedy this have been derisorily 
ineffective. (ibid. p.19) 
Consequently, it was recommended that the UK government should incentivise technology 
companies to hinder access to infringing material, as well as increasing the maximum penalty 
for serious online copyright theft to ten years’ imprisonment. Within this narrative of the 
CMS’ report, it was noteworthy to point up the fact that technology companies were 
depicted as accomplices, or even perpetrators, of online piracy, while the creative industries 
were regarded as the hapless victims of exploitation.  
Based upon these arguments, the CMS urged “a powerful champion of IP” on the UK’s 
government (ibid.). Such a champion, the CMS described, would be responsible for (1) 
protecting and promoting the interests of the UK’s creative industries, (2) co-ordinating 
enforcement of IP rights in the UK and abroad, and (3) educating consumers on the value of 
IP and the importance of respecting IP rights. These responsibilities bear a striking similarity 
to the Copyright Hub’s aims and objectives and therefore, it was unsurprising that the 
Copyright Hub was given a full endorsement from the CMS:   
The Copyright Hub is a welcome development which should prompt the 
Government to redouble its efforts at working with industry to develop overseas 
markets for British IP content. (ibid. p.26) 
The CMS’s report and other similar calls from within the government’s circle80 to protect the 
creative industries resulted in a significant reduction in the scale of changes being made to 
                                                          
80 Similar calls include Parliament's All Party IP Group chaired by John Whittingdale; Department for 
Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) select committee enquiry into the creative industries in 2013;  
and so on. 
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the UK’s IP framework compared to the original recommendations proposed by Hargreaves. 
Making a remark on this issue, Amelia (pseudonym) – the champion of the LCC initiative – 
recalled how the copyright reform in the UK became “pretty minor” after the initial success 
of the Copyright Hub: 
But I think the Copyright Hub, as an outcome, is something that UK government 
should be really proud of. And the copyright reform that they’ve finally instituted 
are pretty minor in the grand scale of things. You know, something on education, 
something on text and data mining but it’s non-commercial. You know, they’ve 
kind of kept the copyright framework up-to-date without revolutionising it. 
(Transcript D1) 
Evidence of the triumph of the Copyright Hub initiative and the alternative narrative on IP 
was not confined to parliamentary discussions and legislative reform, but also became 
materially embedded in various forms and shapes. Apart from the funding and strategic 
partnership with the Digital Catapult which were examined at great length above, another 
notable indicator of the shift in IP narrative came in the form of public appointment. After 
leaving her role as the second-in-command of the Copyright Hub project in October 2013, 
Ros Lynch returned to the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and was swiftly 
appointed as the new Director of Copyright and IP Enforcement at the Intellectual Property 
Office (IPO) (GOV.UK, 2014). The appointment of a junior civil servant, who just came back 
from her secondment at the Copyright Hub and was relatively new to the field of IP81, to 
                                                          
81 Commenting on her experience in dealing with IP and the UK’s creative industries, Ros Lynch 
admitted: 
I wasn’t involved in copyright at all in 2011 [when the Hargreaves Review was published]. 




immediately take the helm of a highly influential office had given a broad hint of the 
government’s change of direction with regards to their IP policies.  
This move became even more perceptible owing to the fact that Ros Lynch was designated 
to replace Edmund Quilty who, prior to his departure in early 2014, had held the office for 
six years and served under five different IP ministers (Orlowski, 2014). Quilty was notorious 
for his radical copyright agenda, which attempted to make copyright an “opt-in” process and 
to create a compulsory registration database of creative works. He was thus branded by the 
creative sector as “Britain’s unofficial copyright czar”, who “look[s] for every opportunity of 
diluting or abolishing copyright protection” (Focal International, 2014). It was also revealed 
that Quilty’s team of staff from the IPO had played a substantial role in influencing the 
outcomes of the controversial Hargreaves Review82. Consequently, the resignation of 
Edmund Quilty from his post marked a critical success of the creative industries’ campaign 
against copyright erosion and hence, a reliable indicator of the triumph of the new IP 
narrative. 
In short, these observations suggest that the creative industries had succeeded in imposing 
the new IP narrative upon the UK’s government, and at the same time, persuaded them to 
abandon their original plan for making substantial changes to the IP framework. Using 
Lancaster’s – chair of the CLSG – metaphor of “the three pillars of the creative industries”83, 
i.e. (1) a robust framework of copyright legislation, (2) strong action against piracy, and (3) a 
streamlined licensing regime, the creative industries were capable of securing the full 
                                                          
copyright issue when I came to work with Richard Hooper on the DCE feasibility study, 
which was December 2011. (Transcript C5)  
82 Cross-referencing the extract (on page 137) of the interview with Hargreaves in May 2015, when 
he admitted the influence of the IPO staff on his report. 
83 Cross-referencing page 195. 
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government’s support in bolstering the first two pillars, while the CLSG was coordinating the 
concerted effort of the whole industries to work on the last. Summing up the legacies and 
achievements of this phase of work, Richard Hooper – the champion of the Copyright Hub 
“movement” – emotionally remarked in his declaration of victory: 
This is the story of my life. Three years ago, the narrative was the problems with 
copyright - the digital world - change the law. That’s it. Almost all Hargreaves 
[Review] was [about] that… We came along and we said “Wait a minute! This is 
not as simple as that. […] Before you rush off and change the law, you sort out and 
improve your licensing mechanism, processes and organisations”.  
That is the story of this project. That is it. That’s what we’ve done. And so now, 
before you rush and change the law, you have a go at processes. And actually 
when you do that, there’s less requirement to change the law. If there’s less 
requirement to change the law, there are less copyright wars. (Transcript B1) 
D.  Summary 
This section provides a detailed account of the emergence of the Copyright Hub from its 
embryonic proposal by Hooper and Lynch in 2012 to the successful conclusion of the project’s 
first phase in 2013. It depicts a vivid story of the ways the Copyright Hub was shaped, refined 
and redefined in order to navigate and bridge the (often unaligned and even conflicting) 
interests between different groups of stakeholders involved in the process of modernising 
the UK’s IP framework and its copyright licensing practices. This act had been accomplished 
through a series of loosely coordinated, yet contingent, efforts made by a small group of 
“infrastructure entrepreneurs”, whose expertise and personal connections span numerous 
sectors and professional ecologies (i.e. publishing, images, music, and audiovisual sectors of 
the creative industries; policy making and legal practices; data modelling and standard 
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governance; etc.). Although the success of the Copyright Hub in this phase had given the 
project the required momentum for technological development in the future, it also limited 
the project’s choices for partners (i.e. the Digital Catapult and, somewhat unofficially, the 
LCC) and the type of technology and data standards (i.e. the Linked Identifier Network and, 
more specifically, the LCC’s Rights Reference Model), which it would later adopt in the second 
phase.  
Apart from the success of the Copyright Hub project, this section also provides a testament 
to the triumph of the alternative IP narrative, which focuses on streamlining copyright 
licensing processes instead of making changes to the UK’s legal framework. This shift in 
narrative had helped in reducing the propensity of new bills being rushed through the 
parliament owing to sheer political motives and constant pressure to update copyright laws 
as occurred in the past. Consequently, the creative industries had not only been able to 
create a defensible position on “high ground” through the establishment of the Copyright 
Hub project, but also managed to colonise this elevated terrain and shored it up with political 
alliances, collaborative relations, and economic interests. What still missing in this system of 
defence, which consisted in rhetoric, ideologies and partnerships, was a technical 
infrastructure that was capable of fulfilling the vision and promises of the Copyright Hub 
project. The development such an infrastructure will therefore be the prime focus for analysis 
in the next chapter. 
III. Understanding the Copyright Hub’s Success 
This section is dedicated to examining reasons for the successful establishment of the 
Copyright Hub project. These reasons are studied and presented at three levels of data 
granularity: (1) the sectoral and national level, which explains the ways in which the 
Copyright Hub initiative became a solution that worked for both the UK government and the 
222 
 
creative industries, while maintaining an innocuous position towards the technology sector; 
(2) the institutional and project level, which portrays the alignment of interests in the 
collaborative triangle between the Copyright Hub, the Digital Catapult and the Linked 
Content Coalition (LCC); and (3) the individual level, which depicts the roles that key actors, 
most notably Richard Hooper, played in transforming ideas of the Copyright Hub into 
concrete developments. 
A. From the Bird’s Eye View of the Analyst 
At the sectoral and national level, the Copyright Hub initiative emerged at a time when the 
government’s intent to impose further changes to the UK’s IP framework presented an 
increasing threat to the creative industries. In April 2013, the UK Parliament passed the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (ERRA), whose Clause 59 was concerned with the 
licensing of copyright and performers’ rights (Parliament.uk 2013b, pp.48-51). This clause, in 
particular, granted the Secretary of State the powers to provide licenses for works that 
qualify as orphan works, whose copyright owners could not be identified after diligent 
searches were conducted. Those orphan works were gathered into an extended collective 
licensing scheme, which the Secretary of State would subsequently grant to any licensing 
bodies, such as publishers and internet companies, for commercial exploitation without the 
need for consent from their rightful owners. Commenting on the consequences of the 
passing of ERRA, Orlowski (2013) – a veteran copyright columnist noted: 
For the first time anywhere in the world, the Act will permit the widespread 
commercial exploitation of unidentified work - the user only needs to perform a 
"diligent search". But since this is likely to come up with a blank, they can proceed 
with impunity.  
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In the same vein of criticism of ERRA (which the creative industries later dubbed the 
“Instagram Act”), Dominic Young – who would then be appointed as CEO of the Copyright 
Hub in December 2013 – asserted the implications of the clause 59 for rightsholders: 
Maybe the new powers don’t technically remove copyright from the work, but 
they certainly remove it from the copyright owner.84 (Young, 2013)  
In the face of the UK government’s latest “copyright landgrab” (Orlowski, 2013a), the creative 
industries were evidently brought together under increasing pressure to find a solution, 
which was capable of warding off the government’s statutory interventions. Such “a glimmer 
of hope”85 was found in Hargreaves’ proposal of the Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE), and 
later became materialised in the Copyright Hub initiative. For example, the Copyright Hub 
was used explicitly by the image sector to protest the government’s passing of ERRA (i.e. the 
“Instagram Act”). Condemning this act as “put[ting] the cart before the horse”, David Baily – 
a veteran photographer – argued in a note published on the site of Stop43 – a campaign 
group representing a wide range of British photographers and agencies – as follows: 
                                                          
84 Elaborating upon this statement, Young explained that the new powers would remove the 
exclusive rights from the right owners to determine the terms, price, credit as well as moral 
rights of the works they wanted to license (or whether they wanted to license these works 
at all in the first place). Furthermore, Young argued that the new powers implicitly coerced 
right owners into exposing themselves and their works to the Internet or risked making these 
works orphan. In his own words: 
The fact that someone wants to use your work doesn’t mean you have to let them – and it used to 
be your exclusive right to decide. If you have a desire to keep work private and restricted, or only 
licenced on carefully controlled terms, you can and many do. Now if you try that you might just be 
decreasing the chances of a “diligent search” tracking you down and so decreasing your chances of 
escaping this odious scheme. If your work is hard to find it becomes subject to compulsory licensing 
with no appeal and no compensation beyond whatever price a stranger decides to put on your work. 
(Young, 2013) 
85 This reference was used by a senior executive working in the publishing industry when she 
referred to the way the DCE proposal (and later the Copyright Hub initiative) was perceived by 
herself and some other key stakeholders working in the creative industries (Transcript D3). 
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Why the rush? […] A scheme, the Copyright Hub – a scheme backed by the 
government is being developed to ensure that those who wish to find our pictures 
can not only do so quickly online, but also find the contact details of the pictures’ 
owners (Lee, 2013) 
Evidently, the Copyright Hub was used by the creative industries as a blockage to prevent 
statutory interventions being introduced by the UK government. The extent to which such a 
scheme became effective depended largely on the degree to which the Copyright Hub could 
project itself as a promising sociotechnical initiative to establish a new digital infrastructure 
for IP trading and management. Due to the lack of details to evaluate the feasibility of 
implementing the Copyright Hub in technical terms, the degree of the creative industries’ 
endorsement of, and participation in, the project were regarded as the benchmark for 
assessing the Copyright Hub’s future success, and hence, the peer-pressure for the creative 
industries to rally behind the project “even if nothing was gonna happen”. As recalled by 
Goldman (pseudonym) – an expert on data modelling, who had been involved with Hooper’s 
feasibility study from the outset: 
And he had a community, who is brought together largely by the pressure of the 
government, saying “if you don’t improve your performance then we will take 
away rights”. It’s always been the pressure cause behind it. So people came 
somewhat unwillingly to the table but recognising that they had to be there. And 
also they had to be seen to be there, you know. Even if nothing was gonna happen, 
they had to, at least, be seen to be there themselves. But what Richard did was he 
got some good people together and he was able to turn that slightly negative 
motivation into something positive. (Transcript B7) 
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Therefore, the Copyright Hub, first and foremost, emerged from the urgent political need of 
the UK’s creative industries to create a defensible position, from which they could fight off 
the invasion horde of copyright exceptions. Political motivation was thus the driving force; a 
master narrative promoting digital technology as new means for IP management was 
mobilised as ammunition; and the prospect of strengthening of copyright protection and 
potential economic gains were promised as ultimate rewards. As Macbeth (pseudonym) – a 
veteran publisher and an avid supporter of both the Copyright Hub and Linked Content 
Coalition (LCC) conceded: 
I think they understand that there’s a political need for the copyright industries to 
work together even if there isn’t a technical or a commercial need, the political 
need is just as critical and all of us got to be in the same place politically. (Transcript 
B3) 
Not only did the Copyright Hub bring benefits to the creative industries, it also provided 
rewards for the UK government in term of (a) stabilising the process of policy making and (b) 
delegating some of the government’s responsibility for stimulating the economy to the 
private sector. On the one hand, by committing to support the Copyright Hub initiative, the 
coalition government was able to maintain their control over the area of IP legislation by 
addressing fiercely contested policies introduced by the prior administration. IP legislation 
was chosen as a setting for competition because of its high profile and the implosion of 
controversy regarding the Digital Economy Act (DEA), which arose right before the general 
election in 2010. Due to the extended nature of the infrastructural development process, the 
Copyright Hub initiative provided the UK government with an effective mean to counteract 
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the rapid rate of policy rebundling86, which contributed to undermining the government’s 
control over the policy making process as occurred in the past87. On the other hand, the 
Copyright Hub initiative also allowed the coalition government to implement its “light-touch” 
approach to stimulate the economy by encouraging businesses to invest in developing a 
digital infrastructure for IP management and trading, which was expected to generate an 
additional £2.2 billion per annum to the UK’s economy by 202088. It was intriguing to note 
that the realisation of these projected benefits was expected to lie well beyond the end of 
the coalition government and there was no robust mechanism to assess the validity of such 
claims. Instead of being rigorously tested and robustly defended, these expectations were 
indeed provocations that aimed at capturing attention and providing (albeit groundless and 
short-lived) credibility for the government’s programme of actions. These dual rewards 
provided by the Copyright Hub were thus crucial for warding off criticisms of the 
government’s dearth of a long-term vision for economic growth and its programme of actions 
to stimulate the economy, which was seemingly the single most important issue in the 
political agenda between 2010 and 201589. Hence, the Copyright Hub was able to receive the 
necessary endorsement and support from the coalition government. 
Apart from appeasing the creative industries and the UK government, the Copyright Hub also 
maintained expectations of an innocuous initiative, which aimed at developing a harmless 
                                                          
86 A series of rapid political rebundling of IP policies includes the Gowers Review in 2006, Creative 
Britain report in 2008, the Digital Britain report in 2009, and the Digital Economy Act (DEA) in 2010, 
and the Hargreaves Review in 2011.  
87 As evident in the Foreword of the Hargreaves Review, Hargreaves (2011, p.1) urged the UK 
government to adopt a different approach to IP policies in order to avert the prospect that “the pile 
of IP reviews on the Government’s doorstep – four in the last six years – will continue to 
accumulate”.  
88 Cross-referencing the government’s response on page 140. 
89 Evidence for this argument could be found in the white paper addressing the UK government 
policy between 2010 and 2015. In this paper, “UK economic growth” was identified as the most 
critical issue on the agenda and the government’s programme was described as focusing solely on 
actions to “stimulate strong and sustainable economic growth” (GOV.UK, 2015) 
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infrastructure toward the technology sector. Recalling her encounter with the technology 
sector during the process of conducting the DCE feasibility study, Lynch commented on how 
the initiative was expected to help alleviate the pressure on the technology sector, especially 
Google, in term of their obligation to “police” the Internet: 
We saw the tech companies when we were trying to identify the problems, [e.g.] 
what sort of issues they face in getting access to license. […] Google and Microsoft 
and others were […] more questioning at first but my understanding is that they 
eventually were able to see that […] there were benefits in having something like 
a Copyright Hub to make it easier. Because I remember Google saying that they 
don’t want to become the policeman of the web and therefore, if people are able 
to get licenses easy and are able to do the right things themselves, it means that 
[…] they will have less pressure on them to try to police what people are doing on 
the web because that’s not the function they want to take on. (Transcript C5). 
Such an expectation work was vigorously maintained throughout the early stages of the 
project90, when ideas of the Copyright Hub were germinated and developed, to ensure that 
the initiative did not provoke hostility from the technology sector, as occurred in the previous 
statutory intervention, namely the Digital Economy Act (DEA) 2010. This critical task fell 
primarily on Hooper – chairman of the Copyright Hub – who successfully mediated the 
convoluted relationships between the UK government, the creative industries and the 
technology sector. A typical example of Hooper’s skilful mediation work was his Charles Clark 
Memorial Lecture at the London Book Fair in April 2013. In this presentation, Hooper (2013, 
p.10) depicted the Copyright Hub initiative as the creative industries’ commitment to 
                                                          
90 For a more detailed discussion, see this chapter, section II. B. on Cementing Alliances: The Usual 
Suspects and Strange Bedfellows. 
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“making copyright licensing processes and organisations more and more fit for purpose for 
the digital age”. As a result, Hooper argued that the Copyright Hub would benefit the 
government by helping them evade “legislative indecision [which] only prolongs the wars of 
attrition” (ibid.) With regard to the creative industries, Hooper emphasised that the 
Copyright Hub would give them legitimate reasons to ask the politicians “to deliver more 
rigorous and equitable enforcement of copyright” (ibid. p.11). To the technology sector, 
Hooper exhorted technology companies to treat copyright as seriously as patent rights and 
to “work with the grain of the copyright industries and not against the grain – to the benefit 
of consumers and economic growth” (ibid.). It was apparent that, while the rewards which 
the Copyright Hub provided for the UK government and the creative industries were 
meaningful and pragmatic, the rewards which the initiative could bring to the technology 
sector were much less consequential. To the technology sector, expectations of the Copyright 
Hub and the benefits it could bring were no more than provocations constructed to attract 
their attention. Nevertheless, such provocations were indispensable for allaying concern 
from technology companies and for ensuring that the momentum of the Copyright Hub 
initiative would not be impeded in the early stages by challenges from the technology sector. 
In short, at the sectoral and national level, the successful establishment of the Copyright Hub 
can be explained by the ability of the initiative to convince the UK government, the creative 
industries, and the technology sector of its (potentially) meaningful and pragmatic rewards 
and, at the very least, its innocuousness towards them.  
B. From the Giraffe’s View of the Project Management 
At the institutional and project level, the Copyright Hub succeeded in establishing alliances 
with the Digital Catapult and the Linked Content Coalition (LCC) due to its ability to identify 
and fulfil the strategic requirements of these organisations and vice versa. To put it 
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differently, each organisation engaged in the relationship with the deliberate intention to 
gain something out of the interactions. The following section is thus dedicated to delineating 
the reciprocal relationships between the three organisations. 
With regard to the Copyright Hub – Digital Catapult partnership, the Digital Catapult provided 
the Copyright Hub with the necessary resources91 and technical expertise to develop and 
implement its digital infrastructure92. In addition, being in partnership with the Digital 
Catapult also served as a token of the government’s commitment to support the Copyright 
Hub which would, in turn, be employed to further attract and secure the creative industries’ 
endorsement of the project. As a result, making alliance with the Digital Catapult was crucial 
for the Copyright Hub to keeping up the project’s momentum. The Digital Catapult, on the 
other hand, was in need of projects to showcase the kind of impacts they could make to the 
digital economy. Since the Digital Catapult had been designed to engage with the creative 
sector and technology sector horizontally, and to become “a layer in all sectors”93, they were 
seeking for projects which aimed at facilitating the existing market through infrastructural 
development, instead of developing new services and products to compete in the market 
themselves. Furthermore, because of the one-third funding model94, the Digital Catapult was 
required to find partners, who had already secured funding from the industries, to conduct 
joint research projects. All of these elements, coupling with the fact that the emergence of 
the Copyright Hub was coincident with the inception of the Digital Catapult when the centre 
                                                          
91 Apart from resources in term of funding, the Digital Catapult also accommodated the management 
team of the Copyright Hub Ltd throughout the project, as well as providing the Hub with venues for 
interacting with its stakeholders and organising important events.  
92 Cross-referencing this chapter, section II. C., on Partnership with the Digital Catapult. 
93 Cross-referencing Chapter 4, section III. A., p.135. 
94 The one-third funding model was applied to all Catapult centres, including the Digital Catapult. 
Hauser (2010)  recommended that one third of the centre’s budget was predictable core funding from 
public money; a further third from business-funded research contracts won competitively; and the 
final third from collaborative applied research projects funded jointly by public and private sectors, 
also competitively bid for.  
For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 4, section III. A. 
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was eagerly seeking for ideas and projects, made the relationship reciprocal and resulted in 
the Copyright Hub – Digital Catapult partnership. 
With regard to the Copyright Hub – LCC relationship, the Copyright Hub was in need of both 
the political support and resources from the creative industries, as well as a data model that 
was robust enough to be used in the distributed environment of the Internet, but also flexible 
enough to cater for the (often unpredicted) future users and uses of copyright content. This 
was the gap in which the LCC appeared to be capable of filling95. Commenting on this issue, 
Goldman (pseudonym) - the data architect of the LCC’s data model – disclosed: 
LCC has probably provided [the Copyright Hub with] two things [...] LCC provided 
some political support […] [since] the LCC project getting together some consensus 
of view [from the creative industries] towards creating a better framework for 
trading. And then the actual technical work, which I led in LCC, which was the 
modelling. (Transcript B7) 
On the other hand, the LCC was also attracted to the Copyright Hub owing to the expectations 
that the resources made available by the partnership between the Digital Catapult and the 
Copyright Hub could help transform “linked data” – the foundational technology on which 
the LCC’s data framework was built – from a largely academic endeavour into commercial 
services and business-ready applications in the real world. Clarifying this point of argument, 
Macbeth – a veteran publisher who had significant contribution to the establishment of both 
the Copyright Hub and the LCC – remarked: 
The challenge with linked data up until recently has been that it’s been a largely 
academic interest and really rather obscure in terms of the technology, and the 
                                                          
95 Cross-referencing Chapter 6, section I. A. 
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technology itself as a result has not been terribly well developed. If the Catapult 
do a really good job on developing the repository technology […] that could take 
linked data on a very big step forward. […] Up until now the people you’ve talked 
to have all been terribly academic. And when you’ve tried to get them to do things 
that were really commercial, they’ve just fallen over because there’s a very big gap 
between those two worlds. When the first-rate technical people working in the 
Catapult really get and understand what linked data is about and get excited about 
it, that’s the time at which linked data has some chance of getting some real 
traction in the rest of the world. (Transcription B3). 
Apart from these official partnerships, there also existed a subtle relation between the Digital 
Catapult and the LCC. Despite the Digital Catapult’s resources and technical capability, they 
still did not have enough knowledge of the creative industries to develop a data model for 
this domain from scratch. Therefore, the Digital Catapult was seeking for a third-party that 
could provide them with a solution. As explained by the team leader of the Digital Catapult’s 
development team: 
As a development team, we don’t particularly want to take on this [task of 
modelling] because we don’t know the domain well enough that [we] would get it 
right. […]. There are people out there, who are experts in it and living doing this. 
We should try to adopt theirs. And we don’t necessarily want to own it. We don’t 
want to turn evil. So it’s good to have someone else out there who’s come 
collaboration to build the data model that’s accepted by the industries and we’ll 
bring it forward. So we don’t really want to reinvent that wheel. We want 
someone else to do it (Transcript C6). 
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Being a data model that had been developed and accepted by the creative industries since 
mid-1990s96, the LCC’s data model was thus an ideal option to help address the Digital 
Catapult’s domain knowledge gap. In turn, the Digital Catapult offered the LCC, through the 
Copyright Hub project, resources and technical capability to advance their data model and 
implement some real-world applications using this abstract data model. The relationship 
between LCC and Digital Catapult was thus reciprocal and was sustained through the 
Copyright Hub project. 
In short, from an institutional and project-level perspective, the Copyright Hub was successful 
in turning the original initiative into an infrastructural development project owing to a wide 
range of expectation work that addressed its allies’ strategic requirements. Interestingly, the 
alliance with the LCC became feasible because of the Copyright Hub’s promise to bring the 
Digital Catapult on board, and vice versa. Although each partner of the Copyright Hub was 
seeking something out of the relationship, that “something” was not necessarily what the 
Copyright Hub could provide itself. Rather, it was the expectation that the strategic 
requirements of one partner could be fulfilled by the resource and support, which another 
partner brought with them to the joint research project. This was the subtle force that was 
holding the triangular partnership between the Copyright Hub, the Digital Catapult, and the 
LCC together. 
C. From the Frog’s Eye View of the Actors’ Real-time Perceptions 
At the individual level, it was undeniable that the successful establishment of the Copyright 
Hub project was due significantly to the active participation and interactions made by a 
number of key actors. Amongst them, there was Sophie (pseudonym), who had rallied 
                                                          




multiple sectors of the creative industries behind the Copyright Hub and secured the 
industries’ funding for the first two years of the project97. There were also Macbeth, 
Goldman, and Amelia98 (pseudonyms), who acted as active bridging agents between the LCC 
and the Copyright Hub, as well as Selena99 (pseudonym), who acted as the matchmaker of 
the Copyright Hub – Digital Catapult partnership. Yet, there was a clear consensus among 
stakeholders on the decisive role of Richard Hooper in the emergence of the Copyright Hub 
project and the shift of the IP narrative in the UK. For instance, Macbeth (pseudonym) praised 
Hooper as “the man who singlehandedly has changed the narrative in the UK”. To clarify this 
assertion, Macbeth remarked on how the messages of the Copyright Hub initiative were 
“powerfully carried back” to the government circles owing to his political network and 
influence: 
He [Hooper] carried this back again and again into government over the time that 
he’s been working on this [Copyright Hub project], which is saying “Your solution 
to problems with copyright on the network is new legislation new exceptions. Our 
solution is better licensing. Why don’t you give us a chance to do better licensing?” 
I think Richard himself [had done it] in terms of the UK and getting that message 
through to government, because he’s very well connected in government circles. 
I think that message has been really powerfully carried back in by Richard himself” 
(Transcript B3).  
On the other hand, with regard to the private sector, Sophie (pseudonym) argued that 
Hooper was the only one, who was capable of using his leadership and charisma to cement 
the fragile, and often fragmented, alliances between different sectors of the creative 
                                                          
97 Cross-referencing page 187. 
98 Cross-referencing page 156. 
99 Cross-referencing page 201. 
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industries and channelled this united force through the Copyright Hub project. Extolling 
Hooper as ‘the Piper of Hamelin’ of the Copyright Hub project, Sophie commented: 
He’s a bit like the Piper of Hamelin - he brought everyone with him, behind him, 
through his charisma, his personal contact, his deep interest, his passion. And you 
know, he wasn’t threatening, he wasn’t sort of trying to be a regulator or anything. 
But he built this, you know, with a genuine belief that this was the right thing to 
do and he brought everyone with him as I said, and support. (Transcript D3) 
To give an example of how Hooper’s charisma and affection for pursuing the ideas of the 
Copyright Hub had contributed significantly to the successful establishment of the initiative, 
Sophie (pseudonym) juxtaposed Hooper and his approach with Hargreaves to explain the 
contrast in the creative industries’ attitudes towards the two proposals: 
Professor Hargreaves was very reluctant to talk to the industry. We didn’t manage 
to have one meeting with him […] So then the government appointed Hooper, as 
you know, to look at that concept [of the Digital Copyright Exchange]. And the next 
thing I knew was Hooper rang, making appointments to come and see me in my 
office. I wasn’t to go and see him. He wanted to come to my office. And I later 
learnt he did that with everyone […] He really made a huge effort to talk to 
everyone and embrace everyone in the process, which is critical, I think, to its 
success. (Transcript D3) 
Apart from his proactive approach to bringing the creative industries onboard, the success of 
the Copyright Hub initiative was also dependent on Hooper’s capability to mediate the 
(sometimes conflicting) interests of different actors involved in the project. To tackle this 
challenge, Hooper employed a wide range of expectation works that were capable of fulfilling 
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the subtle nuances of stakeholders’ requirements. For instance, despite the perceptible 
benefits which the Copyright Hub could bring to the creative sector, a portion of the creative 
industries still held concern over what they regarded as an attempt to build a centrally-
controlled licensing infrastructure that “will take all the business away”. As illustrated in the 
following quote from an executive manager of a British picture library: 
There’s always a concern there. Anything that’s trying to bring everything under 
one umbrella, under one roof, everything into one place. There is a concern from 
our industry that someone is trying to create the biggest picture library in the 
world [that] will take all the business away. (Transcript C8) 
Therefore, not only did Hooper need to maintain high expectations of the Copyright Hub as 
an initiative which would bring meaningful and pragmatic rewards to the creative industries, 
but he also had to employ a certain type of low expectations, which ensured existing 
businesses that the changes, which the Copyright Hub brought to the market, would not 
disrupt their existing business models. Hooper accomplished this by placing emphasis upon 
portraying the Copyright Hub as a maker of a new market, which focuses on the high volume 
of low monetary value transactions coming mostly from the long tail of the existing market. 
They reasoned that this is a new market, which has not been exploited by the creative 
industries due to the lack of an appropriate and cost-effective mechanism. Therefore, the 
implementation of the Copyright Hub will help in “increasing the size of the overall pie [of 
licensing]” (Hooper and Lynch, 2012, p.21). This portrayal was of utmost importance to the 
Hub’s emergence, especially in the early days, as it generated significant incentives for the 
creative industries to support the proposal to establish the Copyright Hub. As conceded by 
the aforementioned executive manager of the British picture library: 
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One thing Richard Hooper said right from the start was that if the Hub develops 
new products or new licence schemes they will not cut across existing business. 
The idea is to create new opportunities, new rights models, new licensing 
opportunities that are different to what is already being done. If the Hub simply 
was to replicate things that were already out there it would not be doing its job 
and it would simply be cannibalising existing business from existing industry, and 
that’s not its intention. That’s why I’ve been supporting it because I think that is 
the right attitude. (Transcript C8) 
In short, from the perspective of individual actors in real-time interactions, the successful 
establishment of the Copyright Hub depended significantly on the contribution of a number 
of key actors. Amongst them, Hooper played the most crucial role in influencing this process 
through his political connections, creative industries’ support, and the skilful manoeuvre of 
expectation work that fulfilled the nuances of stakeholders’ requirement. In conjunction with 
the analyses at the sectoral and institutional levels, this section thus provides a 
comprehensive account of the establishment of the Copyright Hub, which does not privilege 
any particular perspectives nor specific levels of data granularity. This account not only 
highlights the impact of ecological forces upon the formation of the Copyright Hub project, 
but also gives due credits to the active roles which individual actors play in stimulating the 







Chapter 6 - Data Modelling and the 
Copyright Hub 
I. A short Biography of the LCC’s lineage  
The complex world of copyright licensing, with which the Copyright Hub has to deal, posed a 
critical challenge with regard to data modelling. What the project needed was a data model 
which is not only robust enough to be used in the distributed environment of the Internet, 
but also adaptive and flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of (often unanticipated) 
future users and uses. Therein lay the gap in technical development which the Linked Content 
Coalition (LCC) was capable of filling.   
Prior to the LCC, there existed a number of socio-technical projects, whose main objectives 
were to devise new protocols and standards for automating the communication and rights 
management processes within the networked environment. The earliest project of this kind, 
<indecs>, was founded in 1998 to provide an analysis of requirements for metadata, which 
would enable e-commerce of IP in the networked environment (Cordis, 2001). The <indecs> 
framework, which provides details on a number of principles necessary to achieve such 
interoperability, was then implemented in various sectors and industry standards, such as 
Digital Data Exchange (DDEX) for messaging and data dictionary applications in music and 
Online Information Exchange (ONIX) for distributing digital metadata of products in 
publishing (DOI, 2013). The next important project of this kind was Automated Content 
Access Protocol (ACAP). Emerging from the feud between European publishers and Google 
over copyright infringement in 2006, ACAP was intended to provide a simple mechanism for 
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machines to read and to unambiguously interpret copyright terms and permissions of right 
holders in the digital environment (ACAP, 2006). Despite being wholeheartedly endorsed by 
European publishers and publishing societies, ACAP as a project was effectively cancelled 
when Google refused to adopt the proposed technology, resulting in other major technology 
companies withdrawing their support for the project. As the technical work of ACAP faded 
away, the political force behind ACAP moved on to the next project, known as Linked Content 
Coalition (LCC). 
Beginning in 2012, LCC was funded partly by the European Commission and partly by the 
industries to help promote legitimate use of content on the Internet through the effective 
use of interoperable identifiers and metadata (LCC, 2015b). By the time of its conclusion in 
April 2013, the project has accumulated enormous political support from the creative 
industries and managed to turn itself into a permanent global consortium of standards bodies 
and registries (LCC, 2015a). In October 2013, funding from European Commission and 
industries was secured to help demonstrate the efficiency of the LCC framework through the 
Rights Data Integration (RDI) project. As Goldman (pseudonym), chief data architect of the 
LCC and RDI project, commented on how the Copyright Hub could benefit from the LCC and 
RDI project by not having to develop the data model from scratch, but instead using 
“precisely the same data structure” for its technical implementation: 
And RDI’s been very helpful because before the Hub’s got going, we had already 
started developing the mapping and transformation, and repository work… It was 
simply because the Hub is taking a view that it will reuse everything it can. And the 
RDI stuff is built for this purpose. So, there’s a great deal of synergy at a deep level, 
as it’s using precisely the same model, not even a similar model, but precisely the 
same data structure. (Transcript B7) 
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Consequently, from the perspective of the Copyright Hub, decisions to adopt the LCC’s data 
model were based on both political and practical grounds. By doing so, the Hub was able to 
tap into not only the political support and resources of the creative industries at the 
European level, but also the technical expertise in data modelling, which has been 
accumulated for approximately fifteen years since the begin of the <indecs> project. This 
data model was proved to be one (if not the most) important component of the Hub’s 
foundation technology and hence a single point of success (or failure) of this phase of 
technical development. 
II. Blueprint for development – A technical discourse 
In July 2014, a document entitled ‘Blueprint for development’ was published in order to 
specify high-level business requirements and a general plan for technical implementation, 
with which the Copyright Hub needed to comply (Copyright Hub, 2014). Amongst a number 
of core principles which had been outlined in this blueprint, two stood out as determining 
factors for the Copyright Hub’s future success. First, it was emphasised that the Hub’s 
technical infrastructure must be developed in anticipation of the future. Or in Ribes and 
Finholt’s (2009) terminology, this principle represents ‘the long now of technology 
infrastructure… [which is] conducted today with an eye toward long-term sustainability’. As 
specified in the Copyright Hub’s blueprint: 
In implementing this data architecture, a set of development principles espoused 
by Digital Catapult will be applied to all aspects of the Copyright Hub technology to 
ensure that its technology is not only future-proof (in terms of its scalability and 
flexibility to deal with new challenges and requirements) but is also transferable to 
implementations in other fields of endeavour beyond the management of 
copyright. (Copyright Hub 2014, p.11) 
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Consequently, flexibility and extensibility were prioritised at the expense of functionalities 
and performance, which poses a great number of consequences for the development of the 
Copyright Hub in later stages. 
Second, the blueprint also insisted on ‘the primacy of data’ in the Copyright Hub ecosystem:   
The Copyright Hub Ecosystem is essentially a data communication network… 
Essentially, this is all about flows of data, connecting through identifiers. In the 
Copyright Hub Ecosystem, “data is king” – indeed data is “for ever”, while the 
application and services which depend on that data are likely to be transient (ibid. 
19).  
As a result, a great deal of effort was subsequently put into specifying and detailing the Hub 
Data Model in the blueprint. In justification of the utmost importance, which was placed 
upon the data model, Goldman – the co-author of the blueprint and the principal architect 
behind this model – explained: 
So, the Hub has to have a model, which it can become confident that the 
technologies may change but the data structure can’t. I view data structure like DNA 
passes from one generation to another... And data is like that. If you’ve got good 
data, you can much more easily transform it into new systems. If you’ve got bad 
data structure, then you’re constantly struggling as you transform from systems to 
systems. (Transcript B7) 
Therefore, within the discourse on technical development, the Hub Data Model has become 
an embodiment of both ‘the long now’ and ‘the primacy of data’ principles, and hence a 




III. Understanding the LCC’s data model 
In essence, this data model was based on the LCC’s Rights Reference Model, which in turn 
had been developed from the principles of linked data100. The Hub Data Model consists of 
four Core Data Entities: (1) Parties referring to people and organisations; (2) Creations 
representing any types of content; (3) Right Assignments including licenses, right policies and 
right delegation agreements; and (4) Rights as entities themselves. Metadata and the 
relationships between these four entities are illustrated in the figure below, which was 
reproduced from the Hub’s blueprint. 
 
Figure 13 Core Data Entities of the Rights Reference Model 
As mentioned above, the adoption of the LCC’s data model for the development of the 
Copyright Hub also came with a number of consequences. First, it was relatively well-known 
amongst those experts, who helped consult the Hub in this period, that linked data had not 
                                                          
100 Linked data is a term coined by Tim Berners-Lee to refer to a method of data representation, in 
which IDs are assigned to entities, then explicit statements are made about them, as well as their 
relationships to other entities. This type of representation is typically known as ‘triples’.    
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been widely adopted and trialled in the market-based environment. As a member of the 
Industry Consultant group commented: 
[T]he challenges with linked data up until recently has been that it’s been a largely 
academic interest and really rather obscure in terms of the technology. And the 
technology itself, as a result, has not been terribly well developed. (Transcript B3) 
Second, in acknowledging this shortcoming, the principal data architect of this model further 
admitted two of its primary drawbacks: (1) verbosity refers to the unnecessarily large amount 
of data which are disclosed when using this data model, and (2) granularity refers to the low-
level data, which are redefined and employed in this model. In his own words: 
[T]he model by definition, in computing terms, is a verbose. It’s very detailed so 
where in a simpler model, you might only have two or three roles. In this model, 
you might have fifteen or twenty, you know, to describe the data… [A]part from its 
verbosity, it’s a rather strange model… At the moment, there’s not a wide spread 
acceptance of linked data or use of linked data... And the modelling approach we 
take makes that even worst, if you like, because the modelling approach, which is a 
very granular modular approach, is not something that most developers are familiar 
with at all, or comfortable with at all. (Transcript B7) 
Unsurprisingly, these traits of the data model consequently brought great difficulties to the 
Digital Catapult’s development  team in the implementation process. Voicing his frustration 
over the ‘exceeding complex’ nature of the data model, a former business analyst of the 
Digital Catapult recalled: 
[The development team] have found inconsistency in the LCC’s model, a 
redundancy in it, and they’re proposing a much lighter-weight one because the 
LCC’s model was built for the utmost sophistication, which won’t be required for 
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the early stage of the project… [We] developed some visualisation tools there, it 
looks exceedingly complex with even just a few parameters in there. So, the 
practicality of working with it as a viable long-term model situations unknown to me 
presently. (Transcript C3) 
Confirming this assessment, a developer, who was responsible for implementing the model 
since the early days, also criticised it for the lack of performance. He commented: “If you do 
engineering based on this data model, you can tell it’s not designed for performance or -- 
yeah, performance is a big problem.” (Transcript C4). Therefore, from the perspectives of 
those who had to implement this model, there was a general consensus, which was 
summarised by the tech lead of the development team as: 
[T]he data model is a little bit… [long pause] conceptual and abstract since it’s not 
necessarily that nice of a model to implement… It’s a little idealistic. It’s a bit lofty. 
It’s trying to do too much and so we can simplify by making it not do as much. It 
tries to do everything… And so we may have to remove some of the purity in there 
-- the theoretical side of it out and say let’s get down to practical. (Transcript C6) 
Deeming this a reverse engineering process, the former business analyst and product owner 
of the Copyright Hub project argued that these problems could have been avoided if the 
project had followed a normal procedure. 
[A]s all projects should proceed, it should go to idea, to features to requirements to 
blueprint. That project didn’t go that way. When I arrived, the Blueprint was already 
done and so we had to reverse engineer requirements and features from there. And, 
you know, a lot of early decisions were made in that Blueprint, which perhaps would 
have been taken differently if requirements had been done first. (Transcript C3) 
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Nonetheless, as we have examined at length in previous sections, decisions to adopt the 
LCC’s data model were not based purely on the technical need of the Copyright Hub. In fact, 
this data model had been chosen, at least partly, due to the enormous political support which 
LCC could bring to the project at the time. By turning the Copyright Hub’s narrative into a 
discourse on technological infrastructure development, the creative industries had 
effectively made the Copyright Hub a safe harbour, from which they could shelter until the 







Chapter 7 – Discussion & Conclusion 
 
The primary goals of this chapter are to discuss the ways in which this study contributes to 
furthering our understanding of the dynamics of expectations within the context of an 
infrastructural development initiative for IP trading and management, i.e. the Copyright Hub. 
The contributions are aimed at filling three gaps in the existing literature on sociology of 
expectations, as briefly recapitulated below. 
First, high expectations have been used extensively in the literature as “an index”101 of 
technologies’ early stages of development. As a result, this assertion disregards a full 
spectrum of expectations, or a “typology of promissory behaviour”, which are usually 
employed by innovation actors to advance their choices of technological variations and 
trajectories (Pollock and Williams, 2010b). This problem became even more apparent in the 
case of the Copyright Hub due to its nature of being a social, political and technological 
project of divergent pressures. Lying at the bottom of the disregard for different types of 
expectations in the existing literature is the limitations of conventional choices of research 
designs and analytical approaches, which are usually framed retrospectively around 
particular innovation projects. This gap thus calls for a more subtle and reflexive 
methodological approach to studying innovation-in-the-making.  
Second, there is a gap in the literature concerning our understanding of expectations’ 
credibility. Although several attempts had been taken to explain why and how certain 
expectations seem to be more resonant at a given moment than others through various 
                                                          
101 Cross-referencing page 57. 
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notions, such as “engineer-sociologists” and “heterogeneous associations” (Callon, 1987), 
“social dynamics of expectations” (Konrad, 2006), and “arenas of expectations” (Bakker, van 
Lente and Meeus, 2011, 2012), these studies cannot provide a comprehensible account of 
the ways in which the assessment of various expectations’ credibility occurred in multiple, 
co-existing arenas, interact and influence each other. In other words, the existing literature 
cannot explain how a wide variety of expectations are strategically linked together by an 
alliance of actors to help bolster the credibility of the newly-formed constellation of 
expectations, both individually and as a whole. This gap thus presents the need for a new 
approach, which is capable of examining the interlinkages between multiple, interrelated 
arenas of expectations – an area of knowledge which is still overlooked by scholars of 
expectation studies.  
Third, there is a dearth of scholarship concerning the critical, yet neglected, notion of 
“protected space” within the context of technological changes. This notion is presented in 
contemporary sociological studies of expectations as a black-box, or in Parandian, Rip and Te 
Kulve’s (2012, p.567) words, “an environment which is relatively shielded from outside 
scrutiny”. Such conceptualisation overlooks the complexity and contingencies through which 
a protected space is formed, evolved and dissolved throughout the innovation process. This 
gap therefore requires re-conceptualising the notion of “protected spaces” and the 
processes through which these spaces are formed and dissolved. 
To address these aforementioned gaps, I draw my inspiration from three theoretical lenses: 
(1) the Biography of Artifacts and Practices (BOAP) approach; (2) Linked Ecologies 
perspective; and (3) Things of Boundaries approach to understanding social entities. While a 
detailed discussion of how and why these lenses are useful for tackling the gaps in our 
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knowledge can be found in chapter 3102, it is imperative to reiterate a few key theoretical 
frameworks and analytical concepts that are critical to the discussion in this chapter.  
From the BOAP approach (Hyysalo, Pollock and Williams, 2018), I adopted the view that the 
shaping of innovation and practices takes place within ecologies of interconnected actors and 
therefore, it is crucial to study not only those actors who directly engage in the technology 
development, but also those who are indirectly involved in the innovation process. The BOAP 
approach also advises us to pay close attention to interstices, or moments and sites in which 
various focal actors interact and affect each other, as well as the evolving technology. 
Considering them all together, those interrelated interstices constitute what BOAP scholars 
call a series of configurational movements, in which technology is shaped gradually and 
continuously across the spatially and temporally wide-reaching innovation process (ibid. 
p.12). The notion of “series of configurational movements” highlights the generative nature 
of partial closures and stabilisations in technology development, as well as the fact that 
actors, due to their limited capacity, have recourse to series of partial interventions within 
the reach of their control and relevance in the course of the distributed innovation process. 
This is thus in sharp contradiction to the immutability implied by ANT’s notion of “obligatory 
passage points”. 
From the Linked Ecologies perspective, I concur with the view that the social world should be 
regarded as linked ecologies, each of which acts as a flexible surround for others. Lying at the 
core of this world view is the assertion that the simultaneous existence of numerous adjacent 
ecologies requires actors to seek alliances, resources and support across ecological 
boundaries. Therefore, not only do actors compete individually in their own ecologies, but 
they also vie in the form of alliances across multiple ecologies. Outcomes of individual 
                                                          
102 Cross-referencing Chapter 3, section I. A., pages 77-97. 
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contests thus contribute to the overall result of the alliance’s struggle for power. According 
to Abbott (2005), the concept of ecology is composed of three analytical components: (1) 
actors, (2) locations, and (3) the relationships between these two. Abbott emphasises that 
ligation - the process of constructing the relationship between actors and locations - 
constitutes and delimits both actors and locations at the same time. Furthermore, Abbott 
also insists that the asymmetries in the internal structure (i.e. the stability and degree of 
separation of actors and locations of an ecology) and temporal structure (i.e. rhythms and 
cycles of actors, locations and ligation) of different types of ecologies play a critical role in 
affecting how alliances are formed between the linked ecologies. Regarding the linkage 
between ecologies, Abbott proposes using the notion of “hinges” to depict strategies that 
can provide rewards for members of an alliance in multiple ecologies at once. Not only do 
hinges provide different kinds of rewards to allies in multiple ecologies, they can also be of a 
fundamentally different type (i.e. a hinge can be a ligation in one ecology and be a location 
in another ecology). 
From the Things of Boundaries approach, Abbott (1995) asserts that social boundaries come 
first, and social entities only come into existence when social boundaries are tied together 
by social actors in certain ways. Abbott calls these boundary points “sites of difference” and 
theorise that such differences are things that stem from local cultural negotiations. It is 
argued that local interactions tossed up stable properties, which gradually define two sides 
of the boundary point in question. Based on these assertions, Abbott presents a conception 
of the origin of social entities, which revolves around the process of “yoking” various proto-
boundaries together. Abbott defines yoking as the “connection of two or more proto-
boundaries such that one side of each becomes defined as ‘inside’ the same entity” (Abbott, 
1995, p.871). The concept of “yoking” is thus particularly helpful in reconceptualising the 
processes through which protected spaces are formed and dissolved. 
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Having reiterated these concepts, it is now critical to proclaim my chosen approach to carry 
out the analysis of the case study of the Copyright Hub. Concurring with Mead’s (1932, p.1) 
assertion that “the world is a world of events”, I postulated the existence of a number of 
external events, which exerted significant impacts on the linked ecologies under 
examination. For instance, in the case study of the Copyright Hub, the financial crisis in 2008 
represented such an event, which I initially treated as part of the taken-for-granted socio-
political landscape, and therefore, it did not require any further examination. Although one 
could avoid making this kind of framing by extending the linked ecologies perspective 
indefinitely to accommodate these events into his analysis, this approach would undoubtedly 
produce an exceedingly complex account of the case study and hence, sacrificing the 
comprehensibility for superfluous details. This argument finds parallels in the BOAP’s 
criticism of “the simplistic methodological nostrums” of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Pollock 
and Williams, 2010a, p.548). As exemplified by Latour’s (1987) well-known exhortation to 
“follow the actor”, this approach begs the obvious question as to which actors the researcher 
should follow (see Sorensen and Levold, 1992). The boundless number of actors and paths of 
research that could have been taken demand researchers to make conscious decisions on 
not only their research designs, but also the ways they approach the analysis process. 
Therefore, accepting this kind of framing requires the researcher to make certain 
assumptions, so that his analysis can be limited to a finite number of linked ecologies. Those 
linked ecologies, which are deemed crucial to the research, should emerge from the process 
of data analysis, rather than being pre-determined by the researcher. In the case of the 
Copyright Hub, for instance, three linked ecologies were identified through the process of 
data analysis: (1) policy-making; (2) business (whose actors include the creative industries 
and the technology sector); and (3) IP standard development (with Linked Content Coalition 
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as the prime actor). The dynamics and interactions between the three linked ecologies are 
discussed in more detail below. 
I. The Curious Cases of “Low” & “Slow” Expectations 
The sociology of expectations conventionally asserts that high expectations are “necessary 
to raising the profile [of technology] and attract allies” (Borup et al., 2006, p.290). 
Nevertheless, a careful examination of the case study of the Copyright Hub revealed that, 
apart from high expectations, a number of different “kinds” of expectations were crucial to 
mobilise resources, as well as forging alliances with actors across the linked ecologies of 
policy making, business and IP standard development. I identify these different kinds of 
expectations as the “low” and “slow” expectations, and the curious cases of how these 
expectations help propel the Copyright Hub, as a socio-technical innovation project, are 
discussed at length below. 
First, it has been shown that technological expectations of the Copyright Hub were set low 
for the specific purpose of attracting allies and securing support from actors within the 
business ecology. To make alliances with the creative industries, for example, technological 
expectations were maintained low throughout the early stages of the project in term of the 
Copyright Hub’s prospective functions103. In particular, the potential benefits, which the 
Copyright Hub would bring to the creative industries, were portrayed as contributing 
                                                          
103 Intriguingly, it was documented in the meeting minute of the Copyright Hub Launch Group (CHLG) 
in January 2013 that members of the CHLG were concerned about the low expectations of the 
initiative. It was suggested that the technological expectations might have been set too low to attract 
the attention of relevant stakeholders. As recorded in the report: “A question was raised about why 
anyone would want to go to the [Copyright] Hub if they will be sent elsewhere. It was felt by some 
that the Hub has to do more than merely redirect.” (CHLG, Meeting Minute, Jan 2013). This piece of 
evidence illustrated not only the existence of low expectations in the early stages of the Copyright Hub 
project, but also the nuances of expectation work performed by innovation actors throughout the 




primarily to the public goods (e.g. improving the flow of good quality metadata, encouraging 
a culture of copyright compliance, copyright education and signposting, a forum for 
collaboration across sectors of the creative industries, and so on) without attempting to 
disrupt the structure of existent marketplaces or developing novel services to compete with 
existing service providers104. In other words, the creative industries generally had low 
expectations with regard to the Copyright Hub’s technological functionalities. Yet, such low 
expectations were affirmed as one of the main reasons behind the creative industries’ 
support for the Copyright Hub, since they were precluded from perceiving the initiative as an 
imminent threat to their business models by attempting to “bring everything under one 
umbrella, under one roof, everything into one place [… that] will take all the business 
away”105.  
In conjunction with low expectations, innovation actors also employed another type of 
expectations that was similar to what Pollock and Williams (2010b) identified as “visions let 
loose”. Pollock and Williams defined these expectation as “provocative signposts drawn up 
about the state and future development of the industry” and characterised them as 
“speculative and low in accountability”, which typically resulted in “relatively short-lived 
levels of influence” (ibid. pp.543-544). In the case of the Copyright Hub, visions let loose were 
exemplified by the attempt of the innovation actors to portray the Copyright Hub as a maker 
of a new market. It was speculated that the new digital infrastructure empowered by the 
Copyright Hub’s technology would help open up a new market of high-volume, low-value 
transactions typically occurred at the long tail of the copyright licensing value chain. As the 
argument went, since the new market had not yet been exploited by the creative industries 
                                                          
104 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section II. 
105 A quote from the researcher’s interview with an executive manager of a British picture library. 
Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section III., page 236. 
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owing to the lack of cost-effective mechanisms, the Copyright Hub was supposed to 
contribute to “increasing the size of the overall pie [of copyright licensing]” and hence, 
benefiting the creative industries as a whole (Hooper and Lynch, 2012, p.21). Similarly, it was 
speculated that the Copyright Hub would help alleviate pressure on technology companies, 
especially Google, to police the Internet for infringing activities by virtue of new legitimate 
services enabled by the Copyright Hub’s technology106. Although these speculations were not 
based upon careful research and robust data (and consequently, the failure of these 
provocations did not seem to matter since they did not explicitly damage reputations of the 
announcers), they still played a critical part in catching the attention of the businesses and 
eventually secured the much needed financial, technical and political backing for the 
Copyright Hub project107. 
In addition to low expectations and visions let loose, there existed a distinctive type of 
expectation that was mobilised to help forge the alliances between the ecologies of policy 
making, business and IP standard development, which I identified as the “slow” expectations. 
Unlike low expectations and visions let loose, slow expectations could only be detected and 
understood when one examines the case study from the linked ecologies perspective, which 
asserts the asymmetries in internal structures and temporal structures of different types of 
ecologies. It was evident that the ecology of policy making was organised differently from 
the ecology of IP standard development, particularly in the temporal aspect. While the 
former was organised in a rhythm of five-year span108 with a short cycle of actors, locations 
                                                          
106 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section III. A. 
107 In an article written for the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) Magazine in April 
2016, Hooper (2016) confirmed that funding for the Copyright Hub’s first phase, i.e. “proof of 
concept”, came from the British government, the creative industries in the UK, Australia and the US, 
and the technology company Google. 
108 The coalition government passed the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which received the Royal 
Assent on 15th September 2011, guaranteed the fixed-term existence of five years for every 




and ligations109, and a rapid rate of policy rebundling110, the ecology of IP standard 
development was much more stable in term of rhythms, i.e. a similar set of actors who had 
relatively stable relationships with and had been working on correlative issues of digital IP 
management for an extended period of time111. Similarly, the ecology of business resembled 
what Abbott (2005) described as the ecology of professions, whose “jurisdictions” appeared 
to be well-demarcated and highly stable compared with the rapid rate of rebundling and 
fairly overlapping nature of political “bundles”112. Therefore, the significant mis-alignments 
regarding the temporal structures of the three ecologies were confirmed.  
In his paper, Abbott (ibid. p.254) contended that “a given ecology has its own characteristic 
rhythms, [and therefore] connection between two ecologies can depend on the parallels and 
disparities between those rhythms”. Then, how were temporal mis-alignments exploited to 
help “hinge” the ecologies of policy making, business and IP standard development in the 
case of the Copyright Hub? More importantly, how did slow expectations help propel the 
Copyright Hub as an innovation project? Empirical data revealed that the disparities in 
temporal structures were used as a determinant in the reciprocity of expectations, which 
makes the alliances across adjacent ecologies possible. For instance, expectation work in the 
early stages of the Copyright Hub project placed particular emphasis on the contrast between 
                                                          
109 Each cycle of the ecology of policy making is characterised by the rise and fall of certain political 
actors, the focus and shift of focus on certain locations (i.e. political issues that are of gravest 
concerns), and ligations or the construction of relationships, which constitutes and delimits both the 
actors and locations in question. The period between 2010 and 2015 witnessed the raise and fall of 
the coalition government, whose prime focus was on stimulating the British economy. From 2016 
onwards, however, the location was shifted completely to the political issue of the United Kingdom’s 
membership of the European Union, notoriously known as “Brexit”. Such changes in actors and 
locations required a new ligation process, which in turn affected the ways alliances were forged 
between linked ecologies.  
110 As exemplified by the rapid rebundling of five IP-related policies within the period between 2006 
and 2011. Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section III. A., page 226. 
111 As exemplified by the series of work on the LCC’s data model, which has begun since the mid-
1990s. Cross-referencing Chapter 6, section I. A. 




the “headline-grabbing, one-off, high-profile system”, which was typical of the ecology of 
policy making, and the “unglamorous world of standardisation [… which] simply continues 
over time, and is never complete”113, that was emblematic of the ecology of IP standard 
development. Such expectation work was able to attract and secure the attention of policy 
makers by highlighting the temporal differences between the two ecologies and suggested 
that a commitment to the extended process of developing a digital infrastructure for IP 
management would help alleviate the pressure to constantly intervene in the IP domain by 
means of legislation114. In other words, the slow expectations of the Copyright Hub project 
provided policy makers with the benefits of counter-balancing the rapid rate of political 
rebundling and hence, contributing to stabilising and strengthening the government’s control 
over the location of policy making115.  
On the other hand, the creative industries’ commitment to the Copyright Hub project despite 
slow progress (i.e. “even if nothing was gonna happen”116) was promised to help nudge policy 
makers towards maintaining copyright laws and court systems in their favour117. It was 
particularly due to the mis-alignment in temporalities between the ecologies of business and 
policy making that changes could be accelerated in the latter ecology by innovation actors 
managing momentum in the former. In Hooper’s terminology, the slow progress of the 
Copyright Hub project was desirable for the creative industries to prolong the effect of 
“[moving] the ball from [the creative industries’] court to the politicians’” and hence, 
increasing pressure on politicians to “deliver more rigorous and equitable enforcement of 
                                                          
113 Those are extracts from EPC’s expectation work on defining the DCE proposal. Cross-referencing 
Chapter 5, section I. C., p.168.  
114 Cross-referencing the discussion on Chapter 5, section II. 
115 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section III. A. 
116 An extract from the interview with Goldman (pseudonym) – the data architect behind the LCC’s 
data model. Cross referencing Chapter 5, section III. A., page 224. 





copyright”118. Hooper thus promised, while charting the course for the Copyright Hub project 
in spring 2013, that the progress of the initiative would be “not going too fast, but also not 
going too slowly”119. Slow expectations therefore helped attain the creative industries’ 
support by ensuring them that the Copyright Hub would move at a pace that was closer to 
the temporal rhythms of their own ecologies, as opposed to the rapid rate of political 
rebundling. In conjunction with low expectations, slow expectations extended the room for 
manoeuvre for the creative industries to moderate the problem of “rushed” policies being 
imposed upon them, while still maintaining momentum and control of the technical project 
to make sure that the changes, which the Copyright Hub promised to bring to the market, 
would not become disruptive and harmful to their business models. 
Therefore, one key aspect of my theorisation using the linked ecologies perspective is that 
the exploitation of connections between ecologies is made possible by the mis-aligned 
temporalities of their expectation work. Discussions of the Copyright Hub were often 
referred to a direct linkage between the political, technical and commercial needs of a wide 
range of actors, who routinely assigned a distinctive temporal order to each of these different 
spheres120. By doing so, innovation actors were able to manage momentum in one ecology 
while accelerating desirable changes in another, as well as moderating promises to meet local 
exigencies due to the extended room for manoeuvre offered by the low and slow 
expectations. These accounts call for the conceptualisation of temporal mis-alignment as a 
determinant in the reciprocity of expectations that is needed to temporarily hinge different 
ecologies together. It is precisely because the ecologies of policy making, business and IP 
standard development are organised differently from one another with distinctive rhythms 
                                                          
118 An extract from Hooper’s Charles Clark Memorial Lecture. Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section II. 
B., p.192. 
119 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section II. B., pp. 192-194. 
120 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section III. A., page 225. 
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that those ecologies (with their own diverging yet intertwined interests) look for one another 
in search of alliances and support in the innovation space. This finding contributes to further 
Abbott’s (2005, p.254) theorisation of linkages between ecologies, whose case study of 19th-
century medical licensing suggested that the disparities in rhythms between the political and 
professional ecologies resulted in the frequent changes of doctors’ allies over the years as 
“they sought friends in a political ecology largely disinterested in them”. Nevertheless, 
Abbott’s institutionalist approach to linked ecologies did not allow him to see that temporal 
disparities were not only the reason for the frequent changes of allies across linked ecologies 
in the long run, but also a determinant in the success of strategies hinging multiple ecologies 
together in the short term using temporally mis-aligned expectation work, as illustrated in 
the case of the Copyright Hub. 
My findings of the role which low expectations play in propelling innovation projects also 
finds parallels in nascent sociological studies of technological expectations. An example is 
Gardner, Samuel and Williams’ (2015) case study of innovation work in biomedicine. Studying 
a pioneering clinical team who provide deep brain stimulation to children and young people 
with movement disorders, these authors discover that clinicians carefully manage the 
expectations of their prospective patients by constructing visions which are “personalised, 
modest, and tainted with uncertainty” (ibid. p.998). They conclude that not only hype and 
optimistic visions possess the capability to provide momentum to biomedical innovation 
projects, but so do “less optimistic, uncertain, and modest visions of the future”, which they 
call “low expectations” (ibid. p.998). The unique contribution of my study to the “sociology 
of low expectations” argument is that the ability of low expectations to help resolve 
immediate problems confronting allied ecologies, such as the ecologies of policy making and 
business in the case of the Copyright Hub, can somewhat decouple investments from 
assessments of the ability of the technology to fulfil its promises. 
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In addition, these findings also respond to Pollock and Williams’ (2010b) call for the 
construction of a typology of promissory behaviour that could provide comprehensive and 
nuanced accounts of different types of expectations employed in a technological innovation 
context. On the one hand, the slow and low expectations, and the type of expectations that 
is similar to visions let loose identified in the case study of the Copyright Hub reconfirm 
Pollock and Williams’ (ibid. pp.543-544) assertion that there exists “a spectrum of promissory 
activity” with different levels of performativity and accountability at work in order to propel 
technological innovation. On the other hand, these findings also enrich Pollock and Williams’ 
(ibid.) conceptualisation empirically by applying it to a new setting, which is no longer 
confined to the single ecology of business but extended to a linked ecologies context, where 
the promissory work was employed to help hinge multiple ecologies with distinctive 
structures and rhythms together. Theoretically, these findings contribute to further Pollock 
and Williams’ argument about the correlation between the degree of performativity of a type 
of promissory work and its standards of accountability and verification. With the case of the 
Copyright Hub, I have found that as long as policy makers, businesses and innovation actors 
are allied and taken on board for an innovation project, the degree of performativity of the 
expectation work is not necessarily directly proportional to its degree of accountability, i.e. 
where expectations are low and slow, this enlarges the room for manoeuvre for local players 
to moderate promises to meet local exigencies.  
In short, the curious cases of how low and slow expectations can assist with propelling an 
innovation project has helped us tackle the first identified gap in the literature regarding the 
problem of using high expectations as the index for the early stages of technological 
development. The case of the Copyright Hub has illustrated that, to successfully attract allies 
and secure resources, innovation actors must employ a wide array of promissory work that 
appeals to different types of actors in different ecologies. The most interesting theorisation 
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comes out of this analysis is that temporal disparities are identified as a determinant in the 
successful establishment of hinges between the adjacent ecologies of policy making, 
business, and IP standard development in the case of the Copyright Hub.   
II. Understanding Expectations’ Credibility 
The second gap in literature is concerned with the notion of credibility of expectations. 
Bakker, van Lente and Meeus (2011, p.159) attempt to tackle this issue through the notion 
of “arenas of expectations”, which asserts that expectations voiced by enactors in the arena 
are tested by selectors, “where they are confronted with experience, knowledge and 
interests”. It is assumed that selectors develop their own criteria for assessments, and further 
mandate will be given to those expectations that are deemed more credible by the selectors. 
Bakker, van Lente and Meeus (2012) provide more insights into the processes, by which 
selectors come to their assessments of expectations’ credibility, by identifying a number of 
criteria employed by selectors to arrive at their decisions. Despite the usefulness of these 
findings, the “arenas of expectations” approach still suffers from the shortcoming of what 
Abbott (2005, p.254) calls the “Ecology/Audience” model. This model presupposes a set of 
fixed surrounds for an ecology, in which external criteria for success are taken-for-granted 
while overlooking the impacts of the ecological forces on its neighbouring ecologies. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above121, the existing literature on arenas of expectations does 
not allow us to analyse how outcomes of the trials of strength of expectations in multiple 
arenas interact and influence one other, which leaves a theoretical gap that needs to be 
fulfilled. 
                                                          
121 Cross-referencing Chapter 2, section V. B.  
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To transcend these conceptual limitations, I choose to adopt Abbott’s (ibid.) linked ecologies 
perspective to examining the notion of expectations’ credibility in the case of the Copyright 
Hub. The main benefit of the adoption of the linked ecologies approach is that it helps replace 
the “audience” concept in the analysis with the notion of “linked ecologies” (Abbott, 2005, 
p.250). In the linked ecologies argument, there is no audience, or fixed and unproblematic 
entities that are in the position to externally judge the promissory work of innovation actors. 
Instead, both sides are ecologies and actors in these ecologies are both seeking for alliances 
and support across their own ecological boundaries. As a direct consequence, the reasons 
for some expectations to garner greater legitimacy and become more resonant than others 
at a given moment are not simply because these expectations can convince selectors of their 
credibility, but because such expectation work can provide desirable outcomes for all allies 
in the linked ecologies at once. This point of argument will be illustrated at length below 
using examples from the case study of the Copyright Hub. 
To supplement Abbott’s linked ecologies argument, I also adopt the BOAP’s notion of 
“interstices”, or moments and sites in which key actors interact and affect each other, as well 
as the evolving technology (Hyysalo, Pollock and Williams, 2018). Three key interstices 
identified in the case of the Copyright Hub include: (1) the interstice of policy controversy; 
(2) the interstice of policy implementation; and (3) the interstice of policy revision. These 
interstices constitute “a series of configurational movements”, which gradually and 
continuously shape the trajectory of the Copyright Hub and the relationships between actors 
and locations both within and across multiple linked ecologies. These concepts provide the 
necessary points of departure for the analysis and discussion of expectations’ credibility. 
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A. An Analysis in Context 
Before embarking on analysing the three interstices that shape the trajectory of the 
Copyright Hub, it is imperative to discuss a few taken-for-granted external events which set 
the stage for the interactions between the linked ecologies under examination. 
Understanding these events helps shed light on why certain issues are important concerns 
for actors in one ecology at a given moment and thus, how they influence the ways alliances 
between adjacent ecologies are made. Two events of this kind were identified in the case of 
the Copyright Hub. 
The first event was the 2008 global financial crisis. In this context, the UK’s economy was 
spiralling downward and hence, stimulating the economy was the most important concern 
for actors within the ecology of policy making during the period between 2010 and 2015122. 
This circumstance rendered the coalition government eager to cut public spending and 
reduce the budget deficit through austerity programme, as well as making allies with actors 
in the business ecology in order to delegate part of their responsibility for pulling the country 
out of the recession. In this context, the UK government was heavily criticised by its political 
opponents for the lack of long-term vision for economic growth. Consequently, it became 
increasingly important for the government to identify a setting for competition, which 
allowed them to fend off criticisms and strengthen their control of the policy making process. 
With this end in view, the UK government turned to IP legislation – the area which had 
imploded just before the general election by the passing of the controversial Digital Economy 
Act123 – as a potential venue to earn credit by addressing fiercely contested policies 
                                                          
122 See the government’s policy paper entitled “2010 to 2015 government policy: UK economic 
growth” (GOV.UK, 2015). 
123 Cross-referencing Chapter 4, section II. C. and section III. A. 
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introduced by prior administrations. It was within this context that the interstice of policy 
controversy unfolded. 
The second external event that needs to be mentioned is the controversy surrounding 
aggressive tax avoidance schemes by multinational corporations, which emerged in late 
2012124. It was revealed that multinational technology companies, particularly Google, had 
employed “elaborate corporate structure” and “manifestly artificial tax arrangements” to 
evade their UK tax liabilities 125. As a result, giant technology companies, and the technology 
sector in general, were widely criticised by the public and policy makers for their 
wrongdoings, while the creative industries were, in sharp contrast, praised as the critical 
contributors to the recovery and growth of the economy. It is imperative to note that this 
event initiated a series of investigations conducted by the political opposition targeting the 
technology sector with an intention to undermine the government’s authority due to its close 
alliance with the technology sector. In the face of strong criticisms, the coalition government 
was compelled to somewhat cast aside its old alliance with the technology sector to embrace 
a new one with the creative industries. This event was thus critical to the analysis as it made 
a significant impact on facilitating and strengthening the establishment of alliances between 
the creative industries and policy makers. 
Having carefully discussed the impacts of these external events on the analysis, the following 
section is dedicated to examining the three interstices that shape the Copyright Hub project 
in more details. 
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B. Copyright Hub and the story of Three Interstices 
The Interstice of Policy Controversy 
The interstice of policy controversy emerged from the struggle of the newly-elected 
government for the domination of policy-making processes. IP legislation was chosen as a 
setting for competition due to its high profile and the implosion of controversy which arose 
right before the general election in 2010. 
Under the previous administration, a number of attempts had been made to intervene into 
the domain of IP legislation. The most notable example of this kind was the 2006 Gowers’ 
Review126, which concluded that the existing IP system had been “broadly performing 
satisfactorily”. Within this vision, IP legislation was regarded mainly as an instrument for 
protecting the rights of rightsholders (mostly the creative industries), while the UK 
government was obligated to enforce these laws. The controversial Digital Economy Act took 
a step further and portrayed internet subscribers as being prone to engage in copyright 
infringing activities, and hence forcing the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to police their 
own customers and networks. It was evident that, to gain control of IP legislation, the Labour 
administration had engaged in a “ligation” process, which defined and delimited not only IP 
legislation, but also numerous actors (e.g. the state, the technology sector, the UK creative 
industries, and right users) across the ecologies of business and policy making.  
When the new coalition government came into power in 2010, they attempted to engage in 
this domain by initiating a new ligation process, i.e. the Hargreaves Review, which redefined 
IP legislation as a regulatory barrier to the proliferation of technical innovation and Internet-
based business models in the thriving digital economy. The technology sector was portrayed 
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as the positive force of innovation and economic growth, while the UK creative industries 
were censured for their “lobbyist” position on reforming IP legislation, which focused solely 
on preserving the industries’ diminishing status quo127. Such polar contrasts in the two 
ligation processes inevitably resulted in a high-profile controversy surrounding IP legislation.  
It is interesting to note that the primary expectation work conducted within the interstice of 
policy controversy was developed entirely through policy-led processes, i.e. the Hargreaves 
Review and its predecessors. I call these processes the “expectation mediation processes” - 
an intermediary which mediates and communicates the expectation work of actors across 
ecological boundaries. Empirical evidence disclosed that the Hargreaves Review was 
structured in ways which ensured its findings to be consistent with the government’s 
outlook. For instance, it had been shown that Hargreaves was appointed through a hasty 
process and was given very little time to conduct his review, i.e. only six months to examine 
the entire UK’s IP framework. The problem became even more acute due to Hargreaves’ 
complete lack of background in issues concerning intellectual property prior to his 
appointment128. Hargreaves therefore had to rely on staff, who were pre-selected from the 
Intellectual Property Office (IPO), to ensure the quality of the submitted evidence. In 
addition, the review was supported by an advisory group of experts, who had also been pre-
selected without any consultation with Hargreaves129. As a result, the Hargreaves Review was 
subservient to the government’s outlook on IP issues and was much less independent 
compared to its official status, which appeared in the government’s record as “an 
independent report”. Consequently, even before the actual study was conducted, outcomes 
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of the Hargreaves Review had been somewhat pre-determined130 and destined to be the 
opposite of Gowers Review and other reports published under the Labour administration.  
Although Hargreaves’ conclusions were largely conformed to the coalition government’s 
outlook on IP issues, they deviated in two critical aspects. First, Hargreaves advised against 
“importing Fair Use wholesale” to both the UK’s IP legislation and the EU legal framework 
since the benefits could not be expeditiously obtained due to “protracted political 
negotiation, against a highly uncertain legal background”131. Instead, Hargreaves 
recommended the UK government take advantage of the European Copyright Directive to 
introduce additional copyright exceptions at the national level. Second, Hargreaves proposed 
the construction of the Digital Copyright Exchange (DCE), which was optimistically expected 
to be straightforwardly self-funded by small user charge by the end of 2012. The DCE was 
further projected to enable ‘a functioning digital market in rights clearance’, which would 
add £2.2 billion per annum to the UK’s economy by 2020132. These recommendations were 
firmly in line with what the coalition government was looking for, i.e. a long-term vision that 
might provide short-term concrete achievements in terms of policy making and economic 
stimulation. As a result, the government announced their “broad acceptance” of Hargreaves’ 
recommendations and promised “to have measures in place by the end of [the] Parliament” 
that would allow the IP vision to become materialised133. By doing so, the government 
assumed control of the policy making processes around intellectual property and declared 
that no further major review of the IP system would be considered in the existing parliament. 
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Before moving on to examine the second interstice of policy implementation, it is crucial to 
discuss some preliminary findings which emerged from the analysis of this interstice. 
First, the interstice of policy controversy could be regarded as a battleground initiated by the 
coalition government in their struggle with other policy-making actors for the domination of 
the policy making processes. To succeed in this struggle, the coalition government sought 
support from across the ecological boundaries of policy making and attempted to form an 
alliance with the technology sector in the business ecology. The provision of US-styled “fair 
use” was intended as a “hinge”, which provided dual rewards for members of the alliance in 
both ecologies at once. For the government, it provided a means by which the newly-elected 
government could gain credit by redressing failure outcomes of the policy-making processes 
taken place under the Labour administration, as well as stabilising the rapid rate of policy 
rebundling as occurred in the past134. For the technology sector, it would help tip the balance 
of the UK’s IP framework toward favouring the emerging Internet-based technology 
companies and web services, whose business models were largely built on exploitation of 
copyright-protected content managed by the creative industries.  
In order for this hinge to work, a new ligation process was needed to replace the one which 
had been put forward by the prior administration, and the Hargreaves Review was initiated 
primarily for this purpose. To phrase this in more general terms, a new ligation process was 
needed to help redefine and delimit actors (or members of the new alliance) and the tasks 
(or locations within each member’s respective ecology) which the alliance desired to control. 
Expectation work was therefore performed through ligation processes, whose outcomes 
comprised visions, expectations and promises, were eventually circulated to attract the 
attention of potential allies.  
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Second, it was crucial to note that the coalition government proactively engaged in pre-
determining and influencing the Hargreaves Review so that the IP vision and expectations 
produced through this “independent” process would conform as much as possible to the 
government’s outlook. This finding contrasts with the notion of selectors presented in 
Bakker, van Lente and Meeus’ (2011, p.159) paper, which asserts that “selectors inform (and 
also constrain) themselves with expectations, they make assessments and pick their 
winners”. In this Ecology/ Audience model, selectors assume a fixed and passive role in the 
arena of expectations: i.e. they wait for enactors to feed them on expectations and then react 
by deciding which technological variations are viable, before providing further mandate that 
allows enactors to work on improving their technologies. From the linked ecologies 
perspective, however, both sides of the interaction were ecologies, whose actors proactively 
sought support from potential allies in neighbouring ecologies. The linked ecologies 
perspective thus adds a further layer of contingency to the somewhat simplistic Ecology/ 
Audience model and provides a more comprehensive account of what happened in the field. 
Finally, analysing the interstice of policy controversy also drew our attention to a special kind 
of agent, who acted as a mediator between actors of the ecologies of policy making and 
business. I propose to call this type of agent “expectation mediators”. Due to the 
particularities of the relation between policy makers and businesses, especially when the 
creative industries had been previously condemned for their “lobbyist” position on IP 
issues135, the technology sector and the creative industries could not voice their expectations 
regarding intellectual property in a direct manner to the government. Instead, the 
government employed Hargreaves as an expectation mediator, who acted as a conduit for 
gathering data from the business sector and developing an IP vision, for which the 
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government would eventually assess and provide mandate. The role of expectation 
mediators in influencing the credibility of expectations and shaping the course of innovation 
will be examined more carefully in the discussion below. 
The Interstice of Policy Implementation 
The interstice of policy controversy had elevated IP, especially copyright, to the forefront of 
the battle for dominating the policy making process in the UK. From the government’s 
perspective, copyright was perceived as the “reverse salient”136 of the UK’s IP system and 
being able to gain control of this “location” through the DCE initiative would provide an 
effective means of reinforcing the government’s stance on their newly-formed IP vision. 
From the point of view of the creative industries, however, the DCE proposal represented 
something of the opposite nature: it provided “a glimmer of hope”137 and the necessary 
leverage to undermine the government’s IP vision. The European Publishers Council (EPC), 
for instance, argued that in a well-functioning technological environment, businesses would 
need fewer, not more, exceptions. Copyright exceptions therefore should be “strictly limited” 
and “always be an instrument of last resort”138. To clarify expectations surrounding copyright 
and the potential of a technological solution for streamlining copyright licensing processes, 
Hooper’s feasibility study of the DCE was initiated by the UK government. The 
commencement of this mediation process thus marked the beginning of the second 
interstice – the interstice of policy implementation.  
The interstice of policy implementation differed from the interstice of policy controversy in 
two critical aspects. First, the expectation work in this interstice focused solely on 
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copyright139 and expectations surrounding the roles of digital technologies in streamlining 
copyright licensing processes, while the interstice of policy controversy was concerned with 
IP visions in the broadest sense, i.e. the roles of IP legislation in the UK’s economy and society. 
Second, this interstice was mediated by a new expectation mediator – Richard Hooper – 
whose approach and charisma exerted significant influence upon outcomes of the mediation 
process. Indeed, Hooper was able to rally broad support around the Copyright Hub initiative 
from actors across the ecologies of policy-making and business – an outcome which 
Hargreaves did not achieve with his mediation process140. 
In the interstice of policy implementation, the creative industries actively engaged in a new 
ligation process, which defined and delimited problems of copyright and copyright licensing, 
as well as expectations concerning the roles of the DCE in their vision of “a copyright-aware 
Internet”141. The most notable example of such a ligation process was the European 
Publishers Council (EPC)’s expectation work on defining the DCE proposal142. EPC’s 
expectation work was built on the general vision shared by the creative industries, which 
asserted that the basic principles of copyright laws still functioned adequately in the twenty-
first century and there was no evidence of market failure in the domain of copyright 
licensing143. What was needed, argued EPC, was “a global market infrastructure which 
enables the automation of managing rights on the Internet” and thus, EPC advanced their 
expectations of the DCE to be developed into “a standardised data infrastructure for the 
management of digital rights”144. Such a definition of the DCE not only defined what the 
initiative should be developed into (i.e. a standardised data infrastructure), but also its 
                                                          
139 Apart from copyright, intellectual property is also concerned with patents, trademarks, and 
industrial designs. 
140 Cross-referencing Chapter 4, section III. A., p.143. 
141 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section I. A., p.156. 
142 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section I. C. 
143 Cross-referencing various extracts from the creative industries’ statements, pp.160-161. 
144 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section I. C., p.165. 
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properties (i.e. standard-based, pro-competition, highly distributed, non-exclusive, voluntary 
and industry-led) and the roles which different members of the alliance should take in the 
development process (i.e. the creative industries should lead and be responsible for 
delivering the desirable outputs, while the government should use its convening power to 
create a favourable environment for the initiative to grow and flourish).  
In addition, EPC warned the government against developing the DCE as either (a) “a service” 
or “a market place”, which would become redundant owing to successful counterparts which 
had already existed in sectoral and territorial silos, or (b) a centralised copyright register 
which would inevitably fail due to lack of participation from the creative sector145. By relating 
to their own interpretation of the proposal as well as other competing alternatives, EPC’s 
expectation work highlighted the fact that the formation of a new alliance between the 
creative industries and the government would become feasible only when certain 
expectations regarding the DCE’s properties, types of development, and key stakeholders’ 
roles associated with the project were accepted by the government.  
Nevertheless, the creative industries’ expectation work was not directly communicated to 
the government, but it had to pass through an intermediary layer, i.e. the expectation 
mediation process. Hooper’s mediation process was divided into two phases. The first phase 
was concerned with defining existing problems of copyright licensing and identifying 
plausible technological solution for these problems. Hooper’s report suggested that the 
answers to the question concerning the fit for purpose of copyright licensing in the digital 
age were “much more diverse and nuanced” than what had been previously claimed by 
Hargreaves146. It was insisted that copyright licensing in the UK could be further streamlined 
by reducing the unnecessary complexity regarding the number of actors and processes 
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involved, both within and beyond the boundaries of individual creative industries. This 
argument evidently tapped into the concurrent ligation process occurred at European level, 
which depicted copyright as neither complicated nor confusing, but an inherently complex 
system that needed to be simplified147. By defining copyright as a well-functioning legal 
framework, yet inherently complex system, the creative industries were expected to be 
obligated to reduce the complexity of their own licensing systems. At the same time, the 
need for direct statutory intervention from policy makers in this streamlining process was 
effectively ruled out. Furthermore, copyright users were also redefined as those who wanted 
to be compliant but were ignored by the conventional licensing system owing to the lack of 
a cost-effective mechanism for handling granular requests148. This new definition was in stark 
contrast with the traditional image of copyright users, who had been commonly depicted as 
illegal file-sharers or pirates, and thus alleviating the pressure on policy makers to tighten 
regulations on copyright protection. Built on this ligation work, the first Hooper’s report 
emphasised that there were no commonly agreed standards across sectors for “expressing, 
identifying and communicating rights information”149 and suggested this domain as a 
potential venue, where a plausible technical solution for the problems of copyright licensing 
could be found. 
In the second report coming out of his mediation process, Hooper made a number of 
recommendations, which were categorised under four main topics, to address the problems 
of copyright licensing150. The first topic on data building blocks highlighted the quintessential 
role of data in the licensing process and hence, the need for consistently employing 
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international standards for identifiers whenever they existed. In addition, the Linked Content 
Coalition (LCC) was explicitly cited as “a very real and necessary building block for the 
Copyright Hub”151 due to its potential for establishing a common language for cross-sector 
communication.  
The second topic was concerned with the issue of orphan works and mass digitalisation, 
which Hooper suggested a combination of both legislative and technical measures to tackle 
this problem. Focusing on the technological side of the solution, Hooper cited ARROW and 
ARROW Plus – two concurrent projects tackling the same issues at European level – as 
valuable examples of cross-border solutions, and more importantly, of “the benefits of a 
public-private partnership in finding a workable solution”152. Hooper argued that the 
approach of harnessing the public-private partnership to address copyright issues was 
“crucial” for taking forward any recommendations from his report.  
Third, repertoire imbalance was about the lack of contents in digital formats in comparison 
with their counterparts in physical forms, which the creative industries continually dismissed 
as a myth since most popular titles were already made available online. Despite such claims, 
Hooper insisted that perceptions could drive public opinion, as well as political views, and 
thus urging the creative industries to assume their responsibility for reducing the imbalance. 
This topic thus represented vividly the way Hooper use his report to mediate the tense 
relationship between the creative industries and the government: while the former were 
asked to provide better services and accesses to their content in order to create positive 
public opinion, the latter were urged, in return, to use their power to defend legitimate 
copyright interests against infringement153.  
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Finally, the fourth topic discussed how a technological solution in the form of a “one stop 
shop” could help reduce the complexity and expense of organisations and processes involved 
in copyright licensing. Hooper reiterated the creative industries’ expectations on how the 
DCE could help in short term by providing “better signposting for users”, and in the longer 
term by becoming a platform for automated direct licensing service154. Built on these 
expectations, Hooper proposed establishing “a not-for-profit, industry-led, industry-funded 
Copyright Hub with some possible Government pump-priming in the early stages”155. In 
Hooper’s proposal, the Copyright Hub would fulfil four main purposes: (1) copyright 
education and information, (2) registries of rights, (3) a marketplace for copyright licensing, 
and (4) an authoritative place for dealing with orphan works. These functional requirements 
were expected to be delivered in consecutive phases, beginning with the launch of the 
Copyright Hub’s website for copyright education, signposting and navigation.  
It was imperative to note that Hooper’s proposal of the Copyright Hub not only echoed 
expectations voiced by EPC and other stakeholders within the creative sector as detailed 
above, but it also took into consideration elements of Hargreaves’ recommendations, which 
had been broadly accepted by the government. For instance, one of the main 
recommendations from Hargreaves Review was an integrated solution to replace prior 
policies, which focused solely on enforcing copyright laws. This solution consisted of: (1) 
modernising copyright law, (2) promoting copyright education, (3) enhancing enforcement, 
and (4) encouraging an open digital market for licensing. While Hooper’s proposal of the 
Copyright Hub directly addressed the second and fourth elements of Hargreaves’ integrated 
solution, it also helped in enhancing copyright enforcement by tackling repertoire imbalance, 
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which had been primarily used by copyright pirates as the main excuse for their infringement 
activities156. In addition, Hargreaves also mentioned the need to enable licensing of orphan 
work157, which was also addressed in Hooper’s report. Therefore, it was reasonable to argue 
that Hooper’s reports served well as a middle ground between expectations voiced by both 
the creative industries and the government. The publication of Hooper’s second report thus 
marked the end of the second interstice of policy implementation. 
Analysing this interstice has brought forward an interesting preliminary finding with regard 
to the mediation process. It has been found that the mediation process is significantly 
different from the expectation work performed by enactors as described in the conventional 
Ecology/ Audience model. For instance, Rip (2006) describes enactors as having the capacity 
to anticipate, to a certain degree, the selection environment and change their expectations 
slightly to make them appealing to the selector158. Nevertheless, such an anticipation process 
cannot be compared with the degree of efforts performed by the expectation mediator to 
(a) navigate the maze of conflicting expectations and interests voiced by various actors across 
multiple linked ecologies, (b) mediate those differences, and (c) produce an integrated 
solution that takes into account the expectations of all of these actors. In other words, for an 
expectation mediation process to be successful, a mediator must be able to “mediate” the 
differences between a wide array of expectations and produces “hinges” or strategies that 
provides rewards for different allies across multiple linked ecologies at the same time. The 
main aim of the mediation process thus revolves around the successful establishment of 
alliances with actors in adjacent ecologies, instead of merely trying to convince an external 
audience of certain promising options for technical development. 
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The Interstice of Policy Revision 
After the end of the second interstice of policy implementation, there was a momentary halt 
in the progression of the Copyright Hub initiative due to lack of activities from both the 
government and the creative industries. The situation was somewhat similar to what 
Robinson et al. (2012) described as a “waiting game”, in which one side was waiting for the 
other to take the first step before they made their move. In this situation, however, the 
waiting game was not played by actors of the same ecology, but rather by actors of the two 
separate (yet linked) ecologies of policy making and business. As a result, the dynamics of 
actors involved in the waiting game in the case of the Copyright Hub were rather peculiar in 
the sense that policy makers could exert their authority to impose legislation upon the 
creative industries. Thus, there had “always been the pressure cause behind it”, which 
coerced the creative industries to work together to break the impasse despite their initial 
reluctance159. This observation contradicts Parandian et al. (2012)’s assumption that actions 
at the collective level, which are necessary to break through waiting games, are difficult to 
achieve. Indeed, if there were an imminent requirement for actors of the business ecology 
to make alliance with policy makers, the concerted effort of the industries would not be too 
difficult to come by. 
The beginning of the third interstice of policy revision was marked with a series of activities 
and interactions initiated by the creative industries to break through the waiting game, 
followed by reactions from the UK government, continued with actions coming from the 
business ecology160. The creative industries and the UK government appeared to engage in 
what I call a “turn-based strategic game”, in which actors on each side take turn to make 
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their strategic moves based on the previous actions of their counterparts. For instance, the 
creative industries provided initial funding for the establishment of the Copyright Hub Launch 
Group (CHLG) and Copyright Licensing Steering Group (CLSG) with the intention to “show 
[the UK] government that we [the creative industries] could do something for ourselves”161. 
In turn, the government offered the pump-priming to help kickstart the development of the 
Copyright Hub’s website in a move, which Ros Lynch – the co-author of the Copyright Hub 
proposal – described as “a way of encouraging industries to actually put money into it if they 
can actually see something happening”162. The turn-based strategic game thus allowed the 
accumulation of interactions and trusts between actors across the linked ecologies, as well 
as building up momentum for the Copyright Hub project and providing the necessary 
environment for further expectation mediation work to be conducted. 
Expectation mediation work continued to be the key activities in the third interstice of policy 
revision. The main objective of this work was to mediate the differences in interests between 
a wide array of actors involved in the Copyright Hub initiative and projected the Copyright 
Hub as a “hinge” that could provide multiple rewards to various actors across the linked 
ecologies of policy making, business, and IP standard development163. For example, to help 
the image sector fend off the looming threat of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
(ERRA)164, which could turn a substantial number of copyright-protected images into orphan 
work for exploitation with little or no compensation, the functions of discovering potential 
orphan work and performing diligent search for their rightsholders were added to the 
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technological expectations of the Copyright Hub as optional features165. The image sector 
explicitly used these expectations to condemn the government’s act of passing the ERRA as 
“put[ting] the cart before the horse”166 and eventually developed strong opposition that 
successfully “stymied” the Act (Orlowski, 2013a). Nevertheless, it was also important to keep 
expectations of the Copyright Hub low so that the initiative would not be perceived by 
established market players to be a threat to their existing business models. Consequently, in 
the interstice of policy revision, the technological expectations of the Copyright Hub were 
focused primarily on simple and innocuous functions, such as copyright education and 
signposting, while the more controversial expectations, such as orphan work and 
infrastructural technology, remained vague and optional. In fact, it did not matter to the 
creative industries whether those optional functions would be eventually implemented or 
not, as long as their existence as technological expectations helped enlarge the room for 
manoeuvre and allowed the creative industries to address their immediate local exigencies, 
i.e. to prevent further IP legislation being imposed upon them. 
Similarly, the Copyright Hub was expected to help the government counter-balance the rapid 
rate of political rebundling and hence, strengthening their control over the policy making 
process, whilst shutting down the oppositions’ criticisms of the government’s dearth of long-
term vision for economic growth. Commenting on the reason behind the government’s 
support for the Copyright Hub, Ros Lynch conceded: “We [the government] are still 
continuing to support it, and ministers at any opportunities they get to talk about the 
Copyright Hub, they also include it in speeches, in conversation that they have with other 
parties”167. Therefore, it was apparent that the UK government supported the Copyright Hub 
                                                          
165 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section II. C., page 207. 
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photographers and agencies. Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section III. A., page 223. 
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primarily for the prospect of using it as political ammunition while dealing with other parties, 
rather than being convinced of the Copyright Hub’s performance or the contribution it would 
bring to the economy in 2020, when the coalition government apparently had long handed 
over the baton to other political actors. 
Finally, the Copyright Hub was able to make alliance with actors from the ecology of IP 
standard development since it promised to provide them with a home to turn linked data 
from a largely academic endeavour into real-world applications using the resources and 
technical expertise made available by the UK government and the creative industries. These 
strategies appeared to succeed in capturing the attention and facilitating the establishment 
of new alliances between the creative businesses, policy makers and linked data researchers. 
In conjunction with the emergence of the controversy surrounding aggressive tax avoidance 
schemes by multinational corporations in late 2012, which had already diluted and 
undermined the initial alliance between the government and the technology sector, the 
alliance between policy makers, the creative industries, and the community of linked data 
researchers became established by the end of the interstice of policy revision (i.e. late 2013), 
right before the Copyright Hub project shifted its focus to infrastructural development. 
The well-established alliance between these actors not only manifested in the form of 
funding and political support for the Copyright Hub project, but also in the form of 
partnerships between the Copyright Hub Ltd., the Digital Catapult, and the Linked Content 
Coalition (LCC), which created a protected space for the development of the Copyright Hub’s 
technology (discuss in details below). More importantly, this shift in alliance also manifested 
in the displacement of the overall IP vision in the UK from regarding IP legislation as “an IP 
system created in the era of paper and pen”168, which needed to be updated to meet the 
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challenges of the digital age, to a well-functioning IP system, whose licensing and 
management processes only needed to be streamlined to better serve the demand of the 
long-tailed market. Evidence of the triumph of the pro-IP vision was represented in (a) the 
policy makers’ strong criticisms of the Hargreaves Review for “putting the established system 
of copyright at risk for no obvious benefit”169 and consequently, a significant reduction in the 
scale of changes being made to the UK’s IP framework, (b) the explicit endorsement of the 
Copyright Hub project from the UK government, and (c) the appointment of Ros Lynch – co-
author of the Copyright Hub proposal – as the Copyright and IP Enforcement Director at IPO. 
As a result, it was evident that the interactions and activities of a wide array of actors across 
the ecologies of policy making, business, and IP standard development had resulted in the 
revision of the government’s IP policy, which led to the pro-IP vision became an accepted 
social repertoire.   
To conclude, the examination of the interstice of policy revision helps reconfirm and provide 
further insights into the newly-found notions of “expectation mediator” and the “expectation 
mediation process”. The impacts of expectation mediators and their mediation processes on 
the outcomes of the innovation in question are too significant to be dismissed. It has been 
shown that innovation actors engage in a “series of configurational movements” or a 
sequence of interstices for the ultimate purpose of finding support and forming alliance with 
other actors across the ecological boundaries. The mediation process facilitates this purpose 
by producing hinges or strategies which provide multiple rewards for different members of 
the alliance at the same time. These insights call our attention to the reason behind 
expectation mediators’ capability to secure mandate and support from actors across multiple 
ecological boundaries. Mandate for further technical work is given not simply because 
                                                          




selectors are convinced of the expectations voiced by enactors as assumed in the Ecology/ 
Audience model. Rather, it is given because of the new alliance, which has been formed as a 
result of the successful mediation process. These actors indeed provide mandate and support 
for members of their own alliance in exchange for the reward which they may reap from the 
outcomes of the innovation actors’ work. 
C. Rethinking Expectations’ Credibility 
The main aim of this section is to fill the gap in our knowledge of expectations’ credibility. In 
other words, it is my attempt to find answers for the thorny questions of why some 
expectations gather greater credibility and legitimacy than others and why some ideas seem 
to be more resonant at a given moment in an innovation’s journey.  
The rich analyses of the three interstices, as well as the preliminary findings uncovered from 
them, suggest that the conventional Ecology/ Audience model (under which the Arenas of 
Expectations approach falls) suffers from a number of theoretical shortcomings which make 
it unable to offer comprehensive insights into these questions. The linked ecologies 
perspective is recommended as a fruitful approach to study expectations’ credibility due to 
its ability to transcend the Ecology/ Audience model. First, the linked ecologies perspective 
helps us replace the notion of “audience” with “linked ecologies”. In this view, both sides are 
ecologies, whose actors proactively seek support and alliances across their ecological 
boundaries. This conceptualisation adds a further layer of contingency into the simplistic 
Ecology/ Audience model, which assumes selectors as having a rather fixed and passive role 
in assessing expectations’ credibility. Second, the linked ecologies perspective highlights the 
role of expectation mediators and the mediation processes. It is asserted that, in order for 
an expectation mediation process to be successful, a mediator must be able to mediate the 
differences between a wide range of expectations and produce hinges or strategies that 
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reward multiple allies across the ecological boundaries at the same time. The main aim of 
the mediation process is thus to establish alliances with other actors in adjacent ecologies, 
rather than merely trying to convince an external audience of certain promising technology 
as assumed in the process of expectation work conducted by enactors. Third and most 
importantly, these insights suggest that mandate for further technical work is not given 
simply because the selectors are convinced of the expectations voiced by enactors in the 
arenas, as presumed in the Ecology/ Audience model. Instead, actors provide mandate and 
support for their allies in exchange for the rewards, which have been promised to them via 
established hinges.  
The advantage of the linked ecologies approach over the Ecology/ Audience model becomes 
apparent when I applied it to re-examine Bakker, van Lente, and Meeus’ (2011) case study of 
hydrogen technology. In this case study, the authors provided an observation, which they 
could not provide an adequate explanation for: i.e. metal hydrides was not vital to the future 
of hydrogen technology and thus it was considered trivial to the wider hydrogen community, 
including its selectors. Nevertheless, metal hydrides was still supported by the selectors due 
to “the very fact that there is an option for on-board storage that holds the promise of solving 
the storage problem in the future, makes the prospective chain of hydrogen technologies a 
bit more credible” (ibid. p.160). In other words, metal hydrides was selected not just because 
it could convince the selector that it was a promising technological option, but primarily 
because it could provide “a useful promise to silence the critics of hydrogen as fuel of the 
future” (ibid.). This critical aspect of dual rewards and reasons for the selection of metal 
hybrids cannot be fully understood without resorting to the mediator and the mediation 
process, as well as a shift from the Ecology/ Audience model to the linked ecologies 
perspective in studying expectations’ credibility. 
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Findings in this section also contribute to tackling Bakker, van Lente, and Meeus’ (2012) call 
for further studies on the mutual relationship between the credibility of actors (or a 
community of actors) and the credibility of their promises and expectations, from which the 
notion of “dual credibility” is coined. The analyses of the three interstices have highlighted 
the crucial role which expectation mediators play in influencing the outcomes of an 
innovation project. In the case of the Copyright Hub, there were two expectation mediators 
– Hargreaves and Hooper – who appeared to share many common traits170. Yet, the results 
of their expectation mediation work could have not been more opposite, although the DCE 
proposal and the proposal of the Copyright Hub were not too dissimilar from one another171. 
Then, why would expectations produced by Hooper’s mediation process be much more 
resonant, and in a sense more credible, than Hargreaves’? The reason was that Hooper was 
able to successfully create multiple hinges from his mediation process that provided rewards 
for a wide array of actors in the three ecologies of policy making, business and IP standard 
development, while Hargreaves was not able to produce the same effect with his mediation 
work. Therefore, it was not so much that the dual credibility of actors and their promises 
would affect the lobbying capacity as Bakker, van Lente, and Meeus (ibid.) suspected, but 
what really mattered, in term of the credibility of expectations, was the ability of actors to 
                                                          
170 i.e. they are both civil servants who were appointed by the government to lead independent 
reviews into IP domain; both had relatively little knowledge of the domain of IP before they took their 
positions to lead these reviews.  
171 Hargreaves (2011, p.33) stated that “the aim [of the DCE proposal] is to establish a network of 
interoperable databases to provide a common platform for licensing transactions” and urged the UK 
government to use its convening power to facilitate, instead of implementing the DCE themselves. On 
the other hand, Hooper defined the Copyright Hub as an infrastructure which “link via spokes 
interoperably, scalably and intelligently to the growing national and international network of private 
and public sector digital copyright exchanges, right registries and other copyright-related databases” 
(Hooper and Lynch, 2012, p.20). Hooper also insisted that the Copyright Hub would be an industry-led 
and industry-funded project, with possible pump-priming from the government. Therefore, the DCE 
proposal and the proposal of the Copyright Hub were not too dissimilar in principles. With regard to 
technological expectations, although the proposal of the Copyright Hub had provided a bit more 
detailed on the functions of the Hub as compared to the DCE, these expectations remained 
significantly vague, which rendered them subject to the same kind of “flexible interpretation” as in the 
case of the DCE proposal. 
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forge strong alliances with allies in neighbouring ecologies. Once other actors were already 
taken onboard, there would be no need for innovation actors to lobby the innovation to their 
allies, who would provide mandate for the technology for their own benefits.  
Hence, in order to answer the question of why some expectations can gather greater 
legitimacy and become more resonant than others at a given moment, the linked ecologies 
approach suggests that it is unproductive to theorise credibility as something that is intrinsic 
to expectations, which can be judged by the audience using external assessment criteria. 
Instead, the credibility of expectations should be gauged within the context of their own 
linked ecologies in term of how well these expectations can provide hinges that help forge 
alliances between various actors across the ecological boundaries. Expectations thus gather 
greater legitimacy only when they can help innovation actors establish strong alliances with 
other actors to advance the technology in question. The strength of the expectations’ 
credibility and the strength of the alliance behind it are thus closely correlated. This 
conceptualisation also suggests that it is unhelpful for one to assess the credibility of 
expectations individually. In reality, actors employ a full spectrum of expectations to attract 
the attention and to address the interests of a wide array of potential allies. Consequently, 
multiple expectations are linked together and constitute what I call a “constellation of 
expectations”. The credibility of an expectation thus must always be evaluated in conjunction 
with other expectations in the same constellation.  
The conceptualisation in this section also make a number of contributions to Konrad’s (2006) 
theory of the social dynamics of expectations. First, Konrad built her theorisation on the 
notion of “collective expectations”, which was regarded as “part of a generalised and taken-
for-granted social repertoire” (ibid. p.431). Konrad thus used collective expectations as a 
theoretical point of departure for her analysis without being able to explain how and why 
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certain collective expectations become “a depersonalized social structure”. Konrad’s (ibid.) 
oversimplified assertion that “collective expectations emerge as a result of the exchange of 
expectations between large number of actors” is apparently inadequate to provide useful 
insights into this matter. The case study of the Copyright Hub, especially the analyses of the 
three interstices, have shown us precisely the way in which the pro-IP vision became the 
taken-for-granted narrative for IP legislation in the UK. This was made possible via a series of 
interactions and mediation work that allowed the establishment of strong alliances between 
policy makers, businesses and IP standard researchers, who provided the necessary mandate 
to uphold the Copyright Hub and its associated IP vision. Thus, a collective expectation only 
becomes taken-for-granted when the alliance of actors who support it becomes a dominant 
force across the linked ecologies.  
Second, this conceptualisation also helps explain why a taken-for-granted collective 
expectations can eclipse other alternatives, which was another issue that Konrad could not 
provide an explanation for. It is precisely because each collective expectation is associated 
with a particular alliance of actors that the emergence of a new collective expectation will 
accordingly require its associated alliance to emerge and dominate various locations across 
the linked ecologies. Alternative visions will thus be overshadowed as long as the existing 
alliance remains intact and the hinges are still able to provide the necessary rewards to keep 
the members of the alliance together.  This situation only changes when either the alliance 
is undermined by the impacts of external events172 or the changes in the internal and 
                                                          
172 e.g. as in the case of the controversy over tax avoidance schemes committed by multinational 





temporal structures of the linked ecologies render the existing hinges incapable of providing 
the necessary rewards to members of the alliance173. 
Finally, Konrad (ibid. p.435) asserts that collective expectations, once accepted, can exert an 
image pressure on a wide range of actors to meet those expectations to “demonstrate an 
image of technologically competent”. Thus, image pressure is used to explain why some 
expectations are able to draw a great number of heterogeneous actors, who might not 
necessarily share an interest in contributing to those expectations. Evidence from the case 
study of the Copyright Hub, however, reveals that such pressure does not necessarily come 
from within an ecology, but instead, it can come from across the ecological boundaries174. 
Such cross-boundaries pressure may exert significant impact on actors even if the collective 
expectation has not yet become taken-for-granted. Moreover, it has been found that actors 
subscribe to expectations, which they appear to have no interest in, not simply because of 
the image pressure. Indeed, these actors subscribe to an expectation (or more precisely, a 
constellation of expectations) because of the rewards, which they are promised via the 
hinges that hold the alliance together. Hence, findings of the case study of the Copyright Hub 
also make significant contributions to furthering our understanding of the dynamics of 
expectations in innovation context.  
 
                                                          
173 For example, in the case of the Copyright Hub, when the coalition government handed over the 
baton to other political actors in 2015, a new rhythm of actors, locations and their associated ligation 
began in the ecology of policy making. Stimulating the economy was no longer at the top of the policy 
making agenda, nor were IP-related issues. As a result, the creative industries were relieved from the 
political pressure to commit to the Copyright Hub and it was indicated that they no longer wish to 
keep funding the Hub after 2015. These changes made the hinges, which previously worked for both 
the UK government and the creative industries, inadequate for providing the necessary rewards that 
keep the alliance between these actors together.  
174 e.g. the political pressure which made the creative industries come together to support the 
Copyright Hub was indeed coming from the policy making ecology, rather than being simply a ‘peer’ 
pressure from within the ecology of business. 
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III. The Formation and Dissolution of Protected Spaces 
The main aim of this section is to address the existing gap in our knowledge of “protected 
spaces” within the context of technical innovation. It is my attempt to provide new insights 
into the questions of how protected spaces should be conceptualised, how they are formed 
and dissolved, and what they leave behind when the protected space is no longer needed. 
To recapitulate, the most recent scholarship within the sociological studies of expectations 
which dealt explicitly with the notion of “protected spaces” was Rip and Schot’s (2002) 
visualisation of the innovation journey and application/adoption activities of a novel 
technology. In their model, Rip and Schot hypothesise that an innovation journey goes 
through three clusters of activities: (1) building a protected space; (2) stepping out into the 
wider world; and (3) making sector-level changes. With regard to protected spaces, Rip and 
Schot (ibid. p.162) argue that “the net effect of the networking and resource mobilisation is 
the emergence of a protected space for promising R&D”. Apparently, this oversimplified 
account of the emergence of a protected space offers us little insights into the mechanism 
through which the protected space is formed, let alone any understanding of the ways it will 
eventually be dissolved. Apart from that, Rip and Schot (ibid. p.163) hypothesise that work 
within the protected space “proceeds according to its own dynamics, with only occasional 
checks with the scenario of usage (if at all)”. It is argued that the dynamics of the protected 
space are dependent upon “the nature of the protected space, its boundary agreements, the 
rules and heuristics derived from the promises that were made, together determine choices 
and directions” (ibid.). Despite being informative, such a description does not lend us a 
systematic approach or an analytical framework to study the dynamics of the protected 
space. Since Rip and Schot’s work, no further study concerning the notion of “protected 
spaces” has been conducted. As a result, these issues still await to be tackled. 
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It is my intention to dedicate this section to address those shortcomings in Rip and Schot’s 
conceptualisation of the protected space. I propose adopting Abbott’s (1995) view on the 
relationship between social boundaries and social entities in order to reconceptualise the 
mechanism through which the protected space for innovation is formed and dissolved.  
In his seminal paper, Abbott proposes viewing the emergence of social entities as the result 
of the social actors’ act of tying various social boundaries together. In this perspective, 
boundaries come first, then entities. Abbott (ibid. p.863) calls these social boundaries “sites 
of difference”, whose differences are “things that emerge from local cultural negotiation”. 
Abbott describes this process of negotiation as social interactions which occur within a 
mixture of pre-existing social actors and actions. These pre-existing actors, nevertheless, do 
not remain unscathed after they enter the negotiation, but instead many actors change or 
disappear during the process, which results in the emergence of new actors, new relations, 
and new social entities amongst old parts. Such a process resembles what Abbott (2005, 
p.248) calls “ligation” or “the process of constructing the relations between actors and 
locations that in fact constitutes and delimits both actors and locations”. Thus, sites of 
difference emerge as a result of the ligation process, which place certain actors and locations 
within a social boundary while ruling others outside of it. Based on these arguments, a 
conception of the origin of social entities is presented, which revolves around the process of 
“yoking”, i.e. connecting various proto-boundaries together. It is further assumed that, when 
the social space is relatively unstructured (as in the case of the Copyright Hub), yoking means 
literal connection of boundaries. 
Applying this conceptual lens to studying the formation and dissolution of the protected 
space proves to be fruitful due to the systematic approach it provides to apprehend the issue. 
This approach suggests the first step to studying the emergence of the protected space is to 
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identify the key sites of difference, followed by the examination of the process of yoking in 
which social actors connecting those sites of difference together into a single social entity. 
The properties of those sites of difference and the ways they are yoked together are asserted 
to have significant impacts on the dynamics of the protected space, as well as providing 
explanation for the eventual dissolution of the protected space. 
In the case of the Copyright Hub, the three key sites of difference were identified as: (1) the 
Copyright Hub Ltd., (2) the Digital Catapult, and (3) the Linked Content Coalition (LCC). These 
sites emerged as sites of difference through a number of separated, yet somewhat 
interconnected, ligation processes. For the Copyright Hub Ltd., this site emerged from the 
local interaction between a wide range of businesses working in the creative industries, as 
well as between the creative industries and the UK government, which gradually placed the 
creative industries into the forefront of the battle for streamlining copyright licensing and 
stimulating the UK’s economy, while discouraging the government to use statutory 
intervention to directly intervene in the market. IP legislation was also defined in this ligation 
process as a well-functioning system that only needed to be simplified. For the Digital 
Catapult, this site emerged from the local interactions within the ecology of policy making, 
which delimited the government to use its funding and convening power to indirectly 
stimulate the economy through R&D and infrastructural development with the purpose of 
attracting investments from the private sector. For the LCC, it emerged from the ligation 
process which depicted copyright laws as a well-functioning legal framework, while insisting 
on the inherently complex nature of copyright itself. As a result, the creative industries were 
well placed within the discourse of simplifying and streamlining the (unnecessary) complexity 
of copyright, while policy makers were effectively ruled out of this process. Having identified 
the three key sites of difference, it became apparent that the dimensions of difference of 
these sites were not too dissimilar from one another. As a result, the process of yoking the 
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three sites together to create a protected space was somewhat smooth and 
unproblematic175. For example, the Digital Catapult was described as “a natural home for 
doing the development for the Copyright Hub”176, while the LCC and the Copyright Hub were 
asserted as having “a great deal of synergy at a deep level”177. Additionally, it is important to 
observe that the Copyright Hub Ltd., the Digital Catapult, and the LCC were “avatars” to the 
ecologies of business, policy making, and IP standard development. Since the alliance across 
the three ecologies had been well-established, these three sites of difference, or avatars, 
were used as a means through which resources and support for members of the alliances 
were provided. The successful establishment of the alliance across the linked ecologies was 
therefore the necessary pre-condition for the emergence of the protected space for further 
technical development. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the ways properties of the three sites and the ways they were 
yoked together had an impact on the dynamics of the protected space revealed even more 
interesting insights. With regard to the Copyright Hub – Digital Catapult partnership, the way 
these two sites were yoked was rather peculiar in that they assumed a fifty-fifty partnership. 
In other words, it was supposed to be an equal partnership whereby both partners assumed 
the same level of responsibility and influence over the development of the project. However, 
the relationship was significantly skewed towards the Digital Catapult due to the fact that 
they were the bigger organisation178. This resulted in the imbalance in authority over the 
project and consequently, inputs from the Copyright Hub Ltd. to the project were at times 
being totally ignored by the Digital Catapult. As Boyd – CTO of the Copyright Hub – recalled: 
                                                          
175 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section III. B. 
176 A quote from Selena (pseudonym) – the matchmaker of the Copyright Hub – Digital Catapult 
partnership. Cross-referencing page 201. 
177 A quote from Goldman (pseudonym) – the data architect of the LCC’s data model. Cross-
referencing page 238. 
178 Cross-referencing Chapter 5, section II. C., on Partnership with the Digital Catapult.  
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I had felt maybe I hadn’t said these things loudly enough, they [the Digital 
Catapult] couldn’t understand. But during the mediation [… the Digital Catapult 
revealed:] “No, no, we did hear you. We did hear you. We decided that you were 
wrong!” […] Their view was they owned the driving seat altogether because 
they’re the bigger organisation. (Transcript H8) 
Furthermore, as a publicly-funded organisation, the Digital Catapult was highly susceptible 
to assessment criteria put forward by its funder – the UK government. The most notable 
example of this kind of criteria was the number of SMEs the Digital Catapult had to engage 
with in the early stages of the project. As Young – the former CEO of the Copyright Hub – 
commented: 
The Digital Catapult had to find the way of delivering against the objectives they’ve 
been told. There were certain ones they had early on about numbers of SMEs that 
they were engaging with. It becomes a distorting factor. (Transcript H1) 
Since the Digital Catapult was the dominant site within the protected space, the need for the 
Digital Catapult to meet its objective with regard to SMEs engagement had a significantly 
distorting impact on shaping the technical development of the Copyright Hub project. As 
elaborated in Young’s recollection: 
The distraction was they [the Digital Catapult] had a mundane promise that they 
would have engaged with several hundred SMEs by certain dates. […] They’re 
desperate to find a way to sort of making that number add up because that was 
the deliverable of the day. And that became distorting because they want certain 
types of people, and not others. So, for example, they thought there were some 
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picture libraries, who they thought they could count all of their contributed 
photographers as SMEs they engaged with. (Transcript H1) 
Such imbalance in authority and misalignments in the deliverables and perception of success 
eventually undermined the connection between these two sites of difference. 
With regard to the LCC, this site of difference emerged from the long-term research of a 
community of IP standard developers, who wished to devise a data model that could 
accommodate all requirements with regard to automating right management on the 
Internet. As a result, there was always a tendency from the site of the LCC to over-engineer 
the data model. This aspect was reflected in the way the data model was regarded by its data 
architect as “DNA passes from one generation to another”179 and hence, justifying the reason 
for over-engineering. Nevertheless, the consequence of over-engineering was that it created 
a data model, which the Digital Catapult’s development team found to be too “verbose”, of 
“utmost sophistication”, and “conceptual and abstract” that “it’s not necessarily that nice of 
a model to implement”180. Such problem became even more acute since it did not fit with 
the immediate requirement of the Copyright Hub project, which was fairly simple in the early 
stages in term of technical functionality. This consequently led to various delays and 
problems during the technical development of the project, which eventually forced the 
Digital Catapult to switch to the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) – an alternative data 
model for policy expression language that could also be used for rights expression and 
management. The misalignments between the Digital Catapult, the Copyright Hub Ltd., and 
the LCC became too great that the connections between the three sites of difference were 
eventually broken up, resulting in the dissolution of the protected space. It was also not 
                                                          
179 Cross-referencing Chapter 6, section II., page 240. 
180 Cross-referencing Chapter 6, section III.  
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surprising for the dissolution of the protected space to occur after the alliance across the 
ecologies of policy making, business, and IP standard development was already weakened in 
late 2015 due to the coming into power of a new set of actors, locations, and ligations in the 
policy making ecology. 
To conclude, findings from the case study of the Copyright Hub have illustrated that it is 
fruitful to perceive the emergence of the protected space as a result of social actors yoking 
various key sites of difference together. By analysing the properties and the ways these sites 
were yoked, one can gain significant insights into the dynamics of the protected space, as 
well as providing explanation for the emergence and dissolution of these spaces. These 
findings also suggest that protected spaces do not necessarily shield all of its activities from 
outside interference, nor do they proceed according to their own dynamics with occasional, 
or even no, checking with the scenario of usage. In reality, sites of difference act as avatars 
for members of an alliance to provide support and resources across the ecological 
boundaries, and therefore, these sites are susceptible to any changes made to the alliance. 
Although this conceptualisation has not been comprehensively developed, I believe the 
findings in this section have illustrated that this is a promising approach to further our 
understanding on the crucial, yet still largely neglected, notion of the protected space. 
IV. Conclusion 
The case study of the Copyright Hub is a case of an innovation-in-the-making occurring at the 
intersection of the public and private sectors. This case represents a “niche” of innovation, 
in which complex relationships exist between a wide range of actors across multiple ecologies 
and where the project is subjected to divergent social, political and technical pressures. In 
such cases, the innovation, or technology in question, is normally reconceived over the 
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course of the project. An example of a similar area of innovation, where findings of the case 
study of the Copyright Hub could be applied to, is the development of novel technologies by 
the private sector for the National Health Service (NHS). Innovation in this area necessarily 
requires the participation of a wide range of actors (e.g. policy makers and health regulators, 
private and public institutions, entrepreneurs and data experts, medical practitioners and 
patients, etc.), occurring across multiple linked ecologies. As a result, these innovations are 
subjected to similar patterns and dynamics of expectations, which have been highlighted by 
the case study of the Copyright Hub. This thesis therefore makes the following three 
contributions to knowledge, which are not only applicable to studying the Copyright Hub, but 
they can also be applied to similar cases which fall in this particular niche of innovation. 
First, the case study of the Copyright Hub has illustrated that, apart from high expectations, 
other types of expectations are also employed by innovation actors to secure allies and 
mobilise resource in the context of technological innovation. In the case study of the 
Copyright Hub, low and slow expectations were specifically used to help propel the project. 
In particular, technological expectations of the Copyright Hub were strategically set low to 
preclude the creative industries from perceiving the initiative as a threat to their existing 
business model. Consequently, the Copyright Hub was able to secure support and mobilise 
resources from a great part of the creative industries for being an innocuous project. On the 
other hand, slow expectations were employed to help forge the alliances between actors 
across the three ecologies of policy making, business, and IP standard development. By 
committing to the slow development of an infrastructural project, the government was able 
to counter-balance the rapid rate of political bundling and hence, strengthening their control 
of the policy making process. For the creative industries, the slow expectations of the 
Copyright Hub help prolong and increase pressure on policy makers in order to maintain 
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legislation and court systems in their favour. Hence, slow expectations were able to act as a 
hinge, which provided dual rewards for members of the alliance in both ecologies at once. 
One key aspect of my theorisation using the linked ecologies perspective is that the 
exploitation of connections between ecologies is made possible by the mis-aligned 
temporalities of their expectation work. It is precisely because the ecologies of policy making, 
business and IP standard development are organised differently from one another with 
distinctive rhythms that they look for one another in search of alliances and support in the 
innovation space. 
Second, this thesis proposes using the linked ecologies perspective to transcend the 
conventional Ecology/ Audience model in studying expectations’ credibility. By replacing the 
notion of “audience” with the notion of “linked ecologies”, this perspective asserts that both 
sides are ecologies, whose actors actively seek support and alliances across their ecological 
boundaries. As a result, mandate for further technical work is not given simply because the 
selectors are convinced of the expectations voiced by enactors, as presumed in the Ecology/ 
Audience model. Rather, actors would provide mandate and support for their allies in 
exchange for rewards, which have been promised to them via established hinges. 
Consequently, the linked ecologies approach suggests that it is unproductive to theorise 
credibility as something that is intrinsic to expectations, which can be judged by the audience 
using external assessment criteria. Instead, the credibility of expectations should be gauged 
within the context of their own linked ecologies, in term of how well these expectations can 
provide hinges that help forge alliances between various actors across the ecological 
boundaries. 
Third, by applying Abbott’s approach to the relation between social boundaries and social 
entities, this thesis proposes a fruitful analytical approach to furthering our understanding of 
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“protected spaces”. It is asserted that the protected space is formed when social actors tying 
various sites of difference together to make a single social entity. As a result, by examining 
the properties of these sites and the ways they are yoked together, one would be able to 
gauge the dynamics of the protected space, as well as describing and explaining the 
mechanism through which the protected space is formed and dissolved. It is further 
suggested that protected spaces do not necessarily shield all of its activities from outside 
interference, nor do they proceed according to their own dynamics with little checking with 
the outside world. Instead, sites of difference act as avatars for social actors to provide 
support and resources to their allies in the technical development process, and therefore, 
these sites of difference are susceptible to any changes made to the alliance.  
With regard to ideas for future work, I was curious as to why there is a dominance of studies 
on high expectations in the literature of sociology of expectations. One possible answer to 
this question might lie in the dominant choice of research designs and methodological 
approaches to studying expectations thus far. A quick review of the literature suggests that 
sociological studies of expectations are usually conducted in a retrospective manner due to 
a semi-intuitive argument that things “can only be detected ex post” (Ruef and Markard, 
2010, p.319). As a result, scholars studying expectations usually rely on people’s recollections 
of the distant past (for instance, Brown and Michael, 2003) and/or historical review of 
publicly available data sources (Hedgecoe and Martin, 2003; Nerlich and Halliday, 2007; Selin, 
2007; Ruef and Markard, 2010; to mention a few), which include databases, websites, 
newspapers, reports, scientific publications, professional magazines and so on. The problem 
of using retrospective memories to study innovation process is that people tend to forget a 
wide array of organisational, rhetorical and material contingencies, which were once crucial 
to the shaping of the technology in the past. These contingencies are often discarded as 
peripheral “noise” from which the “victorious” technology emerges (Deuten and Rip, 2000). 
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The consequence of such a recollection process is that the presence of multiple types of 
expectations are erased from the re-constructed narrative, while optimistic expectations are 
more likely to be remembered and preserved, as evident in (Brown and Michael, 2003). 
Publicly available data sources are also prone to being biased towards high expectations, 
since innovation actors tend to make strong claims about the potential of their work while 
wearing the “entrepreneurial hat” in public. When amongst their peers, however, they often 
express a more-cautious and less-certain view on the subject (Brown and Michael, 2003, 
p.13). As a result, using publicly available data sources, especially websites, newspapers and 
magazines could mislead the researcher into overlooking other equally important types of 
expectations besides the optimistic ones. 
This observation brings up the challenge of devising or adopting a new approach to study 
technological changes, which enables researchers to capture a wide range of expectations 
and the ways their complex interactions help shape the innovation’s trajectory. From the 
methodological point of view, the research should be designed to allow researchers to study 
innovation and expectations at the moments of their making or immediate past without 
losing the benefits of hindsight and historical data, as well as permitting the scholar to 
infiltrate into the inner circle of enactors to elicit their (often hidden and contradicting) views. 
Although the adoption of the BOAP approach and the linked ecologies perspective in this 
thesis have provided a number of helpful suggestions as to how such a subtle and reflexive 
approach to study innovation-in-the-making should be developed, the extensive effort 
required to develop such a methodological/ theoretical framework apparently lies beyond 
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7. Who play the important role in bridging the gap between two organisations? 
8. What about Linked Content Coalition? 




10. It is claimed that the establishment of the Copyright Hub is for the benefits of all: licensors, 





From Executive Board 
11. You have been in the business for a very long time. In your opinion, what tipped the socio-
political argument toward favouring the Hub’s solution to copyright over conventional 
argument of changing the law? 
12. How the Hub has evolved from Hargreaves’ DCE, to the Copyright Hub on Hooper’s report, 
and the Copyright Hub now? What are the differences? 
From Governance Working Group (WG) 
13. It is important to make the Hub Ecosystem a trusted environment and be worthy of that 
trust. How can this be achieved? 
14. In the briefing paper of the Governance WG, it is mentioned that the Copyright Hub’s 
operations will be “not for profit”, “not financed by direct participation in revenue streams 
from licensing” and has “its own position to the market will be as ‘light touch’ as possible”. 
So, how will the Copyright Hub operate in reality?  
15. Can you tell me more about the Hub’s current funding scheme? What is the European 
funding for the Copyright Hub? 
16. In the briefing, it is said that: 
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a. The Hub’s ambition is remaking the mechanism of copyright licensing in the age of 
Internet. 
b. It’s done by making the basic functions of copyright licensing work in the same way 
as the Internet. 
c. It is also acknowledged that technology is only a tool. At the heart of the Hub’s 
vision is the political, economic and social argument of the benefits of copyright to 
civil society as a whole.  
Note:  
This argument seems to suggest that if key stakeholders are convinced of the benefits of copyright and 
the right type of foundation technologies are developed, the remaking of copyright licensing can be 
achieved. However, the report of Education Workstream under CHLG showed that, at least in the 
educational sector, both the licensors (i.e. collecting agencies and CMOs) and licensees (i.e. educational 
organisations) have “considerable distance before ecommerce become the norm” and “most schools 
are not prepared to make online payment”. Another recent study of the French recorded music industry 
seems to suggest that institutional maintenance is working against the digital revolution.  
There seems to be more obstacles to the Hub’s success than just convincing key stakeholders of 
values of copyright and developing the right technologies. What do you think?   
17. It is also mentioned that the Hub cannot undertake this task by itself but need “the 
alignment of many competing political, economic and social interests”. Is there any detailed 
strategy for completing this task? 
From Technical Working Group 
18. In the Blueprint document (p.18), openness is particularly emphasised and it is said that “the 
technical underpinnings of the Copyright Hub will be ‘open’… in the form of Open Source 
Software or as Open Standards”. Who made this decision? Through what process? Why? 
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19. Can you tell me the process of choosing and developing reference applications/ use cases of 
the Copyright Hub?  
20. How are these reference models tested? By whom? Using what criteria? How can the 
successes of these models be evaluated? 
21. Can you show me the demonstrator? 
22. What do you think will be the most challenging obstacles for the Hub to overcome in order 
to succeed? 
23. What is the plan for the next few months? 
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Appendix D –  
An example of the Research Diary 
This appendix displays the research diary, which the researcher meticulously kept throughout his fieldwork. The example presented here is composed of 
fieldnotes of the first fieldwork trip to London between 12th and 16th January 2015. These pages showcase: 
• A general interview schedule, which the researcher prepared in advance to help guide interviewing activities during the trip. 
• The ways the researcher arranged his work and interviews throughout the week. 
• The kind of note the researcher took during his interviews with research participants. 
• The kind of note the researcher wrote after an interview had been completed. 































Appendix E - 
Scribble of off-the-record conversations  
This appendix showcases a few examples of off-the-record conversations which the researcher logged during his fieldwork. The scribble contains exchanges 
between the researcher and (1) an executive officer of the Mary Evans Picture Library, (2) a director and co-founder of Soundmouse, and (3) a senior manager 
from BBC. These examples were selected to highlight the ways insights obtained from the latter two exchanges help triangulate and put into perspective the 



















Appendix F – An 














Appendix G –  







Appendix H – An example of How Ideas were Developed through 
a Conference Paper 
 
This appendix illustrates the process through which the researcher developed further ideas for his thesis from the collected data and preliminary analysis 
through presentations, conference papers, and drafts of journal papers. The example shown here presents the thinking process behind a conference paper, 
which was submitted to the 4th Innovation in Information Infrastructure (III) workshop. In this paper, the researcher regarded the Copyright Hub initiative as 
an attempt to develop a new e-Infrastructure, whose properties are distinctively different from traditional computerised systems (i.e. large-scale, a wide 
array of (unexpected) users and uses, longevity). Consequently, the analytical vocabularies provided by Actor-Network Theory (e.g. heterogeneity, 
heterogeneous engineering, etc.) were inadequate to help study the Copyright Hub, and hence, the need for adopting the Biography of Artefacts (BoA) 
approach. It is shown here that the idea of engaging the Copyright Hub case study from the linked ecologies perspective was tested and began to take shape. 
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